


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6 APRIL 1989



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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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First Secretary Masaliyev's Speech at Kirghiz CP CC Plenum

18300280a *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 29 Dec 88 p 1

[KirTAG report on speech by A. M. Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz CP Central Committee: "The Central Committee Buro Information Report at the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Plenum 'On the Reorganization of the Republic's Party Organs Apparatus'; date and place not specified]

[Text] Comrades:

In light of the decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, which recognized the necessity of the fundamental restructuring of all the party's activities and bringing the party organizations' forms and methods of work into conformity with the new tasks, the June (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, as you know, adopted a resolution "On the Basic Directions of the Restructuring of the Party Apparatus." Emphasized in it was the important significance of a clear-cut differentiation of the functions of party committees and state and economic organs and the overcoming of parallelism and duplication in their work. Also intended is a radical change in the structure of the party apparatus, with attention being paid to the improvement of its quality and the strict subordination and accountability of its elective organs to the party."

The main point of the restructuring of the party organs' work, as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev emphasized at the Central Committee Plenum, is to have them concern themselves with truly party affairs and political, organizational and ideological work and be closer to the people.

The profound changes should apply to all aspects of party life—from the shaping of its ranks to the implementation of personnel policy. The essence of these changes is made up of a sharp turn in the direction

of democratization, the complete restoration of Leninist standards for party building, a Leninist understanding of political leadership and the party's place and role in a socialist society, the establishment of such political mechanisms and guarantees as would preclude the possibility of violations of the Leninist principles of party leadership in the future.

Starting with the Leninist concept of the party as the political, ideological and moral vanguard of the working class and of all the workers, the 19th party conference emphasized in particular the necessity of excluding from the party work's practice command-and-order methods, duplication of and substitution for the state and economic organs and strict adherence to principle: the CPSU pursues its own political course through the communists, who work in the various spheres of society's life, and through the party organizations, which are active in practically every labor collective, strictly

observing the democratic principles, upon which Soviet society is based, and the requirements of the USSR's Constitution and Soviet laws.

The CPSU Central Committee has set the task of reorganizing the party apparatus' structure and of reducing and renovating it, having provided an influx of fresh forces from the ranks of politically mature workers, who are more trained in the professional sense and who are staunch supporters of perestroika, possessing high moral qualities.

Starting with these directives, as well as the CPSU Central Committee's resolution of 10 September, 1988, "On the Reorganization of the Local Party Organs' Apparatus," the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro is implementing practical measures for improving the structure of the apparatus of the Central Committee and the republic's other party committees. In particular, we have abandoned splitting up the apparatus according to the sectorial principle and we are quantitatively and qualitatively strengthening the sections and sectors which have been called upon to carry out the political, organizational and educational functions and conduct the current work on the realization and monitoring of the execution of the adopted decisions; and on the rendering of assistance to subordinate organizations in their activities.

Of the party committees, their apparatus is now required, first of all, to put into practice the party line on the revolutionary renovation of society and to act creatively using the methods of ideological and educational work, without being guardians and without fettering the local party units. The party apparatus' work should be more and more distinguished by business-like efficiency, openness, a critical attitude and daily communication with the masses.

Extremely important at this stage of the party's activities are such party apparatus functions as the careful study and generalization of the practice of party work under the new conditions, the analysis of the processes, which are occurring in the political, economic, social and

intellectual spheres, and the assistance in the propagation of the best practices.

Proceeding from this point, the Kirghiz CP Central Committee Buro, in agreement with the CPSU Central Committee, formed within the make-up of the apparatus of the Central Committee and the party obkoms the following departments: Organizational Party and Personnel Work; Ideological; Socio-Economic; Agrarian; State and Legal and General. Retained have been the Administration of Affairs and the Party Control Commission (until the establishment of a control and auditing commission). We consider it also necessary to have in the apparatus of the Central Committee (four people) and in the party obkoms (two people each) groups of inspectors who will work under the direct supervision of the Central

Committee Secretariat and the party obkoms' secretariats. Thus, the number of departments is being reduced from 15 to 8, while the number of primary workers is being reduced from 139 to 114.

The apparatus structure of the party obkoms will be similar to that of the Central Committee's apparatus. As you know, the Talas Party Obkom has been abolished and, in place of the Issyk-Kul and Naryn obkoms, a new one has been established—the Issyk-Kul Obkom.

In the Osh Party Obkom, instead of 70 workers, 67 have been retained, while, in the Issyk-Kul [obkom], there are 57 instead of the 88 which were in the two abolished obkoms. The Kirghiz CP Central Committee requested that (a second category be established for the Issyk-Kul Obkom). Our request has been supported by the CPSU Central Committee.

Taking into account the abolishment of the two obkoms and the reduction in the Central Committee's apparatus, it was proposed that 104 staff positions be cut, or 33.2 percent. The Kirghiz CP Central Committee submitted a proposal to the CPSU Central Committee CPSU due to this aimed at strengthening the apparatus of a number of party gorkoms and raykoms by 16 staff positions.

As a result, there was a reduction of 88 regular positions or 27 percent of the strength of the apparatus of the Central Committee and the party obkoms.

In connection with the reduction and renovation of the party apparatus, questions arose regarding the judicious use of the released workers. They were sent from the Kirghiz CP Central Committee apparatus to strengthen subordinate party committees and soviet and economic organs. Thus, Comrade R.N. Abdysamatov, chief of the Central Committee's Culture Department, was elected first secretary of the Dzhahal-Abad Gorkom, Comrade Zh. Turdubayev, chief of the Central Committee's Agriculture and Food Industry Department, was elected first secretary of the Naukatskiy Party Raykom, and Comrades B.V. Perfilov and A.A. Rysmendiyeu, chiefs of the Central Committee's industrial departments, have been confirmed as department chiefs of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers.

A number of workers have been assigned to supervisory work in the State Agro-Industrial Committee and the republic's ministries and departments.

In conformity with the CPSU Central Committee's directives, the following departments have been established in the Kirghiz CP's Frunze Gorkom: Organizational, Ideological, Socio-Economic, General and a Party Commission. At the same time, the number of primary workers has been reduced from 29 to 26 people.

There are no plans for a reduction in the remaining party gorkoms and raykoms. Within the apparatus of these committees, organizational and ideological departments,

clerical sections and party commissions have been established. In the Osh and Przhevalsk Party Gorkoms, in addition, a Socio-Economic [Department] has been established, while Agrarian Departments have been established in the Sokulukskiy and Kara-Suyskiy committees.

We are now studying the matter of the establishment of Central Committee commissions for important lines of work. We will submit a proposal to a regular Central Committee Plenum.

In the course of the conducted reorganization, the party apparatus needs to be freed decisively from extra functions. Our responsibilities are changing substantially now, starting with the Central Committee's first secretary and ending with the party raykom and gorkom instructor. It is necessary to attach more dynamism to the party apparatus' work, along with greater specificity and timeliness, in solving such pressing matters of perestroika as the Food Program, the acceleration of housing construction and increasing the volumes of consumer goods production and services. At the same time, greater depth and consistency must be provided in the solving of prospective problems and in predicting the development of the social and political processes and so on.

We should not become dissipated and expend our forces and energy on the compiling of various inquiries and the conducting of meetings and debates. Everything associated with the realization of the current plan tasks, the integrated department programs and the coordination of the efforts of the ministries and departments in solving regional economic and social problems needs to be taken up by the republic's Council of Ministers, the corresponding Soviets of People's Deputies and their local executive committees.

We should all well understand that the reorganization of the party apparatus can not be regarded as a simple organizational action, the implementation of which by itself will introduce fundamental changes into all our work. This is just a precondition, extremely important, but, all the same a precondition for the changes, starting from a position which will make it possible to raise the party's leadership in all spheres of society's affairs to a much higher level.

It is precisely to all these things that I want to pay particular attention. Indeed, no one has relieved us of the responsibility for either the solving of economic problems or for raising the people's living standards and especially for implementing political reform in society and for the organizational and ideological support of perestroika.

Another matter is that we are faced with solving these problems using a smaller number of workers and, in a new fashion, without going into details, political methods. In order to do this, we should all learn to work, and to teach

others to do so, with constant and self-critical evaluation of the individual work performed so that each person can increase the individual contribution to common matters.

The times require that the party committees and ideological organizations creatively reinterpret the forms and methods of their own activities and open up a lot of elbow-room for the initiative and activism of the communists.

Once again, it is necessary to emphasize that success in party work in its current stage—a stage that is very important and complicated—can be ensured only by politically mature and well-trained personnel who have high moral and business-like qualities and are capable of organizing matters in a new fashion and creatively.

In connection with this, competent political party fighters, capable in the final result of bringing our party organs to a qualitatively new state and imparting to them the status of organs of truly political leadership, should enter the party apparatus.

In the bustle of everyday life, we must not forget that party personnel, beginning with the Central Committee's apparatus and ending with the local party organizations, have a special political responsibility for current affairs. A responsibility for advancing perestroika, not by empty words and slogans, but by practical deeds, and for subsequently putting the party policies into practice. This has always been important. This is twice as important today, when our entire society is at a revolutionary turning point and has begun to stir into action.

From this comes the urgent necessity for each of us, regardless of position and rank, to work with a maximum of effort and maximum responsibility in a results-oriented fashion—in the interests of perestroika and socialism.

Comrades:

The restructuring of the party apparatus does not mean a narrowing of its activities or forgetting one or another of the problems. On the contrary, the party apparatus has been called upon to intensify its own

influence on the work of other organs, acting through their communists.

Large, crucial problems remain to be solved in industry, in agriculture and in the social sphere. In 1989, we must increase the production of national income by 4.1 percent, basically through an increase in the productivity of social labor.

One feature of the new plan is the intensification of its social orientation. Using all available financing sources, the construction has been planned of 1,529,000 square meters of housing. The output of consumer goods will increase by more than 300 million rubles as against the 5-year plan.

In the agro-industrial complex, plans have been made for bringing the purchases of cattle and poultry, taking into account the targets of the last Central Committee Plenum, up to 280,000 tons and milk to 575,000 tons, which exceeds the 5-year plan by 18 and 10.6 percent respectively.

In order to do this, it is necessary to take great pains and to ensure the efficient work of all the links. But, in some places, things are still being done the old way.

Take, for example, the wintering of cattle. In a number of rayons, it is proceeding in an unsatisfactory manner. The non-productive waste of animals is being tolerated, as is the reduction in the milk yield.

The party committees need to shift the center of gravity of all organizational and political work to the farms. It is necessary to adopt measures for the establishment of good living conditions for the livestock farmers and to improve their trade, cultural and domestic services. Soviet and economic organs must actively join together in solving these problems.

Since January, all sectors of the economy have been shifting to self-financing and self-support [samookupayemost] and new collectives will be established which will operate on a hiring contract basis. There are still unsolved problems in housing construction and the introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress in industry.

Perestroika has entered into a period when more serious and effective ideological support of practical actions is required. The party organizations need to keep their fingers on the pulse of life, to react rapidly to changes in public opinion and to retain the initiative in their own hands.

The paramount task is the utmost strengthening of discipline and the consolidation of the social state system and its legal foundations. This is the path to the harmonious combining of democracy and order and

of the citizens' rights and obligations. We can not tolerate a slide toward anarchy and aimless rally-holding. Debates and discussions, as practice shows, become a creative force only when they are supplemented by an improvement in matters.

Comrades:

Perestroika has breathed powerful animating forces into the people and increased their activism. Proof of this is the participation in the first stage of the expanded preparations for the elections of the USSR People's Deputies. The duty of the party committees is to ensure the conducting of the election campaign on a broad democratic basis so that truly deserving people become deputies.

**UzSSR: Background on Khabibullayev
Misconduct, Exposure**

*18300318 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 Feb 89 p 3*

[Article by G. Dimov, IZVESTIYA special correspondent, Tashkent: "Request For Resignation"]

[Text] In its issue No 24 for 1989, IZVESTIYA reported that P. Khabibullayev, chairman of the Uzbek Supreme Council Presidium, had resigned. The editors have received a number of letters from the readers with a request to describe what triggered this decision and what were the real reasons! The following article is in answer to their request.

M. Zakhidov, university party committee secretary, addressed the Tashkent City Party Conference, which was held at the beginning of December. On his speech the press said only that "The speaker said that the question of the selection of cadres to leading positions remains open.... The former president of the Academy of Sciences paid no attention to uprooting negative phenomena."

It was clear to everyone that the delegate was discussing not only the former president of the Academy but the present chairman of the presidium of the republic's supreme council. His speech included the following:

"My speech at the rayon conference was suppressed. The reaction of the party authorities is puzzling. This is on the eve of the elections of people's deputies. An error was made by promoting Comrade Khabibullayev to his high position, an error which must not be exacerbated."

Pulat Kirgizbayevich Khabibullayev became director of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Nuclear Physics. That year in the history of the institute was marked by two events: the reconstruction of the reactor was completed and the physics building was fantastically decorated with wood carvings and ornamental murals. Both were later linked to the activities of the new boss. It is true that no one could share the director's credit when it came to decorating the facade of the building, for he personally had drawn up the sketches, and contracted with the Applied Arts Combine. Having taken over the nuclear institute, it was he who cut the ribbon on the occasion of the completion of the reactor's reconstruction. That was all. However, some 3 years later P. Khabibullayev became the laureate of the Uzbek SSR State Prize imeni Biriuni, for having managed the entire project. A while later, already as one of the noted scientists in the country, and developer of a "new type of structure for high temperature reactors," he was awarded a bonus and the gold medal of the United Nations World Patent Organization.

As a mark of official flattery, he then began to be described as an outstanding nuclear physicist.

However, man does not live by atom alone. After opportunities had appeared for gene engineering, here as well Pulat Kirgizbayevich was able to carve a place for himself. As early as the mid-1970s, based on a contract with the Novosibirsk Organic Chemistry Institute, the Radkopreparat Enterprise of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Nuclear Physics, began the production of isotopes which could affect genes. The project involved institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the then USSR Glavmedbioprom. The technology for the production of isotopes was mastered.

In its 13 June 1982 issue (No 163/164), IZVESTIYA described the project in detail in the article "Molecular Surgeons." It described the enthusiasts of this new project, working in Novosibirsk, Tashkent, and Moscow. Naturally, Pulat Kirgizbayevich was not among them. However, as was the case with the reactor, 3 years later, once the project and been nominated for the USSR State Prize, it was once again P.K. Khabibullayev who acted as its head. By then he was already not only director of the Nuclear Physics Institute but also president of the Academy.

At that point there also was a rumor concerning the contribution which P.K. Khabibullayev had made to world science. Once again, we do not remember his denying it.

The next year, in 1987, another project—the development and series production of chromium containing scandium shells for instruments using quantum electronics—was nominated for the USSR State Prize. Here again the main developer was that same individual. He subsequently was to admit that "yes, this was not very modest."

When the latest elections for the Union Academy were announced he, naturally, knew that there would be a vacancy for a specialist in power industry and, at the suitable moment, he invited himself to the forthcoming circuit session which was to be held by the USSR Academy of Sciences in this area. Soon afterwards the session was held in Tashkent. All of this was properly organized, with rich receptions and trips. One month later, the Academy president and doctor of sciences in acoustics became corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the field of power industry.

The period of his presidency was marked by the appearance of new scientific centers in the Academy and an improvement in its structure. However, science did not benefit greatly from all this. According to G. Chernov, doctor of sciences at the Nuclear Physics Institute, "In many of the key positions within the academic system, in both the natural and social sciences, the tone was set primarily by either creatively sterile or shameless pushy people, sometimes bordering on the edge of corruption, people with so-called "higher qualifications." They also blocked the influx of fresh, strong and truly modern scientists. This situation was worsened by the archaic electoral system prevailing in the Academy."

Hardly anywhere else had talent become so openly depersonalized as here. Under the guise of combining sciences and, frequently, for reasons of greed, the "collective" nature of labor, in its most pejorative meaning, was raised to a cult. As director of the Nuclear Physics Institute, naturally, Pulat Kirgizbayevich promoted all areas of development of the Institute. However, was this a reason for considering as "his own" any decent results obtained by the collective? Yet, that is precisely the way he started behaving and, I believe, it is precisely because of this that this leader lost track of what he was doing.

"I am familiar with works signed by P. Khabibullayev," wrote Doctor of Sciences A. Mukhamedzhanov, head of the department of theoretical physics, an alumni of Moscow State University and one of the leading scientists at the Institute. "In the field of nuclear physics alone his works cover 12 sectors, which would be inconceivable even to a leading light. Yet he is not a specialist in any one of these areas...."

In the course of his tenure in leading positions, as a co-author, not only with his subordinates but also with noted scientists from the center (there are indications that sponsorship and favoritism could be the subject of a separate study and not only for the local but also the Union Academy), P. Khabibullayev published 322 articles and nine monographs. At a discussion of his accomplishments, one would tap one's forehead and agree that, "apparently he went too far."

Now everything has been clarified. What was not taken into consideration, however, was the most important and major fact: the harm which was caused to science in the republic and how much insincerity and untruth, subservience and fraud occurred on the basis of such co-authorship, affecting, in particular, young scientific workers. They obligingly added the name of the boss or put his name ahead of their own so that, behind this cover, bypassing others, they could see their names in print, speed up the defense of their titles and advance in their jobs.

He borrowed from the previous managers anything which could conceivably promote his career. He personally tried not to reciprocate. Rashidov's son-in-law became his right hand as first deputy director of the Nuclear Physics Institute. The son of the then chairman of the Council of Minister, N. Khudayberdyev, who had recently graduated from the Institute, was promoted to head of laboratory within 3 years. And the moment I. Usmankhodzhayev assumed leadership of the republic, his wife became a member of the Nuclear Physics Institute and over a period of 3 years was paid a salary without doing virtually any work. Well, as they say, the debt was paid: it was under Usmankhodzhayev that Pulat Kirgizbayevich reached his scientific and administrative Olympus as president of the Academy.

At the congress of the republic's communist party, the president of the Academy knifed the "exes" in the back: "Science, the higher school and public health have been swarmed by the children and relatives of highly placed parents. Family relations and mutual guarantees have seriously hindered the involvement of truly talented people in science." But who more than he had contributed to this situation? And everything was done on a calculated basis, with complete understanding of the situation. When Rashidov fell his son-in-law immediately disappeared from the Institute. The same system was applied subsequently in replacing other relatives of officials who had become compromised.

Two years ago, at the local exhibition of achievements of the national economy, the Academy president was displaying for the benefit of the leadership of the republic the most efficient scientific advances. He praised the Institute of Polymer Chemistry and Physics and its director. Generally speaking, the praise was deserved. One year later, however, he dismissed him. It was clear to all that the president was distancing himself from the previous director only because the director was Rashidov's daughter, although it was precisely she, as stated by noted scientists, who was right for that position by virtue of her qualifications and organizational talents. However, Pulat Kirgizbayevich was already being quoted as possible chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and God forbid that something should go wrong: better to overdo than to underdo.

The new president of the republic was visited by his academic colleagues and some of them, in his waiting room, would worry: Had they forgotten the right time or had they done something wrong in the past? Sitting behind the tables in the reception room were those same people who had been members of the scientific staff, secretaries, and assistants. Conscientious and experienced personnel of the apparatus of the Supreme Soviet Presidium were mercilessly, and for no reason, replaced by the president. The technical secretaries who had been transferred from the Academy were immediately promoted to highly salaried positions as advisors.

The president resigned after no more than 9 months of work. What the people thought was, How could we have appointed him? Where were we looking?

We know how he was elected: the vote was based on the long familiar prescription: "Who is against?" "Abstaining?" "No one." All of this took 30 seconds. Where were the people looking when they recommended him? They were looking at the references. What tempted them to vote for P. Khabibullayev? Was it his age, energy, regalia, or official characteristics? In all likelihood, all of these put together. However, at this point this is not the main thing.

Let us imagine that soon after the rayon or city party conference, at which Khabibullayev would be discussed, he would turn to the newspaper: criticism addressed at

him could not be ignored only because he happens to be one of the leaders of the republic. These are different times and, whether he agrees or disagrees with the criticism, he would ask for a commission to be set up.

The outcome, in all likelihood, would be the same as it is now: the facts may be obvious. However, the judgment of one's conscience might have been milder. Rumors would be squelched and that would be a lesson for others, including the party press, for this would settle such an unusual situation which had developed in the party's life.

This would be unlikely! Arrogance and a false sense of honor had blinded him. He became enraged: some petty teacher, candidate of some sort, dared speak out against him openly, against the president of the republic and vice-president of the country?

On the day after the first rayon conference, M. Zakhidov was summoned to the presidium of the Academy and delicately asked about what he had said. This was followed by frequent messengers sent by different influential individuals. They appealed to his conscience, they advised him not to kick up a row. The "boss would not forgive this." It is true that after the city conference the passions cooled off and a commission went to work. The point was, who would prevail?

Traditionally, on the eve of the new year, members and corresponding members of the Academy are invited to tea and the most pressing problems of the recent past are discussed in the light of perestroyka. This time, however, the more pressing problem prevailed. "At the traditional New Year's meeting," M. Salakhitdinov, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences president reported, "a number of academicians and corresponding members discussed with indignation...." What they discussed was described in a "14 page addendum."

The first variant of the collective academic process was signed by Vice-Presidents O. Lebedev, Z. Yusupov and Z. Salimov, by M. Yunus, director of the Nuclear Institute and academy corresponding member, and M. Ashurov, party committee secretary at the Institute and candidate of sciences. Since this was judged insufficient, academicians were visited at home. Some among them were helped to avoid prosecution in court and others were promoted. In either case, even those who knew the truth but were unwilling to speak up signed. It was thus that 40 signatures were collected.

What was the reason for the "indignation" of the people at the reception, and what was said in the "platform of the 40?" Here is what: "The determining feature of perestroyka is the democratic and interested consideration by party members and the public of problems submitted for discussion.... This has nothing in common with the positive cleansing processes... which are an example of a blunt political demagoguery contained in the speech by M. Zakhidov at the rayon and city party

conferences," behind which "one could see a group of individuals whose objective, using slander, was to discredit one of the major scientists and leaders of the republic...." and so on, item after item, rejecting all charges against him as being lies, lies and more lies.

This letter was issued on 10 January. On 23 January, however, when the results of the consideration of the speech by party member Zakhidov, considered by the Central Committee Buro became known, a new letter was sent to the same address:

"To the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee:

"Considering that Comrade Khabibullayev, P.K. admitted his errors, we request that the note on this problem, presented in 14 pages, be withdrawn."

Whom to accuse now? They could only blame themselves, although no one could thank Pulat Kirgizbayevich as well: he knew of the organized gathering of signatures in defense of his sins and he did not stop it but, instead, encouraged it. He refused the republic commission and insisted on "an alternate" commission from Moscow. Those who gathered the signatures as well hinted that Moscow would justify him. However, these hopes were not justified, for times now are different. The commission, therefore, reached the conclusion it was bound to reach. All charges leveled against Pulat Kirgizbayevich were proven to be true.

What can we say, the decision taken by P. Khabibullayev to resign was legitimate. It was a good thing that he realized that it was better for him to do it by himself. However, the aspiration of his colleagues to protect him by hook or by crook is an alarming symptom. It proves that many more efforts will be required to reject the difficult legacy of the recent past, when the law, the truth and morality were easily sacrificed to the whims of those in power. The supporters of the old order find it difficult to surrender their positions, should they decide openly to confront the new situation.

P.K. Khabibullayev's request to be transferred to scientific work was granted. The 52-year old academician of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences now, obviously, will head one of the leading laboratories of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences Thermophysics Department he created himself. It is to be hoped that this will mark the beginning of his new and healthy career which will consolidate as his credit that which he had truly contributed to science. As to the question of his resignation from the position of presidium chairman, it will be considered at an extraordinary session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

Marat Teshayevich Zakhidov, candidate of physical and mathematical sciences, and deputy party committee secretary at the university, is the president's "evil genius." "For reasons of his principle-mindedness and party

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openness, and for asserting the principles of democracy and glasnost and for an unbroken spirit in the struggle for the truth and the ability to express the feelings of the people," as reads the decree of the pre-electoral meeting

held by the collectives of Sabir-Rakhimovskiy Rayon, he was nominated candidate for people's deputy of the USSR for the national-territorial district No 117 in Tashkent.

Readers Ask About Town Name Changes, Past Debt, Stalin's Life

18300381 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian
No 8, 25 Feb-3 Mar 89 p 8

[Letters from readers with replies from ARGUMENTY I FAKTY]

[Text] *We now have many cities named for political figures: Kalinin, Sverdlovsk, Voroshilovgrad, etc. When did this campaign begin?*

[Signed] A. Afonyushkin, Town of Zarya, Moscow Oblast

The first such name changes occurred in the early 1920s.

On February 14, 1923, the VTsIK decreed to change the name of the city of Gatchina to Trotsk (in honor of L. Trotskiy who at the time was Narkom [Minister] of the Ministry of the Navy and Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council). The action marked the 5th anniversary of the suppression of the Kerenskiy-Krasnov rebellion and the founding of the RKKA [the Workers and Peasants' Red Army]. During those troubled days of November 1917 Trotskiy arrested Krasnov in Gatchina.

Later, when Trotskiy was expelled from the USSR in 1929, the city that bore his name became Krasnogvardeysk (until 1944).

In 1924, a city of Zinovyevsk appeared on the map. It was Elisavetgrad, the native city of G.Ye. Zinovyev, renamed in his honor. In 1934 the name of the city was changed once more, to Kirovograd.

In 1925, Tsaritsyn became Stalingrad.

In this regard, I would like to stress two points. None of the above-mentioned individuals objected to such name changes. The second point is those actions alone were already a deviation from Lenin's principles. Trotskiy, Zinovyev and Stalin all subscribed to the leader-worship doctrine which was later to nourish the cult of personality. It is not surprising, therefore, that when Stalin's cult became reality in the early 1930s a wave of name changes of cities, rayons, factories, plants and streets, to honor those who made up the leader's closest entourage, swept the nation.

[Signed] A. Loginov

Will state obligations for USSR economic development issued in 1953-56 be repaid?

[Signed] O. Razgulyayev, Tashkent

The following information was provided to us by the USSR Ministry of Finance:

"The 1989 USSR state budget calls for full repayment of state borrowings of 1953, totaling R1.4 billion. The exact date when repayments will begin is being discussed.

State borrowings of 1954-56 will be repaid when required material and financial resources are found."

Please provide more information on Stalin's second wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva.

[Signed] T. Pindus, Ivano-Frankovsk

You write that Stalin did not attend his wife's funeral. Other publications, however, maintain that he did. Who is right?

[Signed] N. Pavlov, Town of Maksatikha, Kalinin Oblast

We asked Candidate of Sciences in History A. Kolesnik, the author of the articles on Stalin's children (see AIF, Nos 41 and 46, 1988, and No 1, 1989), to answer these questions.

According to Stalin's family legend, in 1903 Iosif Dzhu-gashvili saved a 2-year old Nadya Alliluyeva when she played on the Baku embarkment and fell into the sea.

They met 14 years later: a young schoolgirl and a 37-year old revolutionary exile who had just come back to Petrograd from Siberia. For a while, Alliluyeva worked in Lenin's office and visited the South Front.

The union of I. Stalin and N. Alliluyeva could not be called a happy one. The spouses frequently fought. On several occasions N. Alliluyeva left her husband, taking the children with her. Not long before her death, she even spoke of going to live with her relatives after finishing the Industrial Academy where she was studying at the time.

N. Alliluyeva unquestionably knew her husband's affairs. What did she find out about him? What did she learn that made her life impossible? We may never know that. Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva died on the night of November 7, 1932.

Three hypotheses about her death exist. The first one is that she shot herself, the second that she was shot by Stalin and the third that she was shot on his orders. The two latter ones may never be proven due to lack of documents.

N. Khrushchev, who studied with N. Alliluyeva and knew her, later wrote: "...I had a great respect for... Nadezhda Alliluyeva. She was so much unlike Stalin..."

"Later Nadya committed suicide. She died in mysterious circumstances. But, no matter how she died, the cause of her death was some action by Stalin..."

The question whether or not Stalin attended his wife's funeral did not come up accidentally. A number of sources maintain that he did. Some Moscow residents who witnessed N. Alliluyeva's funeral on November 10, 1932, also claim that they saw Stalin walking behind the hearse. Some people not only saw the funeral procession from atop buildings and fences but also came near Stalin. They write that he was pale and his face was made up to cover smallpox marks.

Here, however, is what S. Alliluyeva wrote in her memoirs "Twenty Letters to a Friend": "During the first few days (I. Stalin) was in a state of shock. He said he wanted to live no more... He was in such a condition that people were afraid to leave him alone. At times, he would be overcome by some kind of anger, or wrath. This was explained by the fact that mother had left him a letter.

"Apparently she wrote it at night. Naturally, I never saw it. It was probably destroyed right away, but it existed—I was told about it by those who had seen it. It was horrible. It was full of charges and reproaches. It was not just a personal letter, but partly a political one as well. Having read it, father may have thought that mother was by his side only outwardly, while in reality she was somewhere close to the opposition of the time. He was shocked and angered by it, and at the civil ceremony he approached the body only for a moment; then he suddenly pushed it off, turned away and left. He did not attend the funeral.

"Mother was buried by her friends and family; her uncle Avel Yenukidze, her godfather, walked behind the hearse. Father was upset for a long time. He never visited her grave at the Novodevichye cemetery. He could not bring himself to do it. He felt that mother passed away his personal enemy."

Who was then that was mistaken for Stalin by the many witnesses of the funeral? The study of photographs and conversations with some of the few relatives of Stalin who are still living (they personally requested that I do not use their names), suggest that it was A. Svanidze, the brother of Stalin's first wife. If Stalin in person had walked behind the hearse, no one would have been allowed on the roofs or fences. Moreover, no one would have been able to come near Stalin and touch his overcoat. "The leader of all peoples" feared assassination and organized his guard so that no outsider could approach him.

Historians' Roundtable on Rehabilitations, Remaining Problems

18300359 Moscow NEDELYA in Russian
No 52, 26-31 Dec 88 pp 10, 11

[Roundtable discussion, materials prepared by the NEDELYA Communist Education Department: "The Difficult Path to the Truth"]

[Text] Exactly a year ago some well-known Soviet historians (two of last year's discussants—I.D. Kovalchenko and A.M. Samsonov—are also among our guests today)

met around NEDELYA's "roundtable" and discussed timely problems of historical scholarship, as well as the role of historical truth in restructuring society. That meeting laid the foundation for an entire series of essays in our publication, which has allowed us to fill in certain blank spaces on the country's historical map. Moreover, the path which Soviet society has traveled in 1988, and historical scholarship along with it, is impressive.

Just a year ago it was still difficult to suppose that as early as this past spring there would be a juridical rehabilitation—and by autumn a party rehabilitation—of Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin, Aleksey Ivanovich Rykov, Mikhail Pavlovich Tomskiy, Khristian Georgiyevich Rakovskiy, and other Bolsheviks of Lenin's Old Guard, whose names were wiped out of this country's history by decades of Stalinist terror. Moreover, scarcely anyone would have supposed that in September the "Selected Works of N.I. Bukharin" would be published. And who could have dreamed just a year ago that the "Memorial" All-Union Historical-Educational Society would be founded?

[NEDELYA] Nevertheless, the path which has been traveled seems to be only a beginning, right?

[I. Kovalchenko] Yes, that's right. This passing year [1988] has provided a great deal for Soviet history to study. New facts have been revealed, and many hitherto-closed pages of our history have been opened. However, we still are confronted with a great deal of work to do. Because, you know, new facts are only the beginning of scholarship. Its principal task is analyzing, summarizing, and explaining the course of historical development, based on these facts.

[Yu. Polyakov] The path to historical truth is long and complex. We are now at the stage of stating the truth. We need to explain the reasons why our history has turned out to be filled not only with heroic but also tragic, not only glorious but also sordid pages. We must work very hard to attain the truth of history, raising strata of previously unknown sources, restructuring our own consciousness, striving to understand the historical process in a new way. Historical scholarship has just entered upon a difficult and complex phase wherein new concepts emerge.

[A. Samsonov] Progress made by historical scholarship during this past year is evident if only in the fact that we are openly discussing previously forbidden problems are listening to strangely different, sometimes unpleasant, opinions. I sense increased creative activity in my own work as well. During the past year I have published: "Memory of the Past: Events, People, History" ("Nauka" Publishing House) and "To Know and Remember: Dialogue Between an Historian and a Reader" ("Politizdat").

However, we still have far to go before solving the principal problems, particularly in elucidating the history of Soviet society and the most recent history as a

whole. It's gratifying that "An Outline History of the CPSU" is being prepared, but does this simple, pleasant fact reflect a general forward movement by our historical scholarship? Alas, no. The organization of research on the most important scholarly problems, such as, for example, the history of the Great Patriotic War, is being constructed in the old-fashioned way, on an administrative-command basis. The main editorial commission of this most fundamental (10-volume!) work ought to, in my opinion, be headed up by scholars. And should we not be concerned by the fact that the History of the USSR Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences has ceased work on the concluding, 12th volume of "A History of the USSR from the Earliest Times to the Present Day"? The reason is that the authors do not have access to many archival documents without studying which it's impossible to truthfully write a history of Soviet society.

Last year we talked about the archive problem. It has remained. Access to the archive holdings is free only for the following two scholarly institutions: the IML [Marxism-Leninism Institute] under the CPSU Central Committee and the Military History Institute under the USSR Ministry of Defense. As a result, the conditions for monopolism in scholarship have been retained, and a lag in historical scholarship has been planned as before.

[V. Zhuravlev] This past year has indeed been abundant in discoveries which liberated the power of truth. All this, to a certain extent, helped to break down the obstacles and stereotypes of the "stagnant type" of historical consciousness. But any shattering in scholarship is merely the prerequisite for radical, creative, constructive work.

[NEDELYA] We'd like to believe that 50 years from now our historians will recall the late 1980's as a time of an unprecedented flare-up of interest in society's past and in historical scholarship. It's possible that someday our period will even come to be called a "renaissance." But can it be said now that historians have already comprehended the principal problems of the distant and more recent past? Have they answered all the "difficult" questions?

[I. Kovalchenko] In my opinion, far from all the "difficult" questions of our past are yet clear, whereas certain of them have merely been posed. And quite some time will be required to obtain true answers to them. As you know, the Renaissance was a lengthy period in history.

[Yu. Polyakov] In the knowledge of our country's history this past year has been more noteworthy than any other. It was specifically in 1988 that there occurred the most tangible shift in the evaluation of past decades—a shift in public awareness which is radical and, obviously, already irreversible. The radical changes which have taken place are completely explainable: the critical understanding of the present-day reality has sharpened interest in the past—in

the causes of stagnation and the pre-crisis condition. And the circumstances of glasnost have allowed us to reveal many hitherto-unknown strata of history. In and by themselves, they bear an enormous critical charge. Thus, the natural growth of interest in history has led to a new qualitative condition. Steps of paramount importance have been taken in the understanding of Soviet history. Scholars have at last been freed from their blinders of many years, they are writing in a more unfettered manner, discussing matters more acutely, and "digging deeper." But so far historians have not only failed to comprehend the main problems or to answer all the difficult questions, but, to the contrary have found even greater qualitative problems and questions.

[V. Zhuravlev] As to those persons researching the problems of the CPSU's history, they've not yet come to grips with answering the "most difficult" questions. Historians have closely approached the possibility and necessity of making the transition from simply disclosing the so-called "blank spaces" of the country's and the party's past to a conceptual comprehension of the process of our post-October Revolution development as a whole. We must distinctly admit that the center of gravity in analyzing the historical past nowadays is shifting more and more from answers to the question "how" to the broad, all-embracing comprehension of the dialectic of factors and processes of a cause-and-effect type. Because, after all, the chief lessons of the historical past are contained in the answer to the question: "Why did something which nowadays so disturbs and excites us happen in the historical past specifically one way rather than another?"

Only answers to the questions "why" allow us to move further along—to an informed development of that mechanism the presence of which will, once and for all, consign the concepts of the "cult of personality," "authoritarian-bureaucratic system," etc. to the category of strictly historical terms.

Development of a new concept of the history of the party and Soviet society, on which historians are now working, presupposes, of course, a comprehension in the dialectic of the positive as well as the negative aspects of the historical experience. Absolutization or a hypertrophied exaggeration of just one of these aspects is fraught with the danger of repeating the old errors and deformations which have already done a disservice to historical and party-historical scholarship. And not just to the latter.

[R. Medvedev] In my opinion, there's not much point in speaking about some kind of flare-up of interest in history and our past. There has always been such interest in the society. It's just that now many previously closed doors, and many genuine opportunities have begun to appear. By taking advantage of them, we historians have been able to state things to the people. And this has only intensified the general interest.

I'd supplement your question by another assertion, and that is the feeling that the past has been a closed door. Let's admit to ourselves—does it not really seem to us that we don't know our own past, that we are people without an historical memory? Among our intelligentsia there were many persons who strove to change this situation. Alas, instead of encouraging such a striving, certain people persecuted them, expelled them from the party, and exerted pressure on them with a single purpose—to force them to abandon historical truth. Nowadays there is, fortunately, no such pressure; nowadays we can state things and be printed freely.

[V. Lelchuk] It's impossible to believe that our scientists would venture to answer all the "difficult" questions which will be asked by persons interested in modern physics, chemistry, astronomy, mathematics.... But historians, it seems, are supposed to comprehend the "main problems of or long-ago and more recent past," to answer all(!) the "difficult" questions.

I'm not going to assert that such a posing of the question calls for a return to the traditions laid down 50 years ago by the "Short Course," but this little word "all" is very reminiscent of a fondness for just two colors—black and white. At that time there "could be no" unclear matters. But, of course, there were no sciences revealing the true greatness of the October Revolution in the ensuing decades. Nowadays, however, the situation is different in principle: we must revive the Leninist concept of building socialism. And, therefore, historical scholarship must not be enrolled in the "service field," for, like any branch of science, it cannot, under any conditions, answer "all the difficult questions."

There's no doubt that in the past year our knowledge, linked with the basic stages of Soviet society's development, particularly with the 1920's and 1930's, has been substantially enriched. The public's horizon and demands are changing even more rapidly. The very practice of perestroika has posed new problems requiring ever-deeper comprehension of their sources, roots, and laws of evolution. Therefore, no matter how significant this year's shifts may have been, the main thing still lies ahead: only now can we begin to develop a conceptual comprehension of the material.

Let me boldly assert that we're merely at the sources of that "historical renaissance," which our descendants, perhaps, will call the start of perestroika. But, alas, it's also true that much more could have been done this year. Thus, the economists came out with a new textbook. The activism of cultural figures gave birth to an interesting new journal entitled *NASHE NASLEDIYE*. One could also list other innovations. But, just as before, there are no new school textbooks on the history of Soviet society. The idea of creating a popular journal of historical scholarship has remained unrealized. Nor has a society of historians been founded yet.... Let's not continue such a sad list.

[NEDELYA] Some time ago Central Television showed a court where a lawsuit brought by former Procurator Shekhovtsov in defense of I. Stalin was tried. In your opinion, do we need a court trial of Stalin himself and his close associates?

[I. Kovalchenko] The highest court for political leaders and epochs is the court of history. Such a court trial has begun and will be conducted by many generations, for Stalin was merely the tip of a huge iceberg of the administrative-command, bureaucratic system which deformed socialism; it also led to very great sacrifices and economic crisis. Only history can melt such an iceberg. The generation of the "sixties" performed a great historical service in starting this court trial of history. The task of the present generation is to continue this trial, to deepen the arguments for a sentence by analyzing the causes and consequences of the cult.

[A. Samsonov] The Stalin cult was condemned by the 20th CPSU Congress. This was followed by attempts at rehabilitation and, if not justifying, at least forgetting the crimes committed under the personality cult. Glasnost has demanded a new, uncompromising trial of Stalin and his evil accomplices. In my opinion, it's already proceeding—this trial by the whole people. Resounding evidence of the victims of Stalin's repressions, along with the testimony of eyewitnesses and contemporaries, has been appearing in newspaper articles and television programs. Actions have been taken by the Commission of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo to rehabilitate persons unjustly condemned from the 1930's to the 1950's. Unfortunately, Stalin and his close associates escaped a court trial during their lifetimes. They are being sentenced by the court of history and public opinion. Figures in the fields of literature, art, and science must carry out their own lofty missions in this trial-type process.

[R. Medvedyev] In the juridical sense, there can be no court trial of Stalin and his associates. Persons already dead cannot be tried in court; that's just mysticism. Only the Inquisition held trials of deceased persons; they used to dig up the bodies and try them in court. That's silly and savage: the person cannot defend himself or reply to questions. This, of course, would mock what we call a court trial.

Stalin can be tried only by the court of history. We must name all persons who aided and abetted him, describe all their deeds, write truthful books about their crimes, sort out all the motives, and elucidate all the details of their actions.

Such a trial is needed. But it's already being held by our society. The appearance of new scientific-publicistic books, novels, creation of a memorial to Stalin's victims, drawing up complete lists of persons who died,

indicating the executioners' names—that's what we need. Previously there were many obstacles to such work. Now they are partially removed, and such activity must be expanded.

[NEDELYA] Historical glasnost is testimony to our consistency in carrying out perestroika. Have we been consistent in everything during the past year?

[Yu. Polyakov] The positive processes in gaining knowledge about the past are obvious. But it would be wrong to keep silent about the many negative symptoms also appearing this past year. Dilettantism in history assumed alarming scope. Many interesting materials on historical topics, so popular in the central and local press, contain gross factual errors. Signs of a new one-sidedness and tendentiousness are quite frequent. Sometimes striving for sensationalism leads to the appearance of "pirozhenki" with stale fillings. The principle: "I won't vouch for the taste, but it'll be hot" is unsuitable for cooking and even more counter-indicated for science. It engenders new stereotypes, dictated by a new bias. All this just violates the principles of historicism again—many events of the past are evaluated from the high vantage-point of today, without taking into account at all the specific-historical circumstances of years past, or the level of possibilities and awareness in those times.

Here's what alarms me. An opinion was recently stated in the press that the period of criticism in historical scholarship had already ended. This is hardly so. Criticism in history and aimed at history cannot and must not stop. Criticism is not always proportional or measured out by seasons. Without constantly looking at itself critically, scholarship cannot develop. But—and few would disagree—it's time to end this **meeting** period in our scholarship. It's time to focus our attention on constructive, creative tasks. The old concepts of the history of the CPSU and Soviet society are virtually jaded. But the birth of new ones has scarcely begun.

[A. Samsonov] Let me add my own evaluation to Yuriy Aleksandrovich's opinion. Our country has the type of time-serving historian satirically limned in Ye. Korovin's sketch "Fedotus-Herodotus" (PRAVDA, July). I agree that criticism helps us to overcome vices; it's perestroika in the social sciences, literature, and art. However, the writer's sarcasm, while justified on the whole, is not free from a distortion of truth. How can he assert, for example, that it was not Voroshilov or Beria, but an academician-historian, who devised such formulas as the "great captain" and the "leader of the peoples"? And it's even more invalid to state that our newspapers and journals, our political and fictional literature, had nothing to do with the Stalin cult of personality.

It would be nonsense to defend "Fedotus-Herodotus"—he is, alas, drawn from life. But it's just as absurd to present matters as if Fedotus were merely a freak exception to a generally good public situation in years past. In reality, things were much more complex and dramatic.

Yes, there were scholars who "served time." But there were also scholars who struggled. I could cite specific names and examples of historians who defended their own views despite the very difficult conditions under which historical scholarship developed for decades, oppressed by the authoritarian apparatus at various levels and the numerous bureaucracy of the 1960's, 1970's, and early 1980's.

[R. Medvedev] No, alas, we lack consistency. To this day, there are "forbidden" topics and "blank spaces" in history. For example, there still is no possibility for a truthful and detailed exposition of the facts linked with Trotsky's personality. How easily a new myth is being created! "Trotsky as the demon of the Revolution." But, of course, Stalin could better be described as the "demon of the Revolution." Demon signifies Satan, the Devil. But Trotsky took part in the October armed uprising; he was one of its organizers, a fact which even Stalin gave him credit for at first. Trotsky was a founder of the Red Army and personally distinguished himself in the Civil War. However, certain recent publications contain not a word about Trotsky's revolutionary activity nor any of the favorable remarks which Lenin accorded to him in his own time....

Furthermore, we do not, of course, yet have an objective, full evaluation of the activity of the revolutionary authorities in the first years of the Soviet republic. Yes, the situation was extreme, but, you know, there were also many justified actions. Many actions were evil, but we've romanticized all the events without investigating them, and we've regarded them as heroic, sacrificial deeds. History is not romantic poetry; it must be objective.

Let me repeat A.M. Samsonov's statement that certain archive documents are still closed. It's obvious that many archives have been intentionally destroyed.

[NEDELYA] This year has seen the raising of yet another stratum of our society's problems. Conflicts in inter-national relations, "scores" which have been hidden for decades, have surged to the surface.

What are the actual historical roots of these problems? Guided by our country's historical experience and that of other states and peoples, can we find constructive solutions?

[I. Kovalchenko] Inter-national relations constitute one of the most important and complex aspects of sociohistorical development. History has shown that mutual ties and an exchange of experience between peoples, based on equality and mutual respect, have always been a powerful factor in social progress.

By themselves, no kinds of national traits block friendship or mutual understanding between peoples. But the sphere of national attitudes is linked very closely with people's emotions. Therefore, any kind of divergence or

misunderstanding is perceived extremely acutely here; various prejudices are most firmly entrenched. This is always used in their own interests by various conservative and reactionary social forces and elements. Playing upon the real difficulties and conflicts which always exist in public life, they attempt to include them under a "national umbrella;" they incite nationalistic passions and dissension to achieve their own self-seeking goals.

It's always been thus throughout history. There's only one method of solving a national conflict which is justified and approved by public practice: all parties must rise above their specific differences, look at them from the viewpoint of wide, common-national interests and those of others with whom they interact. The most patriotic strata of any nation have always been advocates of this solution to national divergences and conflicts. It is precisely they, rather than limited nationalists, who have most deeply understood the real interests of their own people.

[R. Medvedyev] Inter-national attitudes are linked with history because, without knowing its own past, a nation and a people cannot exist at all. The first sign of a nation is a common historical lot. Otherwise, people become just a conglomerate of persons who have no connection with each other. Without a history, national life is impossible, as is the existence of a state. If there is no history, there is no society. A truthful history is a chief requirement of every people.

[NEDELYA] Perestroika is now in its fourth year. As we've already said, its very beginning was connected with an increasingly keen interest in history. But, in your opinion, has the role played in society by historians themselves really increased during these years?

[I. Kovalchenko] Although not to the extent that I would wish, the historians' role has increased in recent years. Yes, criticism aimed at scholars is justified. But why forget that the basic part of what we learn about our past, about its "blank spaces," has, nonetheless, been achieved by historians? Thus, the chief correspondents of NEDELYA's History Club are also historians. Of course, we still have much work to do in order to satisfy the widespread demand for historical knowledge.

[R. Medvedyev] Nevertheless, in my opinion, many historians have shown their own unsoundness. It's not coincidental that we lack a textbook on history (as already mentioned), or a textbook on the history of the CPSU; we don't even have a periodization of history. Over the course of 60 years history was essentially subordinated to ideology and politics, to the political struggle for power. In our country historians became accustomed to working not on true scholarship but rather on propagandistic-political documents, "tailored" for a specific leader or historical date.

It's painful to admit, but historians have proved to be unprepared for perestroika. Many of their books have lost their significance and are not being reissued. But these historians have not begun to write new books. Evidently, they lack new concepts, whereas those concepts which were developed earlier are not needed nowadays. The work which historians should be engaged in now is being done mostly by publicists.

I agree that the looks of many historical journals have changed noticeably during this past year. New editors have appeared along with new trends. These journals are attempting to look at historical scholarship in a new way, to conduct its restructuring; but this is a lengthy process.

History is a science; it cannot be restructured in a single day. We need new personnel, a restructuring of education itself. All this requires time.

Collectivization in Kazakhstan During the 1930s
18300300 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 14, 15, 17 Jan 89

[Articles by B. Tulepbayev and V. Osipov¹ under the "History and Fate" rubric: "From a Position of Truth": "On Complex Questions of the Collectivization of Kazakhstan"]

[14 Jan 89 p 3]

[Text] Today, many decades later, it is impossible to calculate the losses of that time with absolute accuracy: no single archive, to include previously secret sources, has complete and systematized data. It was necessary to gather the data literally in fragments. These are bitter statistics: behind every line stand the thousands and hundreds of thousands of people who perished in the years of famine, or were forced to flee their native lands. Realizing the responsibility imposed on us by their memory, we have striven to provide an honest analysis of the most reliable data from all the sources available to us.

The Authors

Today we turn to one of the most controversial and dramatic periods in the life of the republic: the period of the 1920's and 30's; the time of the settlement of nomadic households and mass collectivization; the time of stormy socio-economic restructuring, and along with it—administrative tyranny, mass famine and incalculable human suffering. It is precisely these dramatic circumstances that give rise to the special interest in those times among wide circles of society in Kazakhstan.

Part I

We shall outline in brief the prior history of the question. The Decree on the Land was adopted upon Lenin's initiative at the 2nd Congress of Soviets, immediately after the victorious armed uprising in Petrograd. Placing the land in the hands of the peasants was an important

socio-economic and political act by the Soviet authorities and the party. However, that did not solve all the problems. The vast number of small and miniscule peasant farms with their low cultivation and marketability standards condemned the country to a vegetative state with periodically-occurring years of famine. There was also the danger of reproducing new capitalistic elements from among the peasants—the wealthier kulaks. Therefore, Lenin and the party continued their search for an optimal solution of the agrarian question.

The experience of the first agricultural communes and other cooperative formations allowed the party to seek a means of developing agriculture in the establishment of producer-consumer communes and societies, and to establish the sort of ties between the city and the countryside which would fundamentally transform the economic relationships in the country. It was against this background that the idea of cooperation of the entire population was worked out in the RKP(b) [Workers' and Peasants' Party (bolshevik)] Program, adopted at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919. In explaining the idea, Lenin emphasized the importance of winning the trust of the peasants, "of learning from the peasants the methods of transition to the new system, and **under no circumstances command them!** This is the rule which we have set for ourselves."

However, during the years of the civil war, when the Republic of Soviets was turned into a besieged camp, it became necessary to introduce the policy of "war communism," characterized by extraordinary measures of direct goods-exchange and requisitioning of farm produce. But, as early as the last year of the civil war, the peasantry, which had acquiesced to the requisitioning under emergency conditions, sharply protested the command methods during peacetime. The New Economic Policy (NEP) became the strategic policy for developing the basis of interaction between the proletariat and the peasantry, and replaced food requisitioning [prodrazverstka] with tax-in-kind [prodnalog]. And cooperation was to be the principle for the transition of small-scale peasant farming to socialism.

Lenin had been working out problems of peasant cooperation in his last articles and letters. At the same time we must take into consideration the fact that the basis for the new principle of organizing the rural populace was outlined in "general terms," which remained "undefined, and the substance of the practical tasks has not been described in detail." But Lenin had formulated the most important principles and prerequisites for the socialist transformation of the countryside: strictly voluntary peasant participation in the cooperative movement; to render every kind of state assistance to the new system in the countryside; to search for a form of mutually-advantageous ties between the city and the countryside; to pay attention to real experience; a gradual, unhurried approach in the major new cause of

introducing communist ideas to the countryside; and, all-around development of the culture of the multi-million-strong mass of peasants.

Detailing the party's policy with respect to the peasants and the agrarian transformations took a number of years, and occurred under complex conditions and in an acute ideological-political struggle. The difficulty lay not only in the fact that the country's economy under NEP conditions was multi-structured, but also that the level of development of various regions of the country differed, and frequently the land problem was very closely interwoven with the national problem.

All of these problems were on the agenda soon after Lenin's demise. The report by M.I. Kalinin and the co-report by N.K. Krupskaya, "On Work in the Countryside," delivered at the 13th RKP(b) Congress in May 1924, noted the presence of two growth trends—the capitalist, expressed in the growth of Kulak farms, and the socialist, directed toward attracting the peasants to cooperation by means of the most understandable and available forms for it.

In Kazakhstan in particular, it became clear from data gathered by the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] Kazkraykom commission (In 1925 and 26 the commission headed by Kraykom Buro member U.K. Dzhandosov inspected more than 500 auls and villages) that the average peasant was continuing to prosper, and in certain regions the number of prosperous peasants had increased to 6.0-8.0 percent.

It was also important that the ideas of cooperation began to gradually penetrate the aul environment as well. In certain regions of the republic up to 20 percent of the agricultural artels and up to 40 percent of the TOZ's [Partnership for Joint Land Cultivation] were Kazakh. The nomadic households began to settle down. The growth of the cooperative movement was the principal economic barrier to the spread of the kulak menace; the cooperative associations, given sufficient support from the state, were with the passage of time to seize the initiative from the kulaks and wealthy herdsmen in supplying basic commodity production—grain and meat. Development was proceeding in just that direction, although the overall picture was not entirely cloudless: the growth rate of agriculture lagged behind the needs of the country, and the kulaks and wealthy herdsmen resisted the general democratic and socialist transformations in the auls and villages.

The presence of various trends in the development of agriculture created a broad field of alternatives. In the party leadership various points of view emerged on the way to solving the problems which had sprung up. Without going into an analysis of the positions of the individual leaders of that time, we shall note that in the final analysis Stalin was able to foist his own point of

view on the party, and it not only did not conform with Lenin's understanding of the problem, but quite often was in conflict with Lenin's ideas as well.

One of the fundamental problems of socialist construction in the 1920's was the question of the correlation of the industrialization of the country and the peasant cooperatives. Lenin proposed that industry render assistance to the peasantry in their difficult work, and combine cooperation and industrialization on mutually-advantageous principles. But Stalin demanded the absolute subordination of agriculture to socialist industry.

Another important question on which Lenin's and Stalin's views differed was the problem of finding funds for industrial development; that is, sources of socialist accumulation. Lenin believed that socialist accumulation should be accomplished by virtue of increased labor productivity, and skillful production organization and management. In his report at the 14th VKP(b) Congress Stalin repeated Lenin's instructions, with one small, but as it soon became clear, significant addition: in order to create the accumulation needed for socialist industry, a positive foreign trade balance would have to be achieved. How to achieve it he explained later, at the November 1928 VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum: "...If industry is the leading element, then agriculture is a base for developing industry both as a market...and as a source of export reserves necessary to import equipment for the needs of the national economy."

The 15th Party Congress held in 1927 adopted a broad program designed to accomplish the switch of the peasantry onto the rails of socialism, namely on the basis of developing cooperation. At that same time the concept was developed for modernizing NEP with respect to the tasks of accelerating industrialization and socialist transformations in the country. There were no plans whatsoever for total collectivization. What was envisaged was the more or less planned development of socialist elements, gradually, but unswervingly supplanting the inefficient small-scale peasant farms with the socialist market by virtue of their cooperation. At the same time the congress was proceeding from the previous experience of developing cooperation and its wide popularity among the peasants, and increasing the role of cooperation in barter between the city and the countryside. In Kazakhstan, for example, up to 34 percent of the agricultural production was supplied by various cooperatives in 1927.

However, such planned development did not occur. In the winter of 1927/28 a grain procurement crisis arose in the land. There were several reasons for it, but the main one lay in the fact that the policy of confiscating assets from agriculture and turning them over to industry began to be carried out on an intensive basis.

In order to ensure competitiveness in grain deliveries abroad, prices for grain on the domestic market were significantly reduced in the Fall of 1927. And this

became a direct cause of the crisis in grain procurement during the winter of 1927/28. The peasants, anticipating more favorable market conditions, began to withhold their grain.

The grain-procurement crisis, representing a clear and present danger for the development of the nation's economy, and the food situation of the working class, were interpreted on the political plane as an attack of the petit-bourgeois element on the proletarian state. Therefore it was decided to respond to it with extraordinary measures. The "kulak strike," as Stalin put it, must be crushed with force. The struggle with the kulaks became the slogan of the day, and soon grow into an appeal to liquidate them as a class.

The campaign against the kulaks was unfurled to the accompaniment of increasingly rigid demands to expose them as "disorganizers of the market and price policy," which called for action "in an especially urgent manner, without regard to formalities."

The percentage of kulaks in one region or another was artificially overstated by the local organs for the convenience of the higher authorities. Meanwhile, objective data did not testify to the growth of the kulak class, but to its significant decline: by 1928, the percentage of kulaks in the RSFSR as a whole had shrunk from 3.9 percent to 2.2. percent, and in Kazakhstan from 6-8 percent to 3-4 percent.

At the same time, from 1928-1930, Kazakhstan and especially its grain-growing northern regions suffered a crop failure, and in the winter of 1929/30 there was a dzhut [mass cattle starvation] as the steppe vegetation was locked in an icy suit of armor. The grain procurement plan for the winter of 1928/29, however, was defined at 11.5 million centners which exceeded the real capability of the peasant farms by almost a third.

In addition, the orientation toward exceptional measures for grain procurement heated up the situation in the republic from the first days of procurement. Sent to the villages and auls were 4,812 officials with the strictest instructions and vast powers. Cruelty and lack of scruples became the basic line of their behavior. The fundamental blow was to have been dealt to the kulaks and the rich herdsmen. But the officials, who had a poor grasp of the situation, often beat upon the average peasant and even the poor ones.

But administrative measures did not provide an economic effect. Confiscated from the 34,121 convicted "wealthy herdsmen and kulaks" were 631,000 poods of grain and 53,400 head of cattle—which amounted in all to about one percent of the plan for grain and 3.5 percent for meat procurement. Meanwhile, the VKP(b) Kazkryakom reported in the Spring of 1929 that they had managed to fulfill the plan for grain procurement by 84.3

percent, and had expanded meat procurement by a factor of 1.5 for cattle and by a factor of 3 for sheep, in comparison with the preceding year.

It is clear that the main burden of grain procurement fell on the shoulders of the average and poor peasants. Moreover, the granaries of many of them were swept clean, right down the last kernel. Also falling under the plan for grain procurement were the nomadic households, which did not plant crops at all. They were forced to sell their cattle and buy grain for the procurers.

A still more severe situation took shape in subsequent years. The press of the extraordinary measures continued to grow.

Such actions aroused the just anger of the peasants. Until quite recently the reason for this had been explained as merely the ill will of the kulaks, who did not want to "collectivize" and "liquidate themselves" in the course of the grain procurement. Without denying a certain role to the kulaks in the unleashing of this struggle, one must acknowledge that to a certain extent the situation was exacerbated by the clumsy and at times also criminal activity of the representatives of the state authorities. Consciously or unconsciously they provoked the intensification of the struggle in the countryside. According to OGPU [Unified State Political Directorate at the USSR Soviet of People's Commissars (1922-1934)], 31 "band-formations" were operating in Kazakhstan in 1929, comprising 350 people; in 1930 there were already 82 with 1925 people, and in 1931 80 and 3,192. In addition to this, during that time 2001 "hostile groups" with a total number of 9,906 people were identified during this time; and an additional 10,396 individual saboteurs were arrested. As a result of their actions, 460 party and Soviet workers were killed; 372 hostile anti-Soviet acts were committed, and there were 127 incidents of burning grain and crop damage from cattle.

The excesses committed in the course of grain procurement, and the mass discontent of the peasants forced the authorities to take measures to correct the most flagrant acts of arbitrariness and violence. In 1930, property seized from 9,533 average peasant farms in Kazakhstan was restored, and fines were lifted from another 1,266 farms; 4,073 average peasants were released from prison, and criminal suits against 2,664 people were dropped; voting rights were restored to 1,618 people and 1,160 were returned from exile.

At the same time measures were taken to punish the most zealous grain "procurers." Brought to justice were 97 authorized representatives, of which 71 were found guilty. Disbanded because of arbitrary rule and for taking the law into their own hands were 17 rayispolkoms and rural Soviets. Through the party line 336 persons were subjected to punishment, and of these 50 were fired. The bureaus of five raykoms, one okrugkom and seven party cells, were disbanded.

However, the grain procurement continued under extraordinary conditions. During the winter of 1930/31, the localities began to receive new and terrible orders, to procure the grain "come hell or high water." At the February 1931 VKP(b) Kazkraykom Plenum, Kraykom First Secretary F.I. Goloshchekin said, "We have a new phenomenon in the present grain procurement campaign—a fear of excesses. But this fear of excesses conceals the purest form of opportunism..."

How this "opportunism" was to be overcome was pointed out in a telegram to the okrug committees: "The party punishment for the excesses, which were necessary to the success of grain procurement, are to be re-examined, and the workers are to be rehabilitated. The Okrug Committees are obligated to ensure complete fulfillment of the plan without fear of liability."

This once again "untied the hands" of the local organs in the use of extraordinary measures with respect to the peasantry. And this came at a time when Kazakhstan stood on the threshold of a catastrophe—mass famine.

The alarming situation affected animal husbandry as well. Since 1928 there had been a sharp decline in the number of cattle. The reasons were various: there were episodes of widespread infectious cattle disease; and dzhut, which took part of the herds in the winter of 1929/30; and an increase in the demand for meat in the households, owing to the shortage of grain, and selling off cattle in connection with the necessity of fulfilling the plan for grain procurement, which extended to the nomadic households as well; and the plan for meat procurement which was increasing from year to year; and the provocation on the part of the kulaks and wealthy herdsmen to slaughter their cattle before joining a kolkhoz. All of these causes contributed to the losses in their own way; but they all led to the same end—to a catastrophic reduction in the herd of productive and working cattle—the basis for well-being and life itself for the sharua [nomadic herders] and the peasants. However, the republic leadership saw only one reason for the coming catastrophe—the "ill will" of the class enemy. Thus, all of the blunders in planning for meat procurement, the excesses and mistakes of the responsible organs, and subjective reasons as well, were reduced to the pernicious acts of the kulaks and wealthy herdsmen; and all the responsibility was laid upon the peasantry, which allegedly provided the grounds for action. This approach created the conditions for further increasing pressure on the peasants.

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[Text]

Part II

The extraordinary measures and administration by decree continued to undermine peasant production. There was a reduction in sown crops and herd size;

drought and fodder-shortage raged, and the procurement plans remained unrealistically high. The republic was already starving, but, in response to a cautious request to the VKP(b) Kazkraykom to lower the plans, signed by Goloshchekin and Isayev, a telegram came, saying: "The Central Committee and the Soviet of People's Commissars [SNK] warn you, that unless a genuine turning point in surrendering grain is reached in the republic, they will be forced to resort to measures of repression, similar to the repressions in the Northern Caucasus. In order for you to gain a clear understanding of the aforementioned repressions, we are sending you a copy of the Sevkraykom [Northern Caucasus Kray Committee] decree², which was adopted in accordance with a directive from the VKP Central Committee... [Signed] Molotov, SNK Chairman; I. Stalin, Central Committee Secretary."

It was precisely in this atmosphere of "extraordinary measures" in agricultural procurement and "intensification of the class struggle" in the villages and auls, that mass collectivization and settlement of nomadic households was unfurled in the republic. It is very important to bear these circumstances in mind, along with the now-habitual evaluation of both the "effectiveness" of the kolkhoz system in comparison with privately-owned farms, and its socio-political consequences to the fate of the peasantry as a whole.

We shall now turn to the history of the settlement of the nomads and collectivization in the republic as yet another component of the specific historical background against which the tragic famine of 1931-33 was played out. However, first we would reiterate the kind of meaning Stalin and his confederates ascribed to the idea of collectivization and the goals which they were pursuing at the same time. As previously stated, at the end of the 1920's it began to be interpreted as a form of ensuring that funds were transferred from the agrarian sector to industry. Such a narrowly utilitarian approach to collectivization, naturally, clashed with Lenin's cooperative plan. What was forgotten were the principles of voluntary participation, and step-by-step development of cooperation from its simplest to its highest forms, and the rendering of all-round assistance to the peasantry. When examining questions of collectivization, one must also bear in mind the fact that not all regions, especially the national regions, were uniformly prepared for this act.

As previously noted, there were certain development trends in Kazakhstan's agriculture during the 1920's which gave grounds for optimism. In particular, supply-sales and production-trade cooperation was being successfully developed: there were all sorts of cooperative work associations—for jointly cultivating the land, hay-making, pasturing and caring for cattle; for churning butter and rendering lard; for raising cotton and growing seeds; and other associations. Also showing dynamic growth were the highest forms of production cooperation—the kolkhozes. In 1925, kolkhozes of all forms took in 42,380 households, which was 6.6 percent of the total number; in 1927, 213,566 (17.7 percent); in 1928,

318,863 (25.6); and in 1929, 419,456 (32.9 percent): that is, by the year of the "great turning point," the level of cooperation was sufficiently high. But the existing trends were wholly ascribed to the rate of collectivization stipulated in the **first variant** of the five-year plan drawn up in the spring of 1928.

According to this plan, by the end of the five-year plan (1932/33), 4.0 percent of the peasant households were to have been enlisted for the kolkhozes. In 1928 2,354 kolkhozes in Kazakhstan embraced 25,000 households, or 1.6 percent; that is, over the years of the five-year plan there was to have been only a twofold increase, which would have been altogether realistic and would not have violated the principles of voluntarism and gradualism in kolkhoz construction, and effective assistance to them on behalf of the state. However, the final plan envisaged collectivization of 16-18 percent of the households already. The radical increase in rate was explained, first of all, by the well-known successes in the kolkhoz system; and secondly, by the striving to ensure more rapid and effective transfer of funds to industry and guarantee export deliveries. In fact, in 1929 4,876 kolkhozes in Kazakhstan had already brought in 87,900 households, or 6.9 percent; that is, the initial variant of the collectivization plan for the five-year plan was overfulfilled in a year by almost a factor of two. Similar processes had taken place in other regions of the country as well.

However, not even the significant leap in the rate of kolkhoz creation in 1929 could have ensured fulfillment of the five-year plan for collectivization **on a voluntary basis** (In order to implement the plan, it would have been necessary to expand the number of collectivized households twice or three-times over). The unrealistic nature of the plan, thus, had already laid the groundwork for the forced method of collectivization, and had programmed the future excesses and distortions in kolkhoz construction.

The state of affairs was exceptionally complex in the cattle-herding and grazing areas. Settlement of the nomads had only just begun: by 1929 only a little over 50,000 nomadic households had been given land, which amounted to 7.5 percent of their total number. In 1930 it was envisaged that an additional 84,340 nomadic households would have been settled. However, this was not sufficient for the planned rates of collectivization. Goloshchekin understood this, just as he understood that the aul with its still extant patriarchal-family relationships, its backwardness and lack of culture, was totally unable to immediately take the step to the highest form of agriculture and cooperative farm—the kolkhoz—without going through a period of general-democratic transformations.

But Goloshchekin was an obedient executor of the will of Stalin. If need be he was prepared to turn the problem completely upside down. Hence there followed the conception, that settlement was not to precede collectivization, but the other way around—total collectivization

was to become the stimulus for settlement. Under his influence, the December 1929 VKP(b) Kazkraykom Plenum, which examined the question of the five-year plan for kolkhoz construction, wrote that, "it is necessary to ...stimulate in every way the collectivization of cattle-raising farms at the very same rate as for grain farms...having in mind the embrasure of **not only the grain-growing regions, but also the animal husbandry and cotton-growing regions, having established a rate of collectivization designed to fully embrace the population in the course of one year.**" (Emphasis ours—Authors).

The administrative rage was not even cooled by the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo resolution of 5 January 1930, "On the Rate of Collectivization and Measures of State Assistance to Kolkhoz Construction," which stipulated completion of collectivization in Kazakhstan by the end of the five-year plan, in 1932-33.

Although this resolution stepped up even more the rate of collectivization in comparison to the five-year plan (It became necessary to unite not just 16-18 percent of the households, but fully 100 percent), it did however provide a kind of temporary chance to systematize the work on kolkhoz construction. But the unhealthy competition, campaign-style operations and shock work had already flogged collectivization to death. In January 1930, 24.5 percent of all households in the republic had been collectivized; in February, 26 percent; in March 45.1; and in April, 51.3 percent.

Not only were the already-too-high rates of collectivization just adopted violated, but the forms of kolkhoz construction as well. It became a common occurrence to strive for maximum socialization of peasant property in the course of organizing kolkhozes. It was reported from Zatonolskiy Rayon in Kustanay Okrug that, "In the majority of kolkhozes, cattle and sheep were totally socialized, and in a number of kolkhozes the socialization extended even further—to the poultry and even to melon and cucumber seed and the like."

All of this aroused serious dissatisfaction among the peasants. In many regions, as early as January 1930, a mass exodus from the kolkhozes began, and the people spoke out against the chaotic methods of kolkhoz construction. The entire cause of collectivization was threatened, as well as the very basis of the Soviet State—the union of the working class and the peasantry.

Under these conditions, the leadership, headed by Stalin, decided to somehow bring the most painful problems under control. On 20 February 1930 a special Central Committee resolution was issued: "On Collectivization and the Struggle with the Kulaks in the Backward National Economic Regions," in which the local party organizations were warned against distortions in the national policy in kolkhoz construction, unjustified acceleration of the collectivization rate, leapfrogging the lower forms of cooperation, and the spread of repressive measures to the middle class of the peasantry. In early

March the Regulations on Agricultural Artels was published, as well as an article by Stalin, "Mind-boggling Successes," and a resolution of the VKP(b) Central Committee, "On the Struggle with Distortion of the Party Line in the Kolkhoz Movement." This played a certain positive role. Many people attended the meetings in the auls and villages, called to explain to the workers the party's decision on questions of collectivization, and the measures taken to eliminate excesses. A process of stabilization of the kolkhoz movement began in the republic; kolkhozes created by force were dissolved, and many collective farms, especially in the grazing regions, were reorganized under the initial form of cooperation. Whereas in April 1930 collectivization had embraced 51.3 percent of the peasant households, by the end of 1930 this indicator had fallen to 36 percent, and among the animal-herding households it fell to 15 percent. It was highly characteristic that in the course of correcting the shortcomings, 20,000 peasants expressed their desire to enter the kolkhozes **voluntarily**. Funds were allocated to strengthen the material base of the kolkhozes, and loans were granted for seed.

Incidentally, no in-depth analysis of the reason for the distortions and excesses was ever conducted. Stalin placed all the blame on local officials, and the VKP(b) Kazkraykom followed the same line. The cost of such a policy was revealed very soon: as early as the February 1931 Kazkraykom plenum, the goal was set to "ensure further transition to a higher stage of collectivization...and to place the stronger TOZ's under the regulations of the agricultural artels." A new race for "envelopment" was begun, which led to the situation in which by the end of 1931, 65 percent had already been collectivized; and by April 1932, 73.9 percent of the households were enveloped, while at the same time collectivization of the Kazakh aul population amounted to 71.2 percent. Just as before, the predominant methods of kolkhoz-building were administrative pressure, threats and repression.

It is altogether natural that collectivization—having come to life through the "gate of exceptional circumstances," in grain and meat procurement, in conditions of the sharp struggle with the kulaks, and with the continual use of force and naked administrative-command methods of kolkhoz-building—proceeded with great difficulty and was accompanied by many excesses and distortion.

All these things could not but have a most ruinous effect on the development of agriculture in the republic. From 1928 through 1932 inclusive, cultivated land shrank by nearly 400,000 hectares; the average harvest declined from 6.5 to 4.5 cwt per hectare; and the gross grain harvest from 24.8 million cwt to 15.1 million cwt. The size of the cattle herd for these years also declined for various reasons, from 40.5 to 5.3 million head; that is, by a factor of eight. And after all, for a nomad, his livestock means everything: clothes, and housing, and food. This

undermined the productive forces of the countryside and the aul, and millions of people were deprived of the everyday basis for their existence.

The impoverishment and distortions in the course of the procurement campaigns, in the struggle with the kulaks, and the administrative bungling in kolkhoz-building drove the peasant farmers and livestock keepers to the most desperate acts. In the years 1931-32 there were frequent armed peasant uprisings, which the kulaks and wealthy herdsmen skillfully exploited. But the overwhelming majority of the peasants did not, even in this extreme situation, wish to take up arms against the power which they themselves had won and had defended in the course of the revolution and the civil war. They chose a passive form of protest against the oppression and injustices—they emigrated.

We have come to the most dramatic moment in the history of collectivization in Kazakhstan—the mass flight of peasants from their native localities and herdsmen from livestock-raising regions, and the famine which struck the republic's populace in 1931-1933. Every person's life is unique and dear. But here death cut down entire auls, villages and rayons, and it gathered its evil tribute from both children and the old.

Here are several telegrams and reports sent from the localities to the party and Soviet organs: "All the auls of the region have been seized by starvation," a telegram from Ushtobe stated in February 1932. "Three auls near Lake Balkhash have disintegrated. In the remaining six administrative auls, out of 4,417 households only 2,260 remain, of which 63 percent are starving. The remainder of the populace is in great need. The starvation began in the first days of December 1931. According to imprecise data, no less than 600 people starved to death. Starving people are trying to eat horses' hooves, and the refuse from abattoirs..."

"According to available data," it was noted in a report from the OGPU KazPP of 4 August 1932, "the food situation in Atbasarskiy Rayon has become extremely acute. Mass incidents of swelling and death by starvation are observed. From 1 April through 24 July, 111 cases of death were registered; of these, 43 occurred in July."

The famine embraced not only not only those who fled, states a note from the KASSR SNK [Kazakh SSR Soviet of People's Commissars], but also "nearly 100,000 Kazakh households in the nomadic regions, who still remained in their localities. Massive illness and death has been observed among the Kazakh populace."

Children who had lost their parents were in an especially difficult situation. Tens of thousands of orphans starved to death. On 7 August 1932, the KASSR SNK established that while eliminating "child neglect, by 1 August 25,222 children out of 31,993 were provided services; that is, 80 percent. However, services to children's

institutions on the part of the narkomats [people's commissariats] and the kray and oblast organizations was found to be extremely unsatisfactory."

There was starvation not only in the auls, but also in the villages, kishlaks, settlements and towns of Kazakhstan. In Aktyubinsk, for example, during the spring and summer of 1932, 173 people died from emaciation and dysentery in May, 208 in June, 320 in July, and 450 in August.

Workers at new construction projects in Kazakhstan also suffered from hunger, which was expressed in the exceptional "turnover" of cadres. For example, out of 37,772 mine workers in Karaganda in 1932, 33,865 people "were replaced." Things were especially tight for the "special resettlers." In 1933 there were 7,545 here. Here is what V.D. Zatsepin, an experienced miner from Karaganda who worked underground for 37 years, and wears the Order of Lenin and Labor Red Banner, remembers of those days: His family, in which there were 6 children (and two horses, two bulls and two cows) was "unkulaked" and sent to Karaganda to work in the mines. "We lived in a dug-out hole in the ground, in cold and hunger, when the typhus epidemic mowed the people down. Entire families died out. The corpses were laid out in piles in the snow until spring, for no one had the strength to dig up the frozen ground" (INDUSTRIAL-NAYA KARAGANDA, 8 May 1988).

These victims have been a nagging pain in the people's memory for over a half-century now. And it is no accident that it is namely this that is especially upsetting to society today. However the feeling of protest at times leads to unhealthy competition among certain authors who take it upon themselves to write or to appear on TV and radio on these topics, where for greater effect they set about blasphemously juggling increasingly horrible figures of victims.

Thus, the assertion in the Alma Ata weekly, GORIZONT, of 16 July 1988, that as a result of the famine "half the nation, over three million people, died," is completely unproven. The position of Zh. Abylkhozhin and M. Tatimov in LENINSKAYA SMENA of 19 October 1988 appears to be better argued. But even in their calculations ("...Direct losses from famine, epidemics and other deprivations amount to about 1,700,000 people"), one is immediately struck by the fact that while explaining the overall reduction of the Kazakh population in the years 1926-1939, they are all—those who died from natural causes, and those who fled to other regions or abroad—included among those who perished from hunger.

Today of course, after many decades, it is impossible to calculate the losses of that time with absolute accuracy; not one single archive, to include the previously secret sources, contains complete, systematized data on those who fled, and on the famine. It was necessary to gather

information literally by fragments. These are bitter statistics: behind every line stand the thousands and hundreds of thousands of those who perished in the years of famine or were forced to flee their native land. Realizing the responsibility imposed upon us by their memory, we have striven to provide an honest analysis of the most reliable data from all the sources available to us. At the same time, naturally, under no circumstances can we consider it "truth of the last instance," inasmuch as this page of history deserves further research work by scholars.

Among the specific sources which were pressed into service as source materials, one should cite first of all the correspondence between the Kazkraykom and the VKP(b) Central Committee, by Goloshchekin and Stalin and by the republic and union-level Soviet and economic organs; statistical information from Gosplan and the Kazakh Central Statistical Administration, and from individual people's commissariats—for agriculture and health care; OGPU data in the form of operational reports sent to the party organs; notes, telegrams and reports from local party and Soviet organs and organizations; decisions and resolutions of Plenums and Kazk-raykom buros and preparatory materials for them; letters and complaints from communists and non-party members; reports and accounts by authorized representatives on procurement and collectivization.

Because of our concern for maximum objectivity, we propose the following to the readers for a logical course of discussion.

We begin with the general demographic picture, with the size of the population at that period. The most reliable data comes from the census of 1926 and 1939. According to materials of 1926, the population of Kazakhstan consisted of 6,062,910 people, of which 3,496,136 (or 57.6 percent) were Kazakhs; according to the 1939 census, there were 6,093,507 people living in the republic, of which 2,315,532 (or 38 percent) were Kazakhs. Here two facts call attention to themselves—the stability of the overall population numbers since the last census; and the sharp decline in the Kazakh population—by 1,181,000 people.

The stability is explained by the fact that in the 1930's many workers and their families came here from other regions in connection with the industrialization of the republic and organized recruitment. And the reduction in the indigenous population—that is indeed testimony to the famine and the flight which Kazakhstan experienced in the early 1930's.

Of course, the Kazakh nomadic population suffered the most from the famine. However it is a well-established fact that representatives of other nationalities also died of starvation. For example, during these years the number of Uygurs in Kazakhstan was reduced by almost half; Dungans by 25 percent; Uzbeks by 20.5; Ukrainians by

3.4 percent. There were also significant losses among the Russian rural population of Kazakhstan, which were then covered by the influx of workers.

But these were general, approximate figures. Let us turn to information from KASSR Gosplan on the movement of the rural population in the years 1930-33. According to these data, the republic's population began to ebb in 1930, when 121,200 people departed; in 1931 the outflow amounted to 1,074,000 people; and from April to the end of 1932, another 292,000 people left, for a total of 1,487,200 people. But, as noted in the document, these data reflect the situation in only 38 rayons out of 70. It is also well-known that on the whole the demographic deficit in rural population in Kazakhstan in 1933 amounted to 2,498,500 people as compared with 1930, or 58.5 percent of the republic's entire peasant population.

The data on the flight of the Kazakh populace is more or less complete. According to data of the KASSR SNK, in mid-1932 more than "300,000 households" had fled the republic, which amounted to 1.2 to 1.5 million people.

In order to double-check these figures, let us once again turn to the popular census of 1926 and 1939. Let us try to reconstruct the demographic situation among the Kazakh population with respect to the years 1930-33. Knowing the initial figures from the census, one can calculate that by 1930 3.9 million Kazakhs were living in the republic, and in 1933, 2.1 million; that is, there was a reduction of 1.8 million people. Of course these data are also of a relatively inexact nature, inasmuch as they do not take into consideration certain variable demographic factors.

We have, nevertheless, grounds to assert that the number of Kazakhs in the republic decreased by approximately 1.8 million people and the majority of these consisted of refugees. Representatives of other nationalities made up for an additional 700,000 people in the overall deficit in the rural populace.

A great many people fled from the traditional livestock-raising regions of Central Kazakhstan. In 1933 there were only 46,000 households remaining in these 15 rayons, whereas in 1930 there were more than 137,000. The people fled to the Volga Basin, to the Northern Caucasus and the Transcaucasus; they reached the central regions of the country, moving to the Urals, to Siberia, to the Altay and the republics of Central Asia. About 100,000 households went abroad—to Mongolia, China (about 70,000 households fled to Xinjiang alone), and to Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.

[17 Jan 89 p 4]

[Text]

Part III

And so, we have more or less accurately established that during the years 1930-1933 the Kazakh populace in the republic decreased by 1.8 million people and the vast majority consisted of refugees. We shall now attempt to determine the "surplus death rate" of the populace, which will also give us the true dimensions of the tragedy.

During the winter of 1932/33 when the famine began to abate and measures had been taken to provide food aid to the starving, 228,200 people returned to Kazakhstan from other regions of the Union. Hopefully we can exclude these people from the tragic statistics of irreconcilable losses. But at that time far from all the refugees had returned to the republic.

In order to find out how many people managed to survive the famine, in other regions, one can also compare the data on the number of Kazakhs living outside the boundaries of Kazakhstan in 1930 and 1933.

In 1930 the number living outside the republic amounted to 468,000 people, and by 1933 the number had risen to 727,000; that is, an increase of 259,000 people occurred. These are namely the ones who managed to save their lives.

One would like to think that those who fled abroad also remained among the living—they amounted to 400-500,000 people. This hope is inspired by the fact that between 1960 and 1963, 355,000 people returned to Kazakhstan from China—the refugees of 1930-1932 and their descendants.

We shall now sum up certain of the results of the tragedy. Taking into consideration all the aforementioned factors, one can establish that among the Kazakh populace, 1,050,000 to 1,100,000 people lost their lives in the famine of 1931-1933. An additional 200-250,000 victims of the famine were found among the other nationalities in the republic. Such is the price the people paid for the administrative rage of the functionaries who were trying to gain favor.

We have shown the mechanism and the pitiful results of the Kazakh tragedy. But one cannot help describing the efforts of those people who, in such complex conditions, tried to overcome it or alleviate the consequences of this universal sorrow; who were not afraid to raise the voice of truth, when at the same time the highest official organs were hushing up the true state of affairs or trying to shift the blame onto the lower echelons.

The very first acts of administrative tyranny, excesses and gross distortions caused a stream of telegrams, letters and statements from the workers to flow to the party and Soviet organs. As early as 1930, the Central Complaint Bureau of the People's Commissariat, Kazakh RKI [Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate

(1920-1934)] had received more than 17,000. Many of those who appealed wrote of their personal misfortunes. But there also were those who posed the problem in much broader terms, and rang the alarm bell not for themselves, but for the universal calamity, and proposed specific measures to correct the situation.

The attention of the public in the republic is especially drawn today to the letters of both the ordinary people and prominent figures of Kazakhstan—T. Ryskulov, U. Isayev, G. Musrepov and others. Unfortunately it is not possible to present the complete text of the letters in a newspaper article; therefore, we shall publish their basic content.

On 21 February Nurgali Dusenbinov, a resident of Aul No 4, Maksimogorkovskiy Rayon, East Kazakhstan Oblast, appealed to M.I. Kalinin. He bluntly described how certain party-soviet officials and authorized agents took bribes; and "If a certain person did not want to pay the bribe, whether he was a poor [bednyak] or an average [serednyak] peasant—he would be deprived of his vote, his property would be confiscated, and he would be declared a kulak." Hence the poverty, the hunger, and the reason for fleeing, the author concludes. In conclusion he asks: "1. Take urgent measures to halt the starvation; let the state supply food to the populace; 2. All those officials (of local organs)...who are engaging in plundering and bribe-taking, who are spoiling the socialist restructuring of agriculture, must be subjected to severe criminal liability, as enemies of the proletarian revolution..."

In June 1932, I.V. Kolomiets, a party member since 1920 and a worker on the Krasnookyabrskiy Sovkhoz in Dzhetysay Rayon, sent a letter to Stalin. He wrote about shortcomings at his sovkhoz, about local excesses in kolkhoz building and grain procurement; about the famine; about the difficult situation of the villagers; and about the necessity for change in the style of party-soviet work. At the end of the letter he stressed, "...You know, I am not an enemy of the party of Lenin. I am one among the many who have spared no effort and have dedicated their lives to Lenin's ideals."

On 4 July 1932, a letter from a group of communists—G. Musrepov, M. Gataullin, M. Davletgaliyev, Ye. Altynbekov and K. Kuanyshv ("The Letter of Five")—arrived at the VKP(b) Kazkraykom, criticizing the gross mistakes in the administration of agriculture and the excesses in socialist restructuring of the Kazakh auls. The letter pointed out in particular that the catastrophic reduction in the herd size was caused by "leftist" deviations, by the display of "our inability to inspire confidence in the average peasant and explain the actual policy of the party and the government, that the collectivized associations coincide with the interests of the herdsmen themselves, and are at the same time a voluntary matter..."; and our underestimation of individual and public interest of the peasants in collectivization. The authors expressed doubts about the "continuing

silence on questions of the catastrophic reduction of the herd size and the famine which has embraced many rayons with a massive death rate..., which are arousing the people's suspicions and are causing them to have second thoughts about the seriousness of these breakdowns."

They spoke frankly about the fact that the Kazkraykom had poor control over the localities, that under its roof flourished "obvious deceivers, compilers of inflated plans, people who are incapable of heading up the specific work entrusted to them;" and sharply criticized those who "having made certain sacrifices in the class struggle, take consolation from that...and follow the line of least resistance, without overcoming the difficulties," and in this manner are committing a crime.

In August 1932, U. Isayev, a member of the VKP(b) Kazkraykom Buro and chairman of the KazASSR Soviet of People's Commissars, sent a letter to Stalin. The letter disclosed the entire complex of problems associated with the procurement campaigns, the collectivization and the starvation in Kazakhstan. He wrote: "In 10-12 rayons of Central Kazakhstan a significant portion of the populace is starving. According to approximate data, 10-15,000 people starved to death in the spring of this year. The mass exodus, the flight to other krays and republics, which became especially intense in 1931, has not ceased to this day. In many Kazakh rayons, in comparison with 1929, less than half of the population is left. The total number of peasant households in the kray is now less than in 1931, by 23-25 percent. Starving Kazakhs and their homeless children are gathering together around industrial enterprises and sovkhoses in Semipalatinsk and Aktyubinsk Rayons and at railroad stations; they are engaging in theft, are laying siege to kolkhoz fields and are cutting off heads of grain. The hunger, the concentration and the dirt were soil for the spread of epidemics (smallpox, dysentery and so on)."

The author saw the reason for the disastrous situation in the kray in the distortion of party policy, which was expressed "in forced collectivization, in the mandatory socialization of all cattle, and in the use of out-and-out arbitrariness in the practice of caring for livestock. ...The Kraykom has not been decisive enough in correcting these distortions, and was more inclined to believe (and wanted to believe) that the Kazakhs decided en masse to join the kolkhozes, and that only wealthy herdsmen and nationalists were opposed to collectivization. The spirit of 100-percent, immediate collectivization of the aul hovered over the Kraykom itself. Therefore, its proper solution for correcting the excesses remained on paper only...

"The situation created in the aul is to a significant degree connected with the mistakes and shortcomings of the party organization and its leadership. The basic errors are: crazy leftist ideas, the campaign mentality, lack of necessary self-criticism, glossing over shortcomings, and embellishment of the true situation (deception)...

"The desire to outdo the pace of the neighboring rayons and get to socialism faster has led to administratively complete collectivization in the Kazakh auls. ...Does the Kray leadership have a clear understanding of the situation created in the auls? I maintain that, unfortunately, they do not. Hence the measures outlined below, which are actually capable of correcting the situation.

"My proposals:

"1. Present the report of the Kazkraykom to the Central Committee (after preliminary investigation), and derive a comprehensive solution, which points to the miscalculations and basic tasks of the Kazakhstan organization, chiefly on the part of developing the Kazakh aul. Such a decision will have enormous significance; it will stir up and mobilize the entire party organization and all the workers of Kazakhstan to overcome the difficulties and to correct the shortcomings...

"2. Animal husbandry must occupy a central position in the Central Committee decision..." The letter goes on to provide a full-scale program for its restoration. Points 3-5 concern rendering assistance to the starving people and the refugees. Points 6 and 7 speak of building up party-political work among the masses, strengthening the aul party organizations, training and assisting the auls with cadres of specialists.

"8. We cannot, of course, lay all the blame for our shortcomings on someone else. Here the whole buro of the Kraykom is guilty. I personally bear a certain amount of responsibility for the shortcomings and mistakes at the Kraykom and all of our work in Kazakhstan, for I am the leading official in Kazakhstan. But, in order to decisively restructure the work and strengthen the leadership, the leadership of the Kraykom must be re-staffed and renewed. The special role of the first secretary is common knowledge. I personally believe that Comrade Goloshchekin...will not have sufficient power for a decisive turnabout on the basis of severe criticism of the mistakes, both those of the Kraykom and his own."

Isayev was a child of his times. He knew to whom he was writing; therefore neither from him nor from any other Kazakh authors do we find any criticism of Stalin and his "line." However, hardly anything was solved by such criticism until recently. This was not their fault, but their misfortune.

Of course, Isayev himself, along with Goloshchekin are personally responsible for the catastrophe which took place in Kazakhstan. But he did not decline to share the blame with other members of the kraykom.

The letters of T. Ryskulov provide a vivid picture of the situation which evolved in the republic. We know of three appeals which he made to the leading party organs—two to Stalin and one to L. Mirzoyan at the Kazkraykom, which is a copy of notes on a report to the VKP(b) Central Committee.

In his letter of 29 September 1932, Ryskulov, "acknowledging the importance of the Central Committee resolution of 17 September 1932 on animal husbandry in Kazakhstan," proposes supplementing them with specific measures, which on the whole can be reduced to restoring the size of the herd somehow: to return a portion of the socialized cattle and sheep to the kolkhozniks; to assist the populace with cattle from the sovkhoz system and by virtue of state procurement in other regions of the country; to purchase "in neighboring eastern countries (Western China and others), one million head of sheep per year, for distribution among the Kazakh populace," which they will subsequently return to the state. He also proposed that "the krays and republics contiguous to Kazakhstan, to which Kazakhs have immigrated, be obligated to furnish them housing, provide work to the able-bodied, and provide food assistance from local resources."

A note of 31 January 1933 analyzes the blunders of the planning organs with respect to sown areas in the nomadic rayons, and points out that medical services to the public in these rayons is poorly organized.

A letter of 9 March 1933 is much more detailed. It provides vivid examples of the pitiful situation of the populace and boldly discloses, in a principled manner, the excesses and distortions in collectivization and settlement of the nomads, and the distortion of national policy.

Here are a few excerpts from that letter:

"1. Data on the scale of the flight of Kazakhs and their situation: Kazakhs who have fled to krays bordering on Kazakhstan: to the Middle Volga, 40,000; to Kirghizia, 100,000; to Western Siberia, 50,000; to Karakalpakia, 20,000; and to Central Asia, 30,000 people. Refugees were found in even such far-off places as Kalmykia, Tajikistan, the Northern Kray, and others. A part of the population, led by wealthy herdsmen, fled to Western China...

"But the worst result of these flights and the shattering of the Kazakh households are famine and epidemics..."

According to data from local organs, in Turgayskiy and Batbakarinskiy Rayons, 20-30 percent of the populace died out, and a large portion of the remaining populace fled. In Chelkarskiy Rayon in a number of aul soviets 30-35 percent of the populace died...

"2. Reduction in the herd size. ...According to data from the nationwide cattle census in February 1932 (data was double-checked), out of 40 million head of cattle in 1928/29, up to the moment of the census 5,397,000 head remained in Kazakhstan; that is, there was an 85.5 percent reduction..."

The letter concludes with suggestions on providing for the refugees, on systematic settlement of the nomadic population; and on rendering them assistance.

All of the letters cited above corroborate one another and beat on the same point—they demand drawing serious lessons from what happened, and taking energetic measures to overcome the consequences of the national catastrophe.

The reactions of the Kazkraykom to such letters and suggestions were exclusively negative. In response to the letter from I.B. Kolomiys, Chief of the Kraykom Organizational Instruction Department A.G. Diskontov introduced the following resolution: "To send a special responsible official to expose the political physiognomy of the person submitting the statement."

Testifying to the manner in which they "exposed" similar appellants, is the story of another letter. Several days after G. Musrepov, M. Gataullin, M. Davletgaliyev, Ye. Altynbekov and K. Kuanyshev appealed to the kraykom, they were summoned to the VKP(b) KrayKK [Kray Control Commission] which demanded that they retract their statement and acknowledge that it was erroneous and dangerous. On 15 July at a joint session of the Kazkraykom Buro and the KrayKK Presidium, a resolution was adopted which stated that the authors of the letter were "subject to a pessimistic mood, and fell under the influence of right-wing opportunist and nationalistic elements, which was reflected in the document submitted to the Kray Committee on 4 July."

It is well that they were satisfied with their "repentance."

Applying methods of pressure and "exposure," Goloshchekin blocked the criticism addressed to him and to the kraykom. "Goloshchekin interpreted any allusion to the kray leadership as someone's desire to unseat the leadership by means of making its mistakes public." Violation of collective leadership, suppression of criticism, slighting adherence to principle—all of these were characteristic of Goloshchekin.

While Kazkraykom first secretary from 1925 to 1933, he devoted a great deal of attention to the growth of the party nuclei in the villages and auls, the activation of local Soviets, the rooting of the Soviet and economic apparatus, and enlisting the broad working masses for socialist construction. A certain amount of success was achieved in those years in the socialist industrialization of Kazakhstan.

At the same time, during the period of collectivization he committed major blunders and unforgivable mistakes, which led to tragic consequences. He was unable to critically analyze his own activity, or to listen to the advice of his colleagues, nor would he give heed to the communists and the working masses. He saw the reason for the tragedy which burst out in the republic only in

enemy intrigues, the backwardness of the aul, and "distortions of the party line and the policy of Soviet rule by the aul party-soviet organs;" that is, the minor functionaries were to blame for everything and...the suffering peasants and herdsmen themselves as well. He also promoted a "theory" on the fact that the excesses and distortions were natural, and proceeded from the laws of the class struggle; that in socialist construction losses are inevitable.

Of course, other members of the Kazkraykom buro also bore a certain amount of responsibility for these distortions: Ye. Yernazarov, KazTsIK [Kazakh Central Executive Committee] chairman; U.D. Isayev, KazASSR SNK chairman; I.M. Kuramysov, Kraykom second secretary; L.B. Roshal, Kraykom secretary (later replaced by S.T. Golyudov); and U.D. Kulumbetov, deputy chairman, KazASSR SNK.

Only in connection with the obvious failures and the critical situation which had taken shape in Kazakhstan, the VKP(b) Central Committee adopted a resolution on 17 September 1932: "On the Agriculture, and Particularly Animal Husbandry of Kazakhstan," and on 21 January 1933 relieved F.I. Goloshchekin from the post of first secretary, Kazkray party committee. L.I. Mirzoyan, a prominent party and state figure, was sent to Kazakhstan, along with a large group of experienced party officials.

The 6th Plenum of the Kazkraykom, VKP(b), was held in July 1933. The speakers sharply criticized Goloshchekin's defective work style. Miscalculations in the rates, means and forms of collectivization, especially in the nomadic and semi-nomadic regions of Kazakhstan, were "largely the result of the gross political errors and distortions committed by the kray committee," it was stated at the plenum. Ignoring Lenin's principles of peasant cooperation and failure to consider the unique productive activity and way of life of the nomadic population lay at the root of these mistakes.

In spite of the acute food situation in the country, upon the decision of the union government, the republic began to receive significant assistance. During the period from mid-September 1932 through 1 December 1934, more than 5,000,000 cwt of food grain was sent here; in 1933 and 1934 the peasants were sent 956,600 head of cattle. By 1935, the total amount of state expenditures just for settling the Kazakh nomadic population exceeded 350 million rubles.

The emergency measures helped hold off mass starvation. But enormous amounts of time and effort were required to finally overcome the crisis.

In summing up this historical excursion into the dramatic situation in the 1930's, we wish to stress that, no matter how heavy the cost of the mistakes of the past, they must be studied objectively and calmly. Today we understand that the prerequisites and the mechanism for

the Kazakhstan tragedy in general outline were typical for the entire country. As is well-known, during these same years, as a result of a severe crop failure and administrative blunders, a fierce famine raged also through the Ukraine, the Volga Basin, the Urals and Central Asia. Death reaped its terrible harvest there too. But the tragedy had its own specific, terrible features for every nation.

Does all of this mean that the agrarian transformations begun then were following the wrong guideposts? In our view, no. The mass famine, the oppression and the flight of the herdsmen and the peasants from their land were not the direct consequences of the settlement of the nomadic populace and collectivization in Kazakhstan. They were born of violation of Lenin's principle of cooperation, of excesses, of administrative-command methods, and of ignoring the local conditions and peculiarities of the region. And although these deformations did not permit our agriculture to fully display its socialist advantages and capabilities, there is no doubt that on the whole the kolkhoz system has withstood the test of time. It is a historical fact, that on the basis of collectivization, new production relationships took shape in the agrarian sector and significant social achievements were made. The transition from the nomadic to a settled way of life and collective forms of farm management permitted the Kazakh herdsmen and the entire Kazakh people to climb to a higher stage of socio-economic development, and to tear themselves away from the path of the patriarchal-feudal vestiges of the past.

The kolkhoz system possesses the potential for a renaissance and development on the basis of Lenin's principles of the cooperative movement, which indeed is envisaged in the contemporary agrarian policy of the CPSU. And here the principal historical lesson of the early 1930's is extremely important—Agrarian policy must not permit any kind of coercion over the peasant; rather, it must enlist his cooperation through a combination of social and personal interest.

As V.I. Lenin bequeathed, "Under no circumstances command the peasants!"

Footnotes

1. B. Tulepbayev is director of the Institute on Party History at the Kazakh CP Central Committee; he is an academician at the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, and an associate member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. V. Osipov is a section chief at the Institute on Party History at the Kazakh CP Central Committee, and holds the degree of candidate of historical sciences.

2. In accordance with this resolution, a number of stanitsas were placed on the "black list;" shipment of goods to them were stopped; debts were called to account ahead of time; and over 20,000 people were arrested and accused of sabotage.

1937 Ostracism of BSSR Party Official, Suicide Detailed

18000557 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 12 Jan 89 p 3

[Article under the "History Without 'Blank Spots'" rubric by D. Pochanin, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "'I Have Nothing To Hide'"]

[Text] The 16th Congress of the Belorussian Communist Party, which was held in Minsk on 10-19 June 1937, proceeded under complex conditions. A businesslike discussion of the problems confronting it in many cases was replaced by non-objective arguments about "intrigues" and the "exposure" of so-called "enemies of the people." When one becomes acquainted with the materials of this congress, one clearly sees that the situation therein was tense and oppressive. This was described to me by the following presently flourishing delegates to that congress: Comrades F.I. Dadiomova (CPSU member since 1927), I.G. Gerchikov (CPSU member since 1927), and K.M. Rakhuto (CPSU member since 1926).

Particularly strong attacks were made in certain speeches by delegates against A.G. Chervyakov, a member of the Belorussian CP(b) Central Committee Buro and chairman of the Belorussian SSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee]. Many notes were received by the presidium expressing a lack of political trust in A.G. Chervyakov. Here are some of them:

"I would like to put the following question to Comrade Chervyakov as one of Belorussia's old, important officials who has seen with his own eyes our class enemies doing their villainous deeds. Why has he not taken measures against these enemies? Obviously, in certain matters he himself was solidly with them, blindly trusted rogues and national-democrats who turned out to be Polish spies, and promoted them to important positions."

"To Comrade Sharangovich. Tell us: Have Chervyakov's political profile and his involvement with all hostile, counterrevolutionary organizations been checked up on?"

"To Comrade Sharangovich. Answer the following question: How has Chervyakov been exposing the party's enemies?"

Many analogous notes were submitted. And Chervyakov's name was mentioned more than once in the speeches by the delegates.

A.G. Chervyakov made a speech at the morning session on 14 June 1937. He said the following in particular:

"As a member of the Belorussian CP(b) Central Committee Buro occupying an important position in the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and Soviet

Belorussia, I bear responsibility for grave shortcomings in the work of the Central Committee Buro and the government, and for the fact that we overlooked some enemies of the people...."

After A.G. Chervyakov's speech the attacks by certain delegates against him intensified even more.

Here are some excerpts from their speeches:

"Take Comrade Chervyakov, for example. During the checkup on party documents he failed to expose a single person. I am not satisfied with the stance taken by Chervyakov...."

"...We are entitled to demand from Comrade Chervyakov not merely an enumeration of his errors in the past.... We demand that he speak out and expose people for us, that he help us to completely root out persons who, even now, in all probability, are hiding within our party."

"...The following circumstance seems dubious to me—extremely assiduous work by Comrade Chervyakov to maintain his own authority among certain strata of the intelligentsia.... Comrade Chervyakov has never found the strength and courage to decisively rebuff this rotten intelligentsia with its national-democratic tendency or the out-and-out national-democrats...."

On 15 June A.G. Chervyakov was compelled to make a second speech at the congress, and he stated the following in particular:

"A number of serious political questions have been put to me at this congress, and I am obliged to answer them as follows...: 1. Concerning my political errors in the past. 2. Concerning my standpoint in exposing enemies of the people, specifically, in connection with the checkup on party documents which was conducted; on the mutual relationships within the Buro of the Belorussian CP(b) Central Committee and my attitude toward Goloded; on my role as chairman of the Central Executive Committee in administering economic and cultural construction, and leadership in the Dzerzhinskiy Rayon—this last question was put to me yesterday by Berman. Well, I'm going to attempt to answer these questions...."

In the conclusion of his second speech he declared the following: "Many of the accusations made against me are not true. They are very grave. I cannot accept them."

Even after A.G. Chervyakov's second speech the attacks on him continued. The congress delegates with whom I met told me that matters went even further. This congress was held at Government House, in the auditorium where sessions of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet now take place. On 16 June after the morning session a 20-minute recess was announced as usual. However, it continued for more than two hours. Upon opening the

next session, V.F. Shrangovich declared that during the recess A.G. Chevryakov, chairman of the TsIK and member of the Belorussian CP(b) Central Committee Buro, had shot and killed himself in his own office. An announcement was made right away concerning the formation of a commission to organize the funeral; this committee was to comprise several persons, including some of the delegates. The congress's work was not halted.

On 17 June the presiding officer at the morning session declared that those who wished to attend Chevryakov's funeral were free to leave. However, not many delegates took part in the funeral proceedings.

At the evening session the concluding speech by way of discussing the Accountability Report was delivered by V.F. Sharangovich. In particular, he said the following:

"...In my concluding speech I, of course, had intended to devote an entire section concerning Chevryakov's speech at this congress. But, in connection with the fact that Chevryakov has committed suicide on personal, family grounds, it seems to me that there is no need to say much about this double-dealer, who wore a mask for a long time in the Belorussian CP(b), and who, by his act of suicide, albeit on personal grounds, did commit a patently hostile act. It's as if he could not withstand the criticism which has evolved at our congress.

"I am absolutely confident that our congress, our whole Belorussian CP(b), and the entire Belorussian people will receive the announcement of Chevryakov's suicide and evaluate it as a hostile act against the party, against the people, against all of us."

The newspaper ZVYAZDA carried a brief notice to the effect that Chevryakov had committed suicide on personal grounds.

It should be noted that before three weeks had passed they would be saying the same things against Sharangovich, i.e., that he was an enemy of the people, a wrecker, and a spy.

Soon after the 16th Congress of the Belorussian CP(b) he was arrested, then found guilty, and shot. As you know, he was posthumously rehabilitated after the 20th CPSU Congress.

In 1969 a copy of a posthumous letter by A.G. Chevryakov, addressed to the delegates of the 16th Congress of the Belorussian CP(b) was discovered. I showed it to P.M. Masherov, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. After reading this note, Petr Mironovich requested me to seek out the original. Unfortunately, the original could not be found.

We archive staff members have concluded that the original of A.G. Chevryakov's letter has not been preserved but that the copy which was discovered is genuine

and valid. To a certain degree, this is confirmed by V.F. Sharangovich's words a propos of the fact that Chevryakov shot himself because he "could not withstand the criticism which has evolved at our congress."

Here below is the complete text of the posthumous letter (in copy form) from the chairman of the Belorussian SSR Central Executive Committee to the delegates of the 16th Congress of the Belorussian CP(b).

"To the 16th Congress of the Belorussian CP(b):

"Dear Comrades:

"I spoke honestly and openly at the congress. I have not hidden anything or anyone, for I have nothing to hide. I did not organize anyone.

"Everyone has turned away from me, and the most absurd accusations of double-dealing have been leveled at me. Believe me, the path of work in the Belorussian SSR has been complex and difficult, but I have traveled that path solely in the name of the party of Lenin and Stalin, under the leadership of the party and its Central Committee. I depart with the name of the party and its leader, Comrade Stalin, in my heart.

"I depart cursing all enemies of the people. I curse the Belorussian fascists and agents of Polish imperialism.

"I know that I am committing a monstrous crime, but I beg you never to mix me up with the enemies of the people.

"Farewell, Comrades.

"A. Chevryakov".

Let's leaf through Vol 11 of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. On pp 186-187 it states that Aleksandr Grigoryevich Chevryakov was a soviet, state, and party figure, a member of the Communist Party since May 1917. He was born on 25 February 1892 in the village of Dukorka, Minsk Guberniya [Province], to a peasant family. In 1909 he passed the exam to attain the title of people's schoolteacher, and he was employed in Vilnius Guberniya. In 1915 he graduated from the Vilnius Teachers' Institute and was drafted into the army. After the February 1917 Revolution he was one of the organizers and leaders of the Belorussian Social-Democratic Workers' Party, which constituted the foundation for creating the Belorussian Section of the RCP(b). He participated in the October Revolution in Petrograd and in creating the Belorussian SSR. On 1 January 1919 he joined the recently formed Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Belorussia as the People's Commissar of Education, and, along with others, he signed the manifesto re forming the Belorussian SSR. During the years 1918-1920 he was Commissar for Belorussian Affairs under the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Nationalities, he engaged in political work in the Red Army on the

Western Front, served as chairman of the Minsk Guberniya Revkom [Revolutionary Committee], the Belorussian SSR VRK, and took part in the peace talks with Poland (October 1920) in Riga. From 1920 through 1924 he was chairman of the Belorussian SSR Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars, and from 1924 through 1937 he was chairman of the Belorussian SSR Central Executive Committee...."

After the 16th Congress and the Third Plenum of the Belorussian CP(b) Central Committee, which was held on 29 July 1937, the arbitrary rule and the campaign to expose the so-called espionage and wrecking, the repressions against communists and non-party scholars, as well as cultural officials in this republic were unleashed with new force.

Such is the reality. There is nowhere to escape from it. And the party does not intend to keep silent about the grave, bitter pages of our past history. The names of persons who were illegally accused and repressed must occupy their deserved place in history.

Change of Curriculum at Military Schools Urged by Philosophers

18000505z Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
7 Feb 89 p 2

[Letter to editors by Col V. Kovalevskiy, Ph.D. Philosophy, professor; Col (Ret) N. Lysukhin, Ph.D. History, docent; Capt 1st Rank V. Puzik, Ph.D. Philosophy, professor and Col (Ret) Ye. Rybkin, RSFSR Honorary Scientist, Ph.D. Philosophy, professor: "To Raise a Creative Person" under the "Letter to the Editors" rubric; first paragraph a boldface introduction]

[Text] What should be the direction of perestroika in the teaching of social sciences and what path is the most correct and efficient one? This question has been the subject of many seminars and debates among military social scientists as well as military academy students and cadets. In the present letter, teachers of the Military Academy imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskiy express their views on the subject.

It has become totally clear that the set of scholastic subjects and fossilized propaganda plans, formulas and postulates which for decades have formed the basis of social sciences instruction at higher educational institutions can no longer be considered marxism-leninism. Yet, the dogmas' stagnant and stultifying impact will not change if the sequence or methods of teaching them are altered or a number of subjects are no longer taught. We think it is obvious. Yet, we must mention it since some social scientists view that path as the most promising one. For instance, professors at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze propose to replace several social sciences with the general course "Marxism-Leninism and Methodological Problems of Military Theory and

Practice". Their point of view was expressed in the article titled "To Restore Interest in Theory" published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's June 12 issue.

But let us be realistic. Merely combining, joining or enlarging something often does not turn out to be a good thing. There are reasons to doubt it; they are provided by the very history of social sciences instruction at military academies. After [Stalin's] "Short History of the VKP(b)" was introduced, the number of departments was sharply curtailed and everything was very soon reduced to the study of that "encyclopedia of marxism-leninism". Only after the 20th party congress did the "rehabilitation" of social sciences take place, and independent departments reappeared or were newly established and specific courses were introduced.

Experienced teachers know what the introduction of a general course means in practice: philosophers are sent to lecture on economics and historians on philosophy, while scientific communism teachers are assigned to supervise field work in party and political studies. At first it is done as an exception and but later becomes norm.

Another matter needs to be kept in mind: the introduction of a general course, by legitimizing the "versatile" use of teachers, gives a go-ahead to the process of draining those subjects of their basic content and harms the development of military theory. A department is not merely a teaching unit but a research vehicle as well; it is a form of theory's existence and development.

One of the reasons cited by supporters of general courses is the fact that the social sciences curriculum at academies contains nothing new compared to that at service schools. But this refers to the past, to the period of stagnation and dogmatism, when programs and curricula remained unchanged for decades and when even textbooks all over the country were mass-produced or reduced to common denominator. How can one not see that after April 1985 nothing but ruins remain of the concrete blocks of social sciences dogma, that regeneration of social sciences has been gathering strength. The historical, philosophical and social thought is being reborn based on the principle of fidelity to truth.

The renewal of content offers an opportunity to create extremely interesting educational programs for both service schools and academies. There is plenty of material for a good teacher. The proper academic level of instruction will be achieved by finding and preparing at military academy departments gifted professors able to teach their own independent courses.

Naturally, we are all concerned with the fact that curricula are somewhat removed from military practice. One of the ways to solve this problem is to introduce practice-oriented themes into theoretical courses and to offer special courses. The question is, however, how to organize such special courses. Before preparing lectures, we

need to raise the issue at a scientific level. However, there are no dissertations, monographs or methodological materials on the subject, i.e., no scientific foundation exists as yet. Is there not a danger that the schematic approach in theory will be replaced with the same in practice? In general, is it possible to supply future military commanders with recommendations for all possible events in life?

The ability to evaluate correctly and competently events in public life and on duty, and to make appropriate decisions, is determined not by the level of theoretical knowledge of the officer but by his ability to think independently and by his methodological and professional expertise. To build such professional expertise and such personality in an officer is the goal of basic academic education. It can be achieved only if all the

wealth and opportunities inherent in history, philosophy, economics, literature and the arts, and all the treasures of humanities, are fully utilized.

For the study of specific practical questions there are special departments, commanders' training schools and an entire range of non-academic facilities for marxist-leninist and professional training and retraining of officers, which include independent studies. As to military academies, the most promising and reliable way to relate theory to military practice here should be new, thorough and specific courses on military social sciences, complete with appropriate new departments and labs.

The creation of new training and research units at leading higher education institutions will help conduct scientific sociological research on all aspects of life and activities of the Armed Forces.

Pros, Cons on Serviceman's Religion-Motivated Pacifism

18010179 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA
in Russian No 22, Nov 88 pp 29-30

[Article under the rubric "On Antireligious Subjects": "I Sow Goodness..."]

[Text] Pvt Aleksandr Muzhkevich, a military construction worker, has refused to take the oath, will not handle weapons and avoids combat training, although he is a diligent worker and successfully performs the construction jobs assigned to him. What is the explanation for the soldier's behavior?

A. Muzhkevich himself explained it to Maj V. Mukhin, our correspondent:

I am a believer and a member of the Evangelical Christian Baptist sect. Upon entering the army, none of the young men in our church take your formal oath. We have already taken an oath to the Lord God, after all, and one does not take an oath twice. I do not touch weapons, because that is a sin. If every person on Earth were to do as I do and treat other people as brothers, there would be neither wars nor conflagrations on Earth.

Why enclose borders and guard the nation in which we live? It is purely a formality, after all. The fatherland is our entire Earth, on which we exist only a short time. We shall then meet God and begin a new life. Centuries and millions of years will pass, the Sun will die, the Earth and the stars will disappear, but we shall never cease to exist....

I am certain that only a belief in God provides true conviction. I cannot say that I arrived at this conclusion all at once. No, I tried many things before I accepted baptism by water. Once I even wanted to join the Komsomol, but I changed my mind. In my opinion, today's Komsomol members do not have the kind of conviction and purpose which can infect them and inspire them to great deeds. The affectation and phony-ness merely repulse one. Take the Komsomol members in our subunit, for example. Officially, almost every one of them has some kind of assignment, is listed somewhere as an agitator or editor. Generally speaking, however, all of that is phoney. The Komsomol members do not independently perform any sort of interesting work.

You should see what kind of celebrations, shows and concerts we have at our church. We present scenes from biblical life, sing church songs, compose and learn new ones. No one forces us to do this. Each of us feels an inner need for it.

I have told my colleagues about our church life more than once. I regard myself as a sower, and I do not hide that. My goals are lofty and important, you see: I am trying to develop correct views on life in the soldiers.

I can honestly say the thing which disappoints me the most in the subunit is the fact that I am sometimes unable to prevent rudeness, humiliation and physical violence. Unfortunately, some of my colleagues commit these sins. Our so-called activists are passive in these situations. I myself consider it my duty to cheer up, comfort and say a kind word to the victim: "God also suffered and found happiness. You need to be kind-hearted. If you are struck on the cheek, turn the other. We can only save one another with universal love for our fellow man."

I have a lot of time left in the army, and I believe that I will be able to open the eyes of many to the world while I am here.

But What Will the Sowing Produce?

The opinion of Maj Gen (Res) K. Payusov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor:

Pvt Aleksandr Muzhkevich calls himself a "sower" and has set himself the "lofty" goals of "opening the eyes of people to the world" and developing in his colleagues "correct views on life." Let us figure out what he is "sowing."

Having come to believe in God, he regards universal religious pacifism as the best means of preserving peace. Muzhkevich's teachings are, alas, not new. Attitudes condemning armed force and the participation of believers in it have existed throughout the history of Christianity, particularly in the teachings of the religious sects of Donatists, Bogomils, Albigenses, Valdenses, Moravian Brothers, Mennonites, Quakers, Dukhobors, Tolstoyans and others. A few believers take this "moral" position even today among the Jehovah's Witnesses, Reformed Adventists, Evangelical Christian Baptists....

Christian sermons on love and brotherhood have been given for almost 2,000 years, but these things do not and cannot exist between oppressors and the oppressed. Appeals to love one's neighbor (including enemies) as brothers disarm not the oppressors and aggressors, but their victims. The abstract-pacifistic advocacy of peace only makes it difficult for the workers to understand objective reality and diverts them away from effective ways and means of struggling for peace.

There is no place for violence against people in our ideal. "The end of wars," V.I. Lenin taught us, "peace among peoples and the ending of plunder and violence—precisely these things are our ideal...." Moreover, the military doctrine of the Soviet State and its Warsaw Pact allies is based on the prevention of war. The Soviet people do not count on God to give them peace and good will; they struggle persistently for it.

The promotion of peace is inherent in the socialist system, but it is not reduced to a matter of pacifism in religious or any other form. As we struggle for peace and

support pacifist movements in the bourgeois nations, we cannot permit pacifist sentiments in our midst, cannot relax our vigilance to the intrigues of aggressors. This is particularly inadmissible in the military. Assessing the moral position taken by Pvt Muzhkevich, let us frankly say that it is nothing other than capitulation to a social evil, to the aggressive imperialist forces. His conscience is deaf to the needs of the homeland and his people. Focusing on the fulfillment of duty to God, it comes into conflict with duty to the Soviet society and promotes anarchic rejection of the homeland's armed defense.

...Pvt Muzhkevich is disappointed most by the fact that "he is unable to prevent rudeness, humiliation, physical violence" and other "sins" of his colleagues and complains that in such cases the subunit's "so-called activists" are "passive." Perhaps Muzhkevich himself actively opposes such "sins"? Unfortunately, he does not. His is only an internal, abstract, impersonal condemnation of them. He limits his role to comforting the wronged, degrading for a Soviet fightingman: "God suffered and bade you," he says, "if they strike you on the cheek, turn the other cheek."

It would actually be naive to expect a convinced Baptist actually to support discipline and order in the subunit or to criticize specific transgressors directly and openly. After all, he honors the evangelical commandment: "Judge not, lest ye be judged." His rule is the following: "Conceal another's sin, and God will forgive two." Comforting and the preaching of patience and all-forgiveness cannot serve as a barrier to nonregulation relations in the subunit, however. Religious-moral "sowing" will not eliminate the "sins." An active stance is needed, the kind, from all accounts, not taken by the subunit Komsomol members. It would not be a bad thing to heed Pvt Muzhkevich's critical comments on measures conducted "formally," at the bidding of "higher-ups" and "boringly." There would then be no fertile soil for the "sower."

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Journalist on New Stage In Church-State Relations

*Moscow NAUKA I RELIGIYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 88 pp 2-4*

[Article by V. Pravotorov under the rubric "The Course of Perestroika": "The Passing Year, The Coming Year"]

[Text] The passing year has been rich in major, turning-point events. The changes have been so rapid and serious that we often have no time to digest and comprehend their real meaning and significance. One example is the preparations for, and celebration of, the 1000th anniversary of the introduction of Christianity in Russia, an event that has occupied a special place in society's spiritual life, in the development of state-church relations, and in our reappraisal [perestroika] of atheistic education.

Life has overturned the predictions of numerous foreign soothsayers concerning a religious anniversary in an "atheistic state." The myths of a "persecuted," "voiceless" church have collapsed. The highest echelons of international clerical circles have publicly conceded that the celebrations were extensive, open, and dignified. Of course, such assessments went against the grain of some in the West. One myth has fallen, but new ones have appeared. Philistines are still being admonished not to believe it, because the anniversary will pass and everything will be as before. Or they are being frightened with another vision: Beware, by adding the holy cross to the hammer and sickle Soviet Russia has become even more dangerous in its expansionist plans!

But perhaps the most frequent refrain is the claim of a "religious renaissance" in the USSR. Reference is made to overflowing halls at concerts of religious music, triumphant exhibitions of old Russian icons, and numerous interviews by clerics in the mass media. Since the church's historical and latter-day deserts are being recognized, that must mean that atheism is collapsing and religion is gaining the upper hand in the contest of world outlooks.

Perhaps it really is gaining the upper hand? Having asked that question one immediately sees polemical spears rising in readiness for rhetorical rivalry. But what if we approached the debate not in order to "trap" the enemy, but as Lenin wrote, "to elucidate the issue"? For it is, indeed, no simple thing. Judge for yourself. The prominent Catholic weekly *FAMILIA CHRISTIANA* began its interview with Vienna Cardinal F. Konig prior to his departure for the festivities in Moscow with the question: "Your Eminence, what are the consequences of modern man's growing atheism and indifference to religion?" At about the same time a correspondent of the weekly *ARGUMENTY I FAKTY* addressed a somewhat different question to Vladimir, Metropolitan of Rostov and Novocherkassk: "What, in your opinion, is the reason that some of our young people are turning to the church?"

Although we have limited ourselves to quoting only questions, the thoughtful reader will doubtlessly see in them certain assessments of the religious situation; frankly speaking, very different assessments. True, judging by the Metropolitan's answer, in clerical circles there is more unanimity on this score: "I would not say... that our young people are all that interested in the church..." But our journalistic brethren took it up readily, so that even *SOVETSKIY SPORT* decided to publish an article entitled, "Why Does the Reverend Need Sporting Goods?"

But seriously speaking, what is behind the current interest in religion and the church? Of course, 1000th year anniversaries are not all that frequent and that alone is a drawing factor. But the main thing is the moral-political atmosphere which is asserting itself in our society and which so attracts world public attention. This is a

response to the glasnost effect, to the spirit of openness [otkrytost], to a desire to honestly reassess the country's present and past so as to discern the contours of the future.

For a long time our mass media either ignored the subject of religion or treated it in solely negative terms. Whatever positive information appeared was only for export. But the church has lived for more than seven decades in Soviet society and the time has long past when its high priests, failing to comprehend the essence of Lenin's decree on freedom of conscience and the nature of the new government, had stubbornly resisted it. The church paid dearly for those mistakes by losing the confidence of many believers. There were also tragic mistakes on the part of the authorities during the years of the personality cult, fiat [voluntarizm] and stagnation, when the legitimate rights of believers and the church were violated. All that, it would seem, has gone, it's all in the past. Except, perhaps, for some extremists in clerical circles and bureaucrats pushed to the sidelines by the surge of perestroika. But simple truths are hard to master: That socialist democracy cannot be complete, and therefore genuinely socialist, if it extends to only a part of societal relations, to some citizens but not others.

Even after April 1985 and the 27th CPSU Congress, which loudly proclaimed that without democracy there could be no perestroika, the mass media, while sharply criticizing bureaucratic red tape in the economy, management and culture and boldly exposing even such traditionally restricted topics as defense and space, said nothing about the number of religious associations or temples and sidestepped festering problems of state-church relations.

The situation began to change appreciably only after the meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church. And here other things became apparent. The light of glasnost helps some see problems better and resolve them more forcefully, but it blinds others and prevents them from seeing the truth. Apparently, it still has not become something normal and natural in our societal life.

Metropolitan Vladimir is right: Public attention to clerical matters, the clergy and their cultural values is to some degree a "reverse reaction." Formerly we ignored it, now let's talk; before we wrote in negative terms, now let's stress radiant hues. So many sugary articles have appeared about churches, monasteries and the selfless actions of clerics. Eventually it was not the journalists but Orthodox priests who felt it necessary to stress that the church is made up of living people, it is not a community of saints.

I do not want to question the wealth of thought in the philosophical heritage of Pavel Florenskiy, Vladimir Solovyev or Sergey Bulgakov. Publication of their works is a noble and, I would say, patriotic undertaking. But I see a "reverse effect" in the fever generated over subscriptions to those books.

Can one cite the number of people visiting churches, mosques and prayer houses or the growth in registered religious associations to unequivocally claim that religion is on the rise? This kind of logic easily leads to the conclusion that perestroika promotes religion. Serious students of the problem are fully aware that today we are merely openly recognizing things that began to happen long ago but were concealed behind a shroud of silence, cheerful reports embellishing the situation, and bureaucratic barriers erected in the way of legitimate demands of believers.

There are, of course, other concerns that feed interest in religion. There are so many worries, hardships and tragedies in the world. We once thought that in just a little more time they would all be resolved. But the real-life dialectics of social progress turned out to be much more complex. Some fears receded into the past only to be replaced by other, formerly unheard of concerns: the threat of nuclear destruction, ecological catastrophe, AIDS. Not everyone can cope with them alone. Some need comfort and support. And when, in our debates about truth, in our efforts for the common good, we forget specific, living people, they may turn to the church in quest of solace and support, especially since today it does not sidestep the concerns and pains of the time, the problems worrying mankind. Its participation in the Culture Fund, the V. I. Lenin Children's Fund and other undertakings are all worldly deeds which generate feelings of good will among people.

Up till now we have been speaking of the social roots of religion. But there are also gnoseological roots: the difficulty and contradictory nature of the cognition process which creates, in the words of Academician N. Moiseyev, a "zone of uncertainty." Religious feelings can be generated by belief in "the unity of nature and man, that our thoughts and feelings are natural processes like outer space and living creatures.

What is this, people may ask, are atheists praising religion? Perhaps we will then recognize its positive role in the assertion of common human morals, and what need will there be for atheism? Some people ask such questions. We have often said: In the struggle for truth atheism has no need for distortions of the truth. The truth of life, the truth of history, however bitter, is "the most beneficial thing" for every real communist who is consistent in his convictions. Isn't it better to honestly understand the actual situation, to try and understand the true role of religion and the church in the modern world, than to create an image of a "straw" enemy, crush it, and then rejoice in one's imaginary victory?

I would also like to discuss the following question. So far the aggregate historical experience has not given us an example that would allow us to say: Here is socialism without religion. But does that mean that Marx's prediction that religion would disappear as socialism develops has proved erroneous? Perhaps it is not a question of the nature of socialism or the laws of its establishment but of

the actual ways in which it was established, with reversals from democracy, deformations of socioeconomic structures, stagnation and major errors of policy, in short, the real-life earthly roots that breed feelings of injustice, social alienation, insecurity and fear. In short, it would be better, in our view, not to rush to judge the truth of Marx's prediction about the disappearance of religion with the development of socialism until we can confidently say that full, developed socialism has been built.

In commenting in this jubilee year of Russian Orthodoxy on all the good things the church has done in our country the mass media have either ignored atheism or treated it in critical tones. Some publications used words like "obdurate," "immoral atheism," "the merciless axe of the atheist." After reading some papers one might wonder whether there was such a thing as an atheist without an axe.

Is this, too, not something of the aforementioned "reverse reaction"? In the tragic 1930s there were indeed atheists who wrote about "the army of obdurate, ignorant priests." And even in less remote times some atheists were not reticent in their use of expressions critical of religion. Such atheism cannot, of course, be justified. But can one equate stupidity, fanaticism and militant ignorance with free thinking, with atheism that springs from the mighty tree of culture and is inseparably linked with the right to freedom of conscience?

No good can come, I am sure, from publications which, instead of analyzing the causes and sources of acute contradictions between fairly large circles of the revolutionary masses and the clerical elite, prefer to fan passions over militant atheism. The duty of the press, Marx remarked, is to turn the struggle of demands, passions and empirics into a struggle of theories and reason, not the other way around. It is wrong to sow seeds of distrust and fan intolerance offensive to people's feelings and conscience, whether they be believers or atheists. Intolerance in relations between atheists and believers is our common enemy, and to a degree our common inheritance. It breeds arrogance, nurtures national conceit, and prevents people from soberly assessing the business and moral qualities of those who adhere to other views or other religions.

We must all, of course, analyze the difficult history of relations between our atheism and religion and restore the full truth. And if today we are inclined to concede that the nature of religion and the church by no means predetermines their class antagonistic role with regard to mass democratic, revolutionary movements and to socialism, is it right, at the same time, to as it were; surreptitiously suggest the notion that atheism inevitably arouses hostility towards believers, that it is blind in its attitudes towards monuments of religious culture? There is an apparent tendency to seek some inner links between atheism and arbitrary rule, the rejection of freedom of conscience in the years of the personality cult, fiat

[voluntaryism] and stagnation. But those ugly attitudes, which distorted the new system's nature, inflicted tremendous damage on everything associated with freedom of conscience, atheism included.

At first glance it seems paradoxical: during the Stalin period, first Lenin's formula about freedom of conscience, recorded in the first Soviet Constitution, was truncated by removing the words about freedom of religious propaganda; later a blow was dealt against atheistic propaganda. But in reality there is no paradox. The cult of the personality merely manipulated the concept of "freedom of conscience," paring away first one side, then the other, replacing conscience with freedom to revere one infallible personality, fostering in the masses, in the words of Chinghiz Aytmatov, an "idolatry syndrome." That was the main blow dealt by the cult against the cause of fostering a materialistic conscience free from fear of the truth and from belief in the supernatural or in miracles, albeit worked not by God but by a leader endowed with supreme wisdom and supreme will.

During the years of the personality cult the church was often accused of abetting the class enemy and world imperialism. True enough. But it was also frequently bunched together with people who consistently advocated positions of materialism and atheism, the "Bukharin bandits and scoundrels." The trouble with atheism was that it was cleverly exploited by the propaganda mechanism that created the atmosphere of distrust and fear needed to ideologically justify repression.

If in referring to history one sticks unswervingly to the truth one must also recognize other things. It wasn't Stalin alone who linked antireligious propaganda and atheism with the mounting class struggle. We could recall the words of N. I. Bukharin spoken in 1929: "The struggle against religion is one of the prime aspects of the cultural revolution... It is topical. The anti-religious front should be clearly seen as a front of the class struggle." We have yet to analyze in detail all the reasons for the great aggravation of state-church relations and the sharply politicized atheistic propaganda during that period of socialist construction.

It is tempting to attribute the violations of the Leninist principles of freedom of conscience in the period following Stalin's death to atheism. We know today the courage and strength N. S. Khrushchev had to display when he came out with his criticism of the personality cult and its consequences and how much was done at the time to restore socialist legality. The CPSU Central Committee passed quite a few resolutions denouncing "gross mistakes" in scientific-atheistic propaganda, "cases of administrative interference in the activities of religious associations and groups, as well as roughshod attitudes towards the clergy." And yet it is hard to agree that the development of normal relations between the state and the church allegedly halted during the years of stagnation. The policy of democratization pursued by N. S.

Khrushchev was far from consistent, and not only in the economic sphere. One need but recall the Pasternak affair or Khrushchev's celebrated meetings with representatives of the creative intelligentsia.

The theoretical roots of the distortions of the Leninist principles of freedom of conscience during that period lie in the utopian doctrine of building the foundations of communism by 1980. It was in a way an integral, internally noncontradictory doctrine. If the material, technical, social, political and cultural prerequisites of communism were to be established by the stated date it meant that there was no secular basis for religious ideas and feelings. All that remained were "conservative conscience," "inadequacies" of propaganda, and the artful actions of clerics and sect members "misleading" the people. Since life, as we know, followed a different scenario, propaganda and administrative force and pressure were accentuated. Theoretical thought was divorced from life and, forced into the Procrustean bed of erroneous ideological dogma and seeing that matters were somehow developing "not according to science," resorted to profound discourses to the effect that the roots of religion had been undercut, yet factors conducive to the survival of religious ideas still persisted.

The theory of atheism offered few genuinely scientific revelations during the years of stagnation. We say this because in our view the currently propagated notion that all the troubles of contemporary atheism stem from the fact that propaganda personnel are poorly versed in theory is far from harmless. They are indeed poorly versed, but the theory, too, is faulty. We have yet to produce a theory that would soberly analyze the current situation, profoundly reveal the reasons for the existence of religious concepts in a socialist society, and clearly demonstrate the actual role of religion and the church in it.

Everyone agrees that much in atheism is outdated and is in need of fundamental renovation and restructuring [perestroika]. But what should atheism be like tomorrow?

An image of the new atheism that would be consonant with the positive changes and concerns of our time is still in the making. But its main, basic features are already apparent. One of them is the in-depth study of religion, its past and present, its theoretical doctrines and mass sermons, its place and role in the modern world and in our Soviet society. When the moderator of the KINO-PANORAMA television program declared, "My atheism is based on ignorance," many atheists took it as something of a personal affront or as a call to reject atheism and turn to religion. But another well-known cultural figure, while stressing that he stood by his atheist positions, openly said, "I want to know what it is I reject." "My desire to know," he went on to explain, "does not mean that I accept the phenomenon, but to know what I reject is my duty."

It seems so pointed and refreshing, doesn't it? But it is quite some time since V. A. Sukhomlinskiy declared as categorically, "True atheism and the birth of the new citizen is impossible without understanding religion."

As it sets forth modern scientific views on religion and the church this journal intends to acquaint the reader more extensively with texts from the Bible and the Koran, with the fundamentals of contemporary religious dogmas, with the history and philosophy of religion and, of course, the history and philosophy of atheism. We want, and will strive, to tell the truth as it is, or at least as we know it today.

Quite a few painful issues of state-church policies remain unresolved. As M. S. Gorbachev emphasized, an important role in this must be played by the new law on freedom of conscience, which will also reflect the interests of religious organizations. The editors are getting letters from readers, atheists as well as believers with numerous critical comments on existing laws and proposals for improving them.

We are asked whether it would not now be better to refrain completely from criticizing religion, whether this does not prevent collaboration between atheists and believers in tackling the major, innovative tasks of perestroika.

We feel sure that it does not. We cannot avoid philosophical arguments and debate. In such debates atheists are moved not by a desire to prove their superiority but to help people come back to themselves, repossess alienated moral ideals, gain faith in their strength and ability to assert justice, which they still associate in their dreams with faith in God, thereby avoiding their own responsibility. This desire of ours is associated with the notion of Liberated Man, Moral Man, Happy Man. But atheists are also convinced that people cannot be brought to this against their will. They must make their own choices. That is why, while working together with believers on renovating socialism, strengthening peace or protecting the environment, we do not sidestep philosophical debates, but neither do we impose our views. The philosophical debate should be conducted in forms and tones that would not impede our joint work. Is this feasible? It is. Testimony to this is our Soviet experience, the lessons of world history, the lessons of the passing year.

Almost 40 years ago (in June 1949) a holy conclave in the Vatican adopted a resolution banning any collaboration between believers and communists; in the middle of this year the Polish Catholic weekly KERUNKI spoke of a meeting between the "Great Preacher of Peace"—the Pope and the "Man of Dialogue"—M. Gorbachev as of a cherished dream.

Is it not symbolic that in the passing year, for the first time in history, Gorbachev and Reagan were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize? We do not know what the

Nobel Committee's decision will be, but a poll conducted by an American public opinion institute among citizens of six West European nations—the FRG, France, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and the Netherlands—showed that 65 percent supported the idea of awarding the Peace Prize for the signing of the INF Treaty. In the breakdown, 32 percent voiced their preference for M. S. Gorbachev, 15 percent for R. Reagan, and 18 for both leaders together.

Each man is true to his social ideals and world outlook, but a common concern for peace and the preservation of human civilization became for them a subject for constructive dialogue and cooperation. Today the idea of the priority of common human values is increasingly capturing the minds of political, public, and religious leaders. "We for our part," it was emphasized at the 19th Party Conference, "have received the opportunity to see and understand the surrounding world better, to take part in discussing its problems and seeking approaches to their resolution, to take advantage of ideas coming from other cultures and traditions..."

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Academy of Sciences Official On Religion-Science Relationship

*18000535b Moscow NAUKA I RELIGIYA in Russian
No 12, Dec 88 pp 6-8*

[Interview with K. V. Frolov by I. Nikolayeva: "Beyond the Boundaries of Science Is Science"]

[Text] The sphere of activity of Academician K.V. Frolov, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, mechanics and machine building, would seem remote from philosophical problems. Nevertheless, Konstantin Vasil'yevich kindly agreed to an interview with our correspondent precisely on such problems.

[Nikolayeva] Our magazine is called NAUKA I RELIGIYA (Science and Religion). Note that the word is "and," not "against." This, however, doesn't mean that science is always in agreement with religion.

[Frolov] I think that the habitual way of posing the problem that science inevitably refutes religion, while religion invariably contradicts science simplifies and distorts the actual situation. Science is science and religion is religion, and I think they will continue to exist side by side for a long time to come. Atheists should not lose their sense of objectivity when speaking of the role of religion in education and social progress. The church has to one degree or another always accepted the latest achievements of science, brought together and preserved the cultural heritage. Take, for example, architecture, construction, calculation of the strength of structures. Numerous shrines have survived to this day even in seismically dangerous areas of Central Asia. Euler's strict mathematical theory of stability of columns appeared much later. Or take such a musical instrument as the

organ. Ancient builders handled intuitively, by trial and error, the most complex problems of nonlinear acoustics which have not been fully resolved theoretically to this day. [Nikolayeva] But perhaps that is to the credit of builders rather than the church?

[Frolov] The church, too. Because supporting and encouraging work in one area or another means helping it.

In this case the church cannot be accused of any shortage of insight or breadth of approach. The destruction of churches during certain periods is most regretful; monuments of our culture were being destroyed.

[Nikolayeva] But what about Bruno, Galileo, attacks against Darwin? The confrontation persists to this day, doesn't it?

[Frolov] I think confrontation usually persists when the debate is over things that have not yet been comprehended or that are not very clear. That, I think, is the ground for reciprocal accusations.

The most terrible thing in the modern world is when the power of the human intellect is used for destructive purposes, which can ultimately lead to the self-destruction of civilization. From this follows a natural reaction, when large sections of the population turn to religious ethical doctrines, to the preaching of love, to the humanistic content of most religious teachings. I am afraid that it is this aspect, which is attractive today as never before, that we neglect, although what we need today as never before in human history is precisely a powerful charge of humanism. In science, too, the humanitarian approach is especially important, it is a vital necessity.

[Nikolayeva] One can often hear claims that science has completely discredited itself and revealed its, so to say, primeval immorality. Does that mean we should "put it in a corner" for bad behavior and all turn for salvation to the truths of Christianity?

[Frolov] I am a scientist and you can hardly expect me to denounce science. The issue is much more complex than it sometimes seems.

Indeed, the people who unravelled the secrets of the atom were scientists consumed by egoistic curiosity. A consequence of this was the appearance of the atomic bomb, ballistic missiles, the neutron bomb, which can kill every living thing but preserve "monuments of yore"... That is what explains the existence of the hackneyed view that science brings evil and great suffering. This is a bitter accusation, although at first glance it may seem to contain a positive program: Spurn this fiend and return to the bosom of a humane, loving church! However, I think that such an assessment is, to say the least, superficial (and often even based on deliberate legerdemain).

The cognitive process cannot be halted. How the fruit of new knowledge is used, for good or evil, is another matter. The discovery of nuclear energy is no exception. Just imagine that it had been discovered long before the methods and technology of controlling processes occurring in the atomic nucleus were developed. But science, while tackling the "nuclear problem" (and we all remember the historical conditions in which it happened), was simultaneously, and perhaps even more, concerned with studying ways of harnessing the new destructive force, methods of protection, control, and prevention.

I recall questions with which I was literally peppered at a press conference by Spaniards, who are, as is known, a very religious and temperamental people. Why are most of you scientists godless? Why don't you believe in anything lofty and moral, and as a result have placed the world on the brink of destruction?

I responded with a question: What about ridding mankind of mass epidemics like the plague, smallpox, cholera and typhus? What about AIDS? It was science that was able, in record time, to gain an understanding of the nature of this disease and suggest prophylactic treatment. It is scientists who are busy looking for effective sera capable of preventing the spread of the disease. It will not be stopped by either preaching universal good or prayers, just as they have previously never stopped various epidemics. I think it is unfair to forget this and lay the blame for the troubles of our age historical, social, and others on science.

[Nikolayeva] But what about faith?

[Frolov] Faith is also necessary. Humanity must, if you wish, go through a new ferment of faith in a better future, a profound, serious and, I would venture, fanatic faith. For this may be our last chance to come to our senses. Humanity is now at the brink, at the limit. If the accumulation of destructive power passes a certain frontier the globe will simply not survive. It is already faltering. Faith in a better future is a religion which I accept.

[Nikolayeva] But traditional religious faith is also alive, and it has no intention of relinquishing its positions.

[Frolov] The Christian religion also has a developed mechanism for fostering faith in a better future. Or if we take the Orthodox Church, it has survived, and perhaps even gained strength, in large measure because of our mistakes. Today we openly recognize that during a certain period we tried to operate not by persuasion but by force, by repression against the church as a social institution. Dynamite was the "argument" in that debate. I think that clumsy, blundering, head on atheistic propaganda only helps strengthen belief in God.

[Nikolayeva] Our readers often ask whether a natural scientist can believe in God. If yes, how can this be reconciled with the search for scientific, objective (and therefore independent of any supreme being) laws of nature?

[Frolov] You are right, and the history of science knows world-famous scientists who also believed in God. Frequently mentioned among them are Sechenov, Pavlov, Filatov, Tsiolkovskiy. How can belief in God coexist with science? Scientists usually explain this for themselves thus: Science does not deal with God, He is outside its domain. Deity is not one of the basic postulates of science, which can neither refute nor prove its existence. I would think that a believer-scientist associates his notion of God primarily with a moral ideal, with concepts of conscience and good. Of course, he rejects many religious dogmas. Perhaps the reasons for religiousness among scientists should be sought in the contradictory character and complexity of scientific progress and scientific cognition, which generates numerous mysterious and puzzles. One cannot forget the nature of scientific development, its far from linear advance, as some of its "defenders" would like it to be. Today, for example, scientists stage experiments for which their medieval colleagues would at the very least have been burned at the stake.

[Nikolayeva] But nevertheless, the difference between "divine" explanation of various mysteries and secrets and the search for scientific explanations somehow separates a believer from a natural scientist?

[Frolov] There are numerous examples when mysterious phenomena ultimately received a scientific, rational explanation. Nor can one ignore the fact that the church frequently prevented prompt explanations of natural mysteries and facilitated the development of ignorance rather than knowledge. Perhaps in most cases the clerics were quite sincerely ignorant of the causes of various "miracles." Divine intervention offered the simplest, problem-free explanation. The church held such positions steadfastly for many centuries. The unexplained and unknown objectively strengthened its positions and it would be hard to expect it to refuse such "gifts" of nature. We spoke of science being accused of immorality. But is the use of miracles for pragmatic purposes an example of high morality? Sometimes, I think, priests actually knew more than they were ready to reveal. I call such examples of deliberate suppression of rational explanations of "miracles" immoral. We often simplify things when we transfer religion's lofty moral proclamations to specific members of the clergy. But they are only human, with all their good sides and shortcomings.

Now about the claim that science delays answers to questions of concern to people. Obviously, if a scientific colleague of mine had written a hundred years ago that one day man would travel into space, walk on the surface of the moon, transmit information from continent to continent almost instantaneously or see through walls,

the scientific community would doubtlessly denounce such a bold person for "retreating into mysticism" and "spreading superstitions." And it made such denunciations many times.

Science does, indeed, in many cases procrastinate with answers because the phenomenon itself, its mechanism, is not quite clear. Or not clear at all. Conversely, all those who write with such ease about various mysterious phenomena in popular science publications seek to quickly satisfy the reader's demand for clear, simple answers to all of life's questions. But this is just cashing in on human interest, not a search for crumbs of truth.

[Nikolayeva] So what is your advice to journalists who write about science?

[Frolov] It is my conviction that science is basically omnipotent. Finding scientifically sound explanations for various mysterious phenomena is only a matter of time. Gradually and eventually mankind will gain an understanding of the most subtle things, and it will do so by applying the methods of science. But as long as phenomena are unknown they continue to be "things in themselves" and provide food for various speculative conjectures.

The important thing is to be honest with oneself and one's readers: This thing is well known, that is still unclear. But frequently conjectures, things not yet proved (only postulated, sometimes very loudly) are declared in writing or from the screen to be the last word in science.

Much remains unclear about "magnetized water," yet some people are already promising future bumper crops. The situation with "mental" transmission of information is still unresolved, yet after some publications one gains the impression that numerous experiments have already proved the existence of telepathy and telekinesis. But a scientific fact is not necessarily a fact of conventional conscience, nor is it something that at first glance might seem self-evident. In science things have to be verified dozens of times over.

I am categorically against haste and sensationalism in the popular science press. I think that such articles must include commentaries by an authoritative expert. Better still, several. Your magazine has a rubric, "Behind the Sensation." It would be good to see more young scientists among its authors. The views of "greats" are also interesting, but you must agree that an unchallenged authority's view tends to "overbear" an interesting idea and deny it the very possibility of an untraditional approach. That is why I personally can only welcome the current seething in "untitled" science and among young people unencumbered by excessive respectability.

[Nikolayeva] Do you sense this youthful "seething"?

[Frolov] I often meet with young researchers and, I think, understand their positions. It is always interesting to be with them, because they (how can I put it?) are as yet unspoiled by all that science has already achieved. They are active and dogged in their creative quests. We, on the other hand, frequently prefer to brush aside all those anomalous phenomena without even studying them. In my view this is the same kind of extreme as uncritical, enthusiastic descriptions of them in the popular press as indisputable findings of science.

[Nikolayeva] But still, are there miracles in science which surprise, amaze and confuse you as a scientist?

[Frolov] Of course there are. In biology, biotechnology and psychology there are probably more mysteries for me than established facts. This century will, most likely, remain in history as the age of physics, but the next will, I think, be called the age of biology. It will bring forth so many incredible miracles.

Imagine a tiny glass cube, one centimeter by one centimeter. It contains "something" capable of completely ridding several hectares of soil of certain bacteria. It is also a bacterium. In one night a biotechnology facility can manufacture several sackfuls of such "devourers" of other bacteria. There is a scientific miracle for you, moreover one that simultaneously arouses admiration and alarm. It is awful to think what could happen if we lost control over processes which we are studying today with such scientific avidness. There is more than enough room here for religious, mystical and various apocalyptic moods.

[Nikolayeva] If we may, a few words about ESP. Readers are simply demanding that we exonerate and officially recognize it!

[Frolov] It depends what we mean by ESP. I will not discuss the telepathist, telekinesist or magic healer who claims to diagnose (and even cure) all diseases without exception by simply looking at a photograph. It is too early to draw any conclusions about them.

As for extrasensory perception in the literal sense of the word, that is, people with abnormally heightened sensitivity (to thermal radiation, for instance), that is no sensation at all! Science has, as far as I know, explained it, leaving no chance for exponents of "extrascientific" explanations. It is natural for anyone to sense heat emanating from another person, but there are unique people possessing truly super abilities. "Super," however, is merely a quantitative characteristic. An ESP medium simply is more sensitive than a normal person to changes in the temperature of your palm when you are subconsciously nervous because you know that a hidden object is in your pocket. This does not mean, as so frequently proclaimed by enthusiasts, the existence of

some sort of "bipole" unknown to science or of some as yet undiscovered additional information transmitting channels. But to the observer, of course, it's an exciting spectacle: a clairvoyant!

[Nikolayeva] Going back from the popular science press to science: Do scientists study all those anomalous phenomena?

[Frolov] Of course, and we have written about them. Sometimes the existence of super abilities like those I just mentioned is confirmed, but more often than not people present the desired as the truth... Incidentally, studies have completely demolished such notions that ESP mediums are some kind of "holy people," "messiahs" or "chosen persons." A natural gift can be fostered and trained.

Chinese medicine has existed for thousands of years. What did a physician have at his disposal before? Nothing but his hands and natural remedies, very few instruments or tools. In Vietnam I met with a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine. He felt the patient's pulse and made his diagnosis: Ailing kidneys, or liver, or lungs... He had developed his sensitivity to such an extent that he could sense some higher harmonies in the pulse beat that apparently made it possible for him to judge of the state of internal organs.

Was he a clairvoyant or miracle maker? No. A unique natural phenomenon? Certainly not: the Vietnamese doctor was not a healer from birth. He developed his abilities, stubbornly training according to methodologies tested over many millennia. The same can be said of the remarkable ability of some people to identify points of biological activity on the body which can be used to "remove" many ailments. The question is, thus, not of any revelations, not of a mystic inner gift, but of knowledge, experience, skill, training.

[Nikolayeva] Perhaps along with the revelation of their inner potential people will have to as it were restructure their ties with the environment more systematically? With the "first" natural environment and the "second," manmade one?

[Frolov] I must say that we have, in general, given too little attention to the study of man as a phenomenon. In broad terms this includes such topics as man and society, man and nature, man in his interrelationship with technology. Now, it seems, the matter has moved off dead center and the USSR Academy of Sciences has formed a special Council on Problems of Man. In this council specialists study such abstract philosophical problems, as well as more mundane questions, like the problem of man's survival in the modern technological, information-saturated world. You see, we must already be seriously concerned with the problem of survival.

Take, for example, man's interaction with modern information technology. From childhood on the contemporary urban dweller spends time in front of a monitor: a television or computer terminal. This inevitably leads to loss of sight: The eye muscle has not been prepared by evolution for such a static load. To be sure, remedies are being actively sought. One of them is continuous alteration of the focal distance, sight "dispersal." It's only a pity that modern children prefer the silver screen to active games. It is high time to sound the alarm: In the FRG 90 percent of the children wear glasses.

[Nikolayeva] So perhaps we should start winding down the "computer revolution" before it's too late?

[Frolov] Progress should not be slowed down, still less reversed. Science is capable of finding a way out of the most hopeless situations (usually created by it). Solutions are being sought and the problem will be resolved.

[Nikolayeva] I want to ask you a "difficult" question of concern to our readers. Is science omnipotent? Can it encompass the entire aggregate of natural phenomena? If not, what lies there, beyond the frontiers of science?

[Frolov] It depends on what you mean by "frontiers." The limits of omnipotence? The limits of applicability of the scientific laws known to me? As a scientist I can only say: Anything can occur beyond the point where my science stops "working." But one thing science will have to do in the nearest future, in my opinion, is to undertake a critical reassessment of its own omnipotence. I have in mind unrestricted impact on the environment: By feeling ourselves "omnipotent" in this area we are, perhaps, undermining ourselves.

After all, there are very many things which we do not know and do not understand. Picture this: Sochi, mountains, sea beaches. You dig up pebbles. You take away only several truckloads, but the mountains have come into motion. Or take the atmosphere. The volume of air would seem to be gigantic, a well-balanced system, but a small disturbance created by, for instance, launchings of space vehicles, can lead to totally unpredictable consequences.

Nature created all this over eons, but we are capable of destroying it in a dozen years or so. And still, I think that beyond the frontiers of today's science lies science again. But another science, perhaps more "restricted" ethically, endowed with greater philosophical meaning, with a new system of values in which the focal point is man.

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Academician Likhachev On Cultural-Social Importance of Religion

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[Interview with D.S. Likhachev by special correspondent A. Romanova: "Only They, the People, Live"]

[Excerpts] D. S. Likhachev, prominent Soviet scientist, winner of USSR State Prizes, chairman of the board of

the Soviet Culture Fund, spoke with our special correspondent A. Romanova in Leningrad.

[Romanova] Dmitriy Sergeyevich, we speak of ancient Russian literature and culture without so to say specifying their age. But lately, in connection with the 1000th anniversary of the introduction of Christianity in Russia, this question acquired a special aspect when the phrase "1000 years of Russian artistic culture" began to appear in the press. How old, in your opinion, is Russian culture?

[Likhachev] If we speak of Russian culture, it has come from the ancient common culture of the Eastern Slavs, three fraternal peoples representing a unity: Russian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian. Beyond any doubt a very high culture existed long before the adoption of Christianity. The very fact of its adoption would have been impossible without a certain level of culture. This is also true of the language, music, understanding of visual art, concepts of other peoples, that is, of their own and world history, of morals and ethics. Moreover, paganism had its advantages. For example, the cult of earth, the attitude towards the earth as a provider, as a sacred thing. But of course, it would be wrong to say that paganism was better than Christianity. Christianity enriched the ancient culture with a more sophisticated alphabet, loftier philosophical thought and morality, a better organization of worship. Rus never lagged behind anyone. For example, ancient Russian architecture, as Grabar wrote repeatedly, was in no way inferior to West European. One could say it was more optimistic and cheerful than Gothic or Baroque. Any number of excursions into pre-Christian times on this subject will not make the truth any less immutable. Traditions have proved to be remarkably stable. For example, the domes of Byzantium or the golden, gleaming helmeted and onion cupolas of Rus. As the poet said, "The cupolas in Russia are covered with pure gold."

[Romanova] Your are speaking of culture in the broad sense, but what about Russian writing and literacy? The role of Christianity, and particularly Christian monasteries in this was enormous.

[Likhachev] Nowadays books are usually concentrated in big cities. In Ancient Rus books "conquered" expanses. Monasteries were built in forests, and the first matter of business was to write books and spread Christianity among the local population. That was the case in such monasteries as Troitse-Sergiyev, Kirillo-Belozersk, Valaam, and Solovki. They all became sources of books, centers of learning, disseminators of culture. The same happened in Siberia.

Many are surprised that "The Lay of Igor's Host" was discovered in Yaroslavl. But Yaroslavl was once a frontier city through which colonization of the North and East into Siberia was carried out. Yaroslavl possessed a high book culture. Testimony to this is not only the fine library of Spasskiy Monastery but also the fact that all

icons and frescoes invariably feature texts and narrative. In some churches, for example, the main cathedral of Borisoglebsk, the walls carry the full "Chronicle of the Princes of Vladimir." The text was also carved on the throne of Ivan the Terrible. Are such things not indications of a high degree of literacy in old Russia? Literacy did not spread gradually, in an ascending manner, so to say. Occasionally, during periods of impoverishment or the strengthening of serfdom, it declined. But in the North, where serfdom did not exist, literacy among the population was always high. In the 19th century all Old Believers were listed as illiterate, though in actual fact they were quite literate. That is what created the impression that the Russian North was illiterate. Actually the reverse was true. It is the literacy of the population, love for culture that explains why bylinas, historical songs and beautiful laments were preserved there. It is, after, all absurd to think that folklore flourishes where the population is benighted, ignorant and illiterate. Traditional Russian culture has survived first and foremost thanks to books. To this day the most diverse publications are brought from the North, sometimes in bundles of 200 or 300 copies. Some acquisitions have been made by the old manuscripts repository of our Pushkin House.

[Romanova] As we rid ourselves of simplistic stereotypes and dogmatic notions about the history of the people's spiritual life we are striving today to gain a more precise understanding of the social role of the church. What do you see as its role?

[Likhachev] One of the most vivid memories of my childhood is a boat trip down the Volga with my parents and older brother. It was May, the weather was beautiful, and it was the holiday of Trinity. The captain announced that we would be docking and whoever wanted to could go to the church. The floodwater had not yet receded. Gangways were lowered to the sand. Virtually everyone headed for the village church. A beautiful choir was singing, flowers adorned the walls and windows, and birch twigs were strewn on the floor. The joy of spring and the holiday impressed itself in my seven-year-old mind forever. Here is another impression. Daniil Granin, Yuriy Senkevich and I were travelling along the Volkhov River to Staraya Russa, a city which Daniil Aleksandrovich, who was born there, and I love very much. Half-deserted villages with dilapidated log cabins, some with boarded windows, slid by, reflected in the dark water. In the distance a tumbledown church receded beyond the horizon. Granin stared at the shore for a long time, then said slowly:

"I wonder what do people live by there? The old women, for instance. Well, the men at least may go to the city, watch a movie. But the rest? Before they at least had the church."

He was right. Without churches, especially in villages, a part of cultural life has vanished. Every church had its choir, if even a small one. The culture of singing, vocalization, musical ear developed thanks to religious

music. There were always benches in front of the church. Even during service people would come out, swap news, talk and gossip. It was life, living communication. Perhaps in many ways like pagan rites were performed in their time. The church filled certain psychological needs. For example, by consoling a deceased person's next of kin. How beautiful are the rites of the Russian Orthodox funeral service!

Another extremely important religious psychological ritual is confession. How to console a person who has experienced some extraordinary event or irreparable loss? Confession, which remained secret, offered a certain relief and, to use a modern expression, helped reduce stress.

Once in Bulgaria I went with a group of scientists to tour the Trinity Monastery near Tynovo. We drove through woods and up hills. In the monastery, behind the walls, we found only a single nun, a dwarf who was remarkably affable and without the slightest inferiority complex. The others had gone to work and she had been left to look after things. The arrival of visitors delighted the woman. She brought us some nuts in work-roughened hands and set out water, honey and several other treats. It was all done with such sincerity, good will and joy at being able to play hostess to us. On our return trip we talked about what her life would have been like in the city. How would she get into crowded public transport? In the streets she would be the subject of offensive attention or ridicule by children. For such victims of fate the monastery was at the same time a haven. In society there is always a sizeable number of people to whom religion is a necessity. This cannot be ignored. It is interesting to note that during the revolution we all considered that priests, monks, church wardens and the like were all do*nothings. In actual fact one has but to look at the lives of Russian saints to see that what distinguished them fundamentally from Western saints was their work ethic. It is common to compare Sergiy Radonezhskiy with St. Francis of Assisi. Indeed, they had much in common, like their attitude towards nature. Sergiy Radonezhskiy, for example, went up to a bear and fed it from his hands. St. Francis also fed animals and birds. But he considered poverty to be the main quality of a true zealot. The Franciscans were a wandering order whose members lived by begging. Sergiy Radonezhskiy forbade monks to beg even in the most difficult times. He preached that one should earn one's bread working like a peasant. Once during a famine the members of the order began to grumble. Sergiy Radonezhskiy personally volunteered to cover a peasant's roof, refusing to eat until he had done all the work planned for that day. Visitors at the monastery often failed to recognize him as the Father Superior, because he worked from sunrise to sunset in the garden, made shoes and clothes for the monks or fetched water. Such a zealot performing daily peasant work inevitably became a center of the peasant community. When the time came to rally the populace against Mamay, Dmitriy Donskoy travelled to Sergiy Radonezhskiy for his blessing, because the Father Superior was the supreme authority among the peasants.

The Russian peasant was always extremely industrious. What held him back was serfdom. The picture was incomparably better wherever it did not exist in the North, among the Cossacks. The Cossacks, for example, in putting virgin lands to the plow reached as far as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean, they reached America, occupied Alaska and descended to the south. Fort "Rossiya," or as the Americans call it, Fort "Ross," stands to this day.

Much has been written and will continue to be written about the years of the "great turning point" and Stalin's disastrous policy with respect to the peasantry. The damage wrought on rural Russia is hardly reparable. Ten years or so ago I was in Vologda. In one church I was shown some fine murals, moreover in good condition. I learned that during the collectivization period the church had been a transit point for persecuted peasant families. Four-tier bunks were built inside to accommodate the settlers. The "administrative business" was conducted there. But not a single mural was damaged. People deprived of shelter and their barest necessities treated the spiritual heritage of their forebears with care and respect.

Nowadays we are all witnesses of vandalism: Abandoned churches with broken windows, graffiti on the walls, senseless damage of decorative objects. How can one fail to speak of all this when dealing with problems of culture?

[Romanova] Dmitriy Sergeyevich, it has long been known how terrible destructive vandalism can be. But there also exists creative vandalism. What do you think about it?

[Likhachev] It costs absolutely nothing to destroy an old building, whether a house or a church, a palace or a mansion. They have no price, no value in the conventional, mundane sense of the word. Moreover, no one is responsible for their preservation. But at the same time it is virtually impossible to tear down an ugly prefab panel building erected at a site where it doesn't belong, because its cost is known, the expenses are known, and there are sheaves of documents; that is, it is obvious that even redoing it will "cost a pretty penny."

Take the suburban Moscow estate of Zakharov. It is a splendid historical park were Pushkin as a child got to know Russian nature, where there should be preserve zones. Unlike Leningrad, Moscow has almost no places associated with Pushkin. Zakharov would be an ideal spot for lovers of Pushkin's poetry to gather, for scientific meetings, poetic contests, for acquainting people with the mystique of Russian literature! But suddenly prefabricated panel structures for some kind of strain testing station were erected, and all Moscow is helpless.

At a meeting in the USSR Council of Ministers conducted by N. I. Ryzhkov I spoke about the problems of Novgorod and Pskov. On view in the hall were maps of

the cities indicating the boundaries of "historic" sections that should be restored. Unfortunately, one has to prove that the entire ancient city is a historic monument and it is impossible to separate the old center from its modern suburbs. A city has its specific image. Every ancient Russian city has its own, specific look. Yaroslavl, Putivl, Novgorod-Severskiy, Kiev: they were all built on the higher bank of a river. The other bank was usually water meadows. I remember that before the war in July one could smell the fragrance of hay on Kreshchatik Street in Kiev.

In Novgorod both banks were built up. The city was a port of four seas: the Baltic, Black, Caspian and White. Naturally, the Volkhov River was always the city's "main street." Through it passed the route of Harald the Bold when he travelled to Kiev to seek the hand of Elizaveta, daughter of Yaroslav the Wise. The Varangians and all foreigners sailed along the Volkhov. That is why all buildings faced the river. But then in our days a huge theater was built in Novgorod with its rear services facing the river! The architects who designed it didn't even think of studying the image of Novgorod or its building traditions. So they erected the building as they saw it on paper. As a rule, our latter-day builders lack general culture.

Today, for example, Leningrad is receiving funding, money, but there are no genuine architects who would understand the architectural style of a city built over centuries. And no one teaches them. It is wrong, say, to overburden the potential of Nevskiy Prospekt and build endless rows of shops, kiosks, malls. Nevskiy Prospekt is one of the finest streets in the world, if not the finest, and it must become a street of culture. Bakeries, butcher shops, hardware stores should all be put into the numerous neighboring side streets. Nevskiy itself should have bookstores, art salons, antiques, souvenir shops. Commerce on it should be prestigious, with large selections of books on the city's history, museums, art. Alas, today we have nothing there to boast of.

[Romanova] Indeed, protecting the cultural heritage of Russia is an important task. It is gratifying to see the appreciably expanding interest in the sources of national culture. It is troublesome, however, that occasionally interest in Russian things is accompanied by a disdainful attitude towards the cultures of other people and a biased representation of their history.

[Likhachev] It is the easiest thing to declare oneself a patriot and defender of everything Russian. But in order to do more than just proclaim it is necessary to have a real knowledge of Russian art, architecture, and the history of relations with other peoples, say with Finno-Ugric peoples, Tatars, Chuvashs, Kalmyks, with the Caucasus and its numerous peoples. It is also necessary to know and understand the history of relations between nations. For example, the conquest of the Kazan Khanate. Of course, one can ask whether there was any need to conquer it. Apparently there was, because Kazan was a haven for everyone who undertook incursions into Russia. But as soon as it was conquered the "History of the Kazan Khanate" was written, moreover with respect for that history and the courage of those who had defended Kazan. The witness, historian and author of "The History of the Kazan Khanate" was impressed with the courage not only of Russian soldiers but of the Tatar troops as well. It is quite remarkable. There are absolutely no pejorative remarks about the enemy. On the contrary. The witness fully records the lament of Queen Syuimbeki when she was taken from Sviyazhsk past Kazan to Moscow. The queen bemoans the beauty of Kazan, its erstwhile power and recent might. All this was thoroughly and faithfully recorded by the Russian chronicler. Or take relations with the Finno-Ugric peoples, for example, during Aleksander Nevskiy's time, when the indigenous people, the Ugro-Finns and Izhorians, helped him in the battle?

I saw Finnish and Russian villages living side by side and the great respect their inhabitants showed towards each other. That was near Petersburg, in the Siverskaya area. There were no taunts or mutual hostility. Or take the Volga, that great Russian river. Were Russians the only people inhabiting its banks? No. In the upper reaches were the Karels, downstream were Cheremisians, Mordvinians, Chuvashs, Mariys, Kalmyks, Tatars.

Or take Nevskiy Prospekt again. There is a Dutch church on it, then two more Protestant churches, then an Armenian Gregorian cathedral, a French church next to it in Kovenskiy street, as well as two Russian Orthodox churches. Nevskiy is a street of religious tolerance, which is highly significant. It is necessary to know all this and not trust someone's interpretations or rumors.

[Passage omitted]

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LITERATURNAYA GAZETA Roundtable on Cultural Pluralism

18300375 Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA*
in Russian No 8, 22 Feb 89 p 3

[Roundtable discussion with literary critic Mikola Zhulinskiy, doctor of filological sciences, literature, Kiev; Rustem Dzhanguzhin, candidate of philosophical sciences, author of a series of articles on ethnic philosophy, Alma-Ata; poet and translator Vladimir Shatskov, poet, translator, Moscow; and Arvo Valton, writer, Tallinn: "Culture Is a Collective Noun"; materials prepared by Natalya Vysotskaya]

[Text]

Mikola Zhulinskiy:

"Do We Perceive Each Nationality's Culture as an Integral Whole?"

"This was the title of the speech given by critic Ivan Dzuba at the meeting of the Kiev Writers' Organization's Commission on Literary Criticism. (It was later published in newspaper KULTURA I ZHITTYA and was a subject of a heated public debate in the republic.) The Spadshchina (Heritage) society, which was formed under the auspices of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences's House of Scientists, began its activity by raising this issue."

Rustem Dzhanguzhin: "Today, no culture can close itself off behind strictly regional boundaries (they simply do not exist). Our social and cultural processes are intertwined and interdependent. When we encounter a new ethnic culture, we find in it not only idiosyncratic qualities but, more important, common features which allow us to see the entire multiethnic Soviet culture as a developed system whose components define one another. Is this not what perceiving a culture as an integral whole primarily means?"

M. Zhulinskiy: "Let us not rush to define the multiethnic Soviet culture as a developed system. In my opinion, we are now at the threshold of a new type of culture, which would have its own models, motivations and forms. This process is directly related to how effectively and profoundly the restructuring of our entire society—in the most revolutionary sense of the word restructuring—proceeds. I would most importantly mention the aim of liberating the individual from an entire range of limitations—internal and psychological as well as social ones. Despite positive aspects and trends in the development of democracy and glasnost, it is still too early to claim today that we have eliminated old stereotypes in thinking, both at the level of the individual and of certain state institutions that continue to work on the same fuel of bans, compulsion and taming. The process of internal liberation will be a long and difficult one."

Vladimir Shatskov: "I would like to add one more thing. The concept of glasnost entails only an opportunity to ask bold questions, not a guarantee that the answers to them will be serious or profound. What we need is experience in analysis, good information and ability to identify key issues and uncover basic causes—in other words, an entire range of qualities that develop under the conditions of long and unconstrained democracy. We had no such conditions for many a long year. This is why our answers more often than not do not match the scale of the issues being raised. Such issues as the following: how could stalinism arise and flourish under socialism? The answer we get is that Iosif Dzhugashvili was a very evil man. Wait a minute: if in a constitutional state everything depends on the personality of the leader (or the usurper), then hereditary monarchy is a much more progressive form of government, since the son could take after his kind grandmother rather than his evil father, so that at least one generation could get a break."

R. Dzhanguzhin: "Well, today the issue is raised more broadly than this even in the press. I hope that the accumulation of knowledge will bring about the transition to a higher level of understanding stalinism. Then, its causes will no longer be piled together indiscriminately."

V. Shatskov: "Here is another tricky question: why in the 8th decade of Soviet power, which proclaimed equality and respect for every nationality, do we have such fierce outbreaks of national hatred and strife and explosions of nationalism? We have grown bolder and in some public speeches go so far as to hint at one of the reasons (and the most obvious one at that): this process is caused by the long period of domination by the official Soviet national (or multiethnic, for the demagogues) culture. In private, even more profound thoughts have been aired: the roots of this disintegration are in the traditional, inherited Russian imperialist oppression. I do not doubt the former statement, but I find the latter questionable."

"Moscow, the capital of Russia, was ruined no less terribly than the capitals of other republics. This, however, is only part of the problem: in addition, Moscow was also embellished. Cake-like highrises with candied turrets were built, as well as a pompous subway system in the style of Creamy Baroque; as to the number of stone wheat bundles and marble grape bunches, Moscow, regarded by the rest of the country as an overfed city, has long held a world record. The language that my son is studying at school is not, in reality, Russian. It is being taught using the methodology developed for foreign languages: for English, German, Spanish, etc. It has been reduced to a primitive, adapted and oversimplified to the point when it finally becomes a kind of international Esperanto. It is a language of an anticulture, which is unfortunately presented under the label of Russian culture. In short, there can be no question of imposing the Russian culture even in the heart of Russian proper. What is perceived as Russian in the suffocating and vague (even to its creators) cultural superstructure, is

nothing more than a folksy Palekh or Maydan design on the base of a huge stamping press that is everywhere identical. For many years to come we will continue to encounter the ruins left by this force, a force that lacks spirit and therefore soul.

"A complete revolution must occur in our consciousness in order for us to understand how preposterous such habitual terms as Administration of Culture really are. Just think about it. A plaque like that would have horrified any countrymen of ours two centuries ago. Not Promotion or Assistance, but Administration. It is ridiculous."

M.Zhulinskiy: "Here is the root of the problem. We were creating a socialist culture based on the premise that it is loftier, better and more humane only because it is ours, a socialist culture. We were basing it on the opposition to the achievements of the past as well as to world culture. ('Gogol erred...', or 'Dostoyevskiy did not understand...', etc.) In other words, we were progressive whereas they were limited. We used to view culture from a utilitarian perspective, seeing it only as a tool to defend present-day ideas. Permit me to quote Ortega y Gasset: life must be cultured and culture must be living. Uncultured life is barbarism, while culture that is not living is Byzantism [meaning unknown, possibly empty decoration]. In essence, we were promoting that kind of culture: it was removed from the people, a kind of culture that was preapproved by the authorities and passed down to us. People can no longer choose cultural values independently. The taste of a moviegoer, for instance, is hostage to the film distribution agency; that of a television viewer to the State Committee on Television and Radio. In the theater, there are various repertory committees. And then we bemoan the loss of artistic standards, the lack of audiences and the flight of readers from serious national literature, poetry, etc."

R.Dzhanguzhin:

"The practice of relying on quantitative indicators and of artificially blowing up statistics has hurt culture, too, not just economics."

"For a long time, we thought that the measure of cultural level is the bulk of college education (totally forgetting about its quality), the existence of an opera and ballet company in every republic and the presence of a home-grown Shakespeare or Tolstoy in the literature of every nationality. Culture was gradually becoming something outside itself. The line of evolutionary development was abandoned. We selected only those of its parts which appeared to support certain ideological tenets. Cultural development was calculated from some initial point zero. As to analyzing cultural development in a broad historical context, such attempts could expose those who rocked the boat to charges of idealizing the past and making one's national history more ancient than it really is."

Arvo Valton: "Be frank, Rustem, say that they would be accused of nationalism. You are right noting that when we force culture or history to replace reality with some ideal model currently suitable to a group of leaders or an individual leader, we commit not only a methodological error but an ideological one as well. The nationalities issue, the question of existence and development of national tongues that is being so heatedly discussed now, has emerged so painfully in the republics only because we all have been oppressed by stalinist nationalities policy for so long. Any mention of national culture or national consciousness was decreed to be nationalism."

M.Zhulinskiy: "And it was also branded with the modifier bourgeois. How much confusion there has been in this issue, how many innocent victims and irreparable losses! So zealous they were that they practically relegated the word national into disuse. The intelligentsia was so frightened that it began to shun its native tongue and folklore."

R.Dzhanguzhin: "Without a serious study of the theory and history of culture and an analysis of the socioeconomic situation existing in different areas of the country at different times, it is impossible to identify the roots of nationalism and chauvinism."

M.Zhulinskiy: "Let us look at the social structure of national cultures. It is no secret that in the Ukraine as well as in other republics national cultures do not exist at all levels of public conscience uniformly. There are plenty of blank spots here. The language, the moral and ethical traditions, the mores and the people's aesthetic ideas about life which contributed to it and nourished it for centuries are disappearing today. We constantly hear that they should be revived. Yet, words are dead without deeds. And what about the attitude toward national cultures beyond the republic's or the country's boundaries? Is it normal that the creative work of Ukrainians living in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Canada, the United States, Australia and other countries is beyond our spiritual horizon?"

"To start correcting the situation we must honestly admit the most important thing: that the theory is lagging catastrophically. In effect, there is no theory: the fundamental concept of national culture has not been developed. Being unable even to define it, how can we attempt to discuss the multiethnic culture as a whole?"

A.Valton:

"The problem with the theory is that it sought general prescriptions and often fraudulently grouped together completely different phenomena."

"I think that it would be wrong to classify cultures by their level of development, contribution to world culture, etc. Today, we must accept the principle that every culture has enormous human value. Any culture. Even if

it only exists in some witch-doctor settlement far away from civilization, in a fishermen's village or in a hamlet high in the mountains. If people there need it, it must be preserved.

"Comparing the data of the 1926 and 1939 census with postwar statistics, it becomes clear that dozens of tribes and ethnic groups have disappeared from the map of the country. This is not just due to the natural process of ethnogenesis (the merging of closely related tribes). Undoubtedly, it is also the result of thoughtless extremes in the nationalities policy, deportations and crude industrial development of the territories. Small ethnic groups are hardest hit by environmental disasters. There are many examples even of strong ethnic cultures collapsing under the weight of similar upheavals. I am convinced that the cultures of small ethnic groups have a great potential. They are, if you will, the new blood of world culture. Looking as though virtue has triumphed, we are glad to enter the cultures of small ethnic groups into the Red Book of history and write articles and Ph.D. theses on their archaic grammatical forms—instead of letting the people speak the language of its culture. And yet, extremely interesting processes could emerge here. As to any forcible annihilation of a culture, any rude or forced intrusion into ethnic processes, it is inhumane and a perversion of culture.

"Let us look at two actual examples. In the Mongolian People's Republic, no secular education in the indigenous tongue existed prior to 1921. The Tibetan culture was dominant and was sustained by the Lamas; when it was overrun and destroyed, a new culture was built on its ruins. Now in Mongolia there are schools teaching in the vernacular, a university and several colleges; modern scientific vocabulary is developing. It is a living culture. Another example is our Buryats, an ethnic group very close to Mongolians. Until recently, they were taught in their native tongue only through the third grade in rural schools. That was all. The destruction of the new type of small nationalities' intelligentsia began in the early 1930s and was completed by the end of the decade. Not only small nationalities were affected by it; large ones were, too. But those blows were much more painful for small nationalities and many of them have not yet fully recovered. It is mind-boggling that even now in the autonomous republics on the Volga those who use the native tongue in labor collectives where representatives of other nationalities also work are considered nationalists and a writer who in his work uses old geographical names, a heretic.

"Who needs this? Into whose hands does it play? You are right, Vladimir Stepanovich [Shatskov], it is not an evil conspiracy of one nationality against others. It is useful to the marginal people, those who rejected one culture without joining another. A rootless bureaucrat will easily issue or carry out any official order. He will dam a river, put a centuries-old forest under the ax or destroy a steppe."

V.Shatskov: "If he uses an impoverished language, a person of any nationality can produce only impoverished ideas."

A.Valton: "And speaking about integration in general: 80 percent of world science now functions in English. Yet, just like art, science can not be above nationality, and this includes exact sciences. National thought process as well as philosophical possibilities and idiosyncrasies that are tied to the language are reflected in sciences as well, including such aspects as national competition and rivalries. Integration can only have a negative impact: it can only impede progress. This is another reason why the role of national intelligentsia is so great now: not only to protect and preserve world culture, but to help develop it as well."

M.Zhulinskiy: "Yet, having taken up this task, we Ukrainian writers, have come up against a blank wall on two sides. On the one side, we have the Administration of Culture. (Let this linguistic monstrosity be our common enemy.) It is afraid of letting this ethnic jinni out of the bottle, hoping that it will keep quiet in there. On the other side, tragic though it may sound, there is a wall created by the people, i.e., the native population of the republic, including some Ukrainians who think that their national heritage lacks future and is even too rustic. What can you do nowadays with this 'grandmother's tongue' if it is not used in government, ask some people, while others have completely rejected the language and do not even teach it to their children."

V.Shatskov: "It is always more difficult to cure a disease than to prevent it. We think that intelligentsia is the group that sustains culture, whereas in reality it is the people; intelligentsia only expresses it.

"In the last century, Russia experienced a massive invasion of the French culture. Yet, classic works of national literature were produced in the French novel genre; an important role in this was played by the Slavophiles. Colloquial Russian did not become impoverished, despite the requirement to study French; even in everyday life, something called a Moscow ambience and a Petersburg manner persisted. Little Paris attracted only shop assistants and telegraph clerks. Our age does not have a monopoly on the destruction of ancient monuments. Ancient Ryazan was totally razed by the nomads. However, a new city was quickly built nearby, since there were people who knew how to build temples and houses. Do you see the point? For instance, I am not very happy when I hear calls to rebuild temples to perform Bach in them, or to set up a museum of contemporary painting, or build a concert hall for dancing and singing groups. This would be a break in the chain. The band of dombra and balalaika players is not a cultural phenomenon if it is promoted as exotica. Nor is an igloo, if only a couple of them are made to display at the economic achievement show. What is most important is the need for such things among the people."

M.Zhulinskiy: "Do you think that the issues for which intelligentsia in the republics is now fighting are still-born?"

V.Shatskov: "In this area, to talk of lost or unformed needs is inappropriate. If those needs were kept from arising or gaining force by some historical conditions, we must first look at those conditions objectively."

M.Zhulinskiy: "But the process itself was interrupted. In the 1920s, the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Central Asian republics began to develop concepts of the national socialist culture and to write truthful histories of the USSR nationalities. Suffice it is to recall the debate conducted in 1925-28 in the Ukraine about various literary development paths. It ended when one of the leaders of our cultural renaissance, revolutionary poet Mikola Khvylyovyy was accused of bourgeois European orientation and of breaking with Moscow, and perished. He was the first Ukrainian writer to kill himself. Two months later, a leninist bolshevik and important party figure Mikola Skrypnyk also committed suicide. He did so as a protest against the perversion of leninist principles of nationalities policy that were occurring in the Ukraine and which were exacerbated after L.M.Kaganovich's appointment as the leader of the Ukrainian people. Stalin's famous letter to Kaganovich, written in April 1926, signaled the start of the liquidation of all literary and cultural organizations and journals; a dark period of repressions began. Under the guise of internationalization, a true denationalization and destruction of the culture took place. I mean here the goal of creating literature, cinema, theater, etc that did not share a national idea or historical and cultural roots. (This goal, incidentally, has not yet been abandoned.)"

R.Dzhanguzhin:

"We must work on developing cultural pluralism.

"The long decades of social lethargy from which we are now starting to awaken resulted, among other things, in the fact that both social sciences and artistic practice were moving—mostly in parallel, but sometimes in opposite directions—further and further away from the life of the society. Is it a surprise that this so-called method which reflects pre-scientific thinking has caused great damage both to social sciences and to artistic practice and perverted the moral standards? Let us take a seemingly simple question of the Kazakh national ethnogenesis. How many absolutely fantastical concepts have been built here! How many contradictions! Neighbors used to fight over such issues as to which nationality this or that epic work belonged or over the nationality of Al-Farabi or Yusuf Balasaguni. Not so long ago, we used to be extremely open to one another's culture. Lately, however, a kind of isolationist trend has emerged. We are now less familiar not only with the Ukrainian, Georgian or Lithuanian literature, but with that of our regional neighbors, Kirghizes, as well. A general weakening of the cultural drive and spiritual energy is underway.

The fact remains, no matter how many articles and monographs we write on the single multiethnic culture and the fruitful process of mutual enrichment and inter-influence. Let us recall Lenin's words that the first responsibility of those who seek to make man happy is not to delude themselves and have courage to admit existing reality. We must think of these words every day. When we abandon reality and lose touch with it, we begin to look at Uzbeks, Turkmens and Kirghizes with the eyes of a border guard and view Azerbaijanis and Yakuts as outsiders."

M.Zhulinskiy: "And what about national and cultural differences?"

R.Dzhanguzhin: "In this case, I am speaking of the social and cultural features of our region. The main remedy against the interethnic strife and various prejudices that have sprung up in the Central Asian republics is to know the role of various tribes and peoples in the creation of one's own ethnic group. These ideas were splendidly developed in the works of prominent scientist L.N.Gumilev, which provide a broad historical panorama of the material and ethnic culture of the peoples of the Soviet East. I am not trying to accuse all our historians and writers of historical amnesia. I can cite the research of A.Margulan, M.Magauin and A.Medoyev, articles by archeologists K.Akisev and A.Akisev and O.Suleymanov's book "AZ and YA" [initial and final letter of the alphabet]. Yet, those individual achievements occurred in the climate of general stagnation and were pushed aside by various quasi-scientific tracts on the 'laboratory of internationalism.' There did indeed seem to be a laboratory, but in the end we have wound up with national alienation."

V.Shatskov: "But now, when we have an opportunity to straighten out and raise our heads, let us look around and see whether or not similar problems exist in other parts of the world, where the above-mentioned reasoning does not apply.

"Many scholars and artists in the West are concerned about the destruction of the European culture. They blame the expansion of the American culture. (Incidentally, no one thinks that the pervasive study of English is part of this process, whereas in our country, discussions about Russian-language schools still have a claim to profundity.) At the same time, the decline in the level of the American culture is explained by the advance of kitsch. Clearly, different causes are mentioned but the result is the same: decline of traditional cultures. Hence, it is logical to suspect some other basic cause, one that is not so obvious, perhaps. Thus, America's problems stem from that cause plus the intrusion of mass culture, Europe's from the same cause plus the trans-Atlantic invasion and ours from the very same cause plus oppression by the supranational culture."

M.Zhulinskiy: "This is almost a plot for a mystery novel. The search for the mysterious unknown. I am sorry I have interrupted you. You, Vladimir Stepanovich, are talking about more or less natural processes underway in culture. If only our words about free development of all nationalities and ethnic groups at all stages of development of the socialist society corresponded to reality. Alas, we know the truth all too well."

V.Shatskov:

"If we view culture as a reflection of a certain essence, it is enough to know that cultures are unquestionably different in order to speak of possible differences in the psychological makeup of the nations who sustain and drive those cultures."

"The prejudice against the term national character is so durable because the term is mentioned before any attempt to convince people is made. However, it would be difficult to explain merely by differences in geography, economics and history the striking dissimilarities in religion, philosophy and the arts, i.e., in the areas that are born of the very methodology of thinking. This common base creates the amazing wholesomeness of national cultures: the fact that only a handful of original sources give rise to a striking similarity of remote cultures, and the centrifugal movement of history (from original tribes to national entities) to a beautiful mosaic of world culture. History reveals to us a picture similar to that of the expanding universe: the nations' foundations grow stronger and stronger, people are becoming increasingly self-aware and assertive and it seems that international integration is a long way off."

"Hence, the national methodology of thinking is the first difference. The second difference is the direction, the vector of thinking. Naturally, I mean a dominant, priority direction. Some cultures create the technology for conquering the outside world (the European culture does that, and the North American culture does, too, as its offshoot); other cultures, such as the Indian culture, create the technology for penetrating the inner world of man; still other cultures are socially oriented. Here is one example: the winds of Buddhism have long been raging over both India and Tibet; yet, in India it has yet to touch the caste system (to which it is inimical in its very essence), whereas in Tibet it has completely transformed the social structure."

"Currently, Europe and America are experiencing a revolt against family, property, etc; people are even attempting to change the unalterable perception of time and space (the explosion of drug use). But in reality, it is a revolt against their matrix of logical thinking, or the typology of their culture. Most likely, we are witnessing a process of general cultural reorientation."

A.Valton: "If I understand you correctly, you think that the process of cultural reorientation is a global one. In certain situations, it does not exclude self-liquidation of certain cultural structures, is it not so?"

V.Shatskov: "This is not quite right. I only wanted to stress that each culture is based on its own genetic matrix of thinking, feeling, perceiving the outside world, etc. For some reason, all nations speak different tongues. Language is a way of expressing one's essence. Hence, the obvious conclusion is that all nations are different. This premise, of course, would lead a racist, a missionary or an internationalist to different conclusions. Naturally, we support the latter. But the premise is correct. Yet, until recently we have regarded the term national character with suspicion, uncertain whether or not it can be used in all cases. So, we need a scientific theory of national character. Perhaps it is not a panacea. But in any case, to make the discussion of cultural ecology a constructive one we must stop being afraid of mentioning terms national character or national culture type. The realization (as opposed to simple hysterical assertion) of one's dissimilarities and uniqueness makes a culture more stable. As to a cultural cocktail, or a mixture for general consumption, it is a tragedy for any nation, large or small, including Russians. Self-realization, on the other hand, or awareness of one's worth and uniqueness, does not cause nationalism or chauvinism, as some people in our country still think, but on the contrary, it makes one respect other national cultures and other nations. This scientific nationalism, if you will, will lead us to the wholesomeness that we all seek."

Actor Ulyanov Outlines Agenda as Candidate for People's Deputy

*18000579 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 23 Feb 89 p 2*

[Interview with M. I. Ulyanov, recorded by N. Polyanskikh, under rubric "26 March—Election of USSR People's Deputies": "Doing My Bit So There Won't Be a Repetition of the Stagnation"]

[Text] USSR People's Performing Artist, Hero of Socialist Labor Mikhail Aleksandrovich Ulyanov is a figure in our cultural and social life who is so well known that he needs no special introduction. Artistic director of the Theater imeni Yevg. Vakhtangov, chairman of the board of the RSFSR Union of Theatrical Figures, and member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, he provides, by means of his entire activity, an example not only of a great talent, but also of a heightened conscience, civic bravery, and personally sensed responsibility.

M. A. Ulyanov has been nominated by the CPSU as a candidate for USSR people's deputy. At a meeting with the ideological aktiv of Moscow and the Moscow area, that was held at the House of Political Enlightenment, CPSU Moscow City Committee and Moscow Oblast Committee, he was asked a large number of questions. It was difficult to answer them because people nowadays want to hear not only a truthful word, an honest evaluation of the situation that has developed in the country, but also the candidate's precise, constructive program. And although that meeting cannot be called, in the literal sense

of the word, a meeting with the voters, for Mikhail Aleksandrovich Ulyanov this was an opportunity, as it were, for him to "test drive" his political program.

[Ulyanov] If I am elected deputy... Well, I have my own position, my own point of view concerning a particular problem. I cannot invent or fabricate one. That position is born in me every day: it arises from my meetings, my thoughts, my disappointments, my pain, my lack of understanding, my indignation, and my hope. I have my own opinion concerning the improvement of the party structure, concerning the ecological problem, concerning man's place in society... I understand that the meaning of being a deputy lies in defending various positions not simply by casting a vote, but by making statements, by presenting resistance, dissent, and protest in the course of discussion. My position evolves from one thing: it is necessary to help our country, to put it back on its feet, to take it out of its crisis situation. But how? By supporting those who try not to keep their own position, but to keep their head, those who can provide relief from this crisis.

[Polyanskikh] Mikhail Aleksandrovich, for a certain period of time we have observed obviously abnormal relations in definite circles of the creative intelligentsia. What are the deeply underlying causes of this "warfare"?

[Ulyanov] There was a time when certain artists were considered to be untouchable. No one could criticize them. One could write about them only in laudatory tones. They were, so to speak, the owners of the tendency. But this certainly does not mean that they were talented. On the contrary! But nevertheless, God help you if you criticized Bondarchuk or, say, me, or Alekseyev and Safronov. Instead, everyone all around applauded. In general, we have become accustomed to applauding. We cannot live without applause. There is a certain famous play in which the heroes find a gramophone at a dump, they put on a record containing a speech made by Stalin at a special congress of the Soviets, and for three or five minutes they listen to applause. The entire record is nothing but applause!

But you will agree with me that the conflicts that have become constant ones recently among the various factions and groupings into which we have hurriedly formed ourselves are also no way out of the situation. These "civil wars," properly speaking, were mentioned, in fact, at the recent meeting between M. S. Gorbachev and representatives of the creative intelligentsia. I feel that it is time to end our interminable and bloody struggle. Accusing one another of all the mortal sins will not lead to anything good. It is necessary to unite and consolidate all the creative forces.

[Polyanskikh] What is your attitude toward the mass information media? Could you possibly tell us about your statement at the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Ulyanov] What is my attitude?... About four years ago, as a member of a rather high delegation, I visited the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany—West German]. In Mannheim we were received by the city's oberburgomeister. He had a neat little house, that was not a rich one but which was, in the German style, immaculately cared for. There were little lawns all around... He didn't have a gardener. The oberburgomeister's wife and daughter took care of everything. In the course of the conversation it transpired that the family was very pleased at a recent development—the daughter had gotten a job by computer.

"What do you mean, by computer?" we asked.

"Well, doing it by computer is when you put your resume into the computer and the company puts in its requirements. If there is a match, your lucky number comes out and you get the job."

We said, "Wait a minute, now! You're the oberburgomeister, aren't you? Do you mean to say that, as the oberburgomeister, you can't ask anyone to find her a job..."

He smiled and said, "Of course I can. But the next day it will be printed in all the newspapers, and the day after that, I'll have to resign."

Well, I wish that we had that kind of press.

And this same question—the democratization of the Soviet press—was the topic of my statement at the party's Central Committee Plenum.

[Polyanskikh] Could you please allow me to read two or three lines that you are familiar with: "...If the memory of a person who has left this life remains on earth, then his best monument is the fact that this land will become even more beautiful. His friends' best memory is the good in their hearts that has been put into people's keeping. And those who worked with him for the good of the Cause will multiply their efforts!" Those are your words, and they were said about L. I. Brezhnev. Among us there are a few who did not write or speak that way. Our misfortune was not only in the lack of sausage and panty hose, but also in the lack of trust in one another. There have been a lot of lies and very little repentance.

[Ulyanov] I think that it is necessary not to repent, but to tear out one's hair about this. There is an expression: "Every nation deserves the government that exists." Because we, like slaves, were ready to sing the praises of anyone. So I could confess, I could say that, yes, I am a miserable soul who had been intimidated and who did not know... But that won't allow us to move any farther ahead. And I will tell you why. Because repenting is like saying, "excuse me, please," and that ends the entire matter. Just like the Moscow ladies who, in a certain

plan, "sin and repent, sin and repent..." And so if I can do even my smallest bit to prevent this from being repeated, that will be my answer to this.

[Polyanskikh] Mikhail Aleksandrovich, could you please tell us about your new role in the movie "Our Armored Train," a clip from which was shown on television.

[Ulyanov] It's not a very large role. I have been so busy lately that I can't appear much in films, but when I was asked to accept the role of the former chief of an NKVD camp, I agreed. Why? Because this is the kind of guy he is: a former camp chief, who had been responsible for the deaths of many hundreds of people, has now settled down comfortably in a small town, where he gets a nice little pension. He has built a great big dacha, and he "milks" it like a cow, making lots of money, and waiting for his hour. In response to a question asked by a former coworker, "What does this have to do with us? What were we guilty of?", he reveals a terrifying philosophy that is largely new to me.

"Do you know who is guilty of everything—of what is happening now, of this entire 'perestroyka,' and all the other rubbish?" He reaches under his sofa and pulls out a portrait of Stalin that used to hang in his office. Twisting the portrait in his hands, he says, "This is the one who's to blame. You know, he couldn't even find his own replacement. And how did it all end?..."

This is a terrifying figure of a man who regrets not Stalin himself, but the Stalinist system. And he becomes even more terrifying when he continues his monologue: "Don't be afraid. They don't have cadres like us. They'll still need us."

In that role I expressed my attitude to the Stalinists. Because it might turn out, God forbid, that these "good guys" will make themselves known again.

[Polyanskikh] What do you think is the degree to which the administration of the country should be decentralized?

[Ulyanov] To the degree when an independent person will be able to live on his own money. If we develop the habit of working poorly, it is dangerous to spend everything carelessly. As a theater director, I have to put on a repertoire today that will attract the audience. Because if the theater is left without a kopeck, my comrades will tell me immediately, "Hey, Mikhail Aleksandrovich, you'd better get moving. You're using bad judgment in this matter." That is the degree to which freedom can exist. And the ruble goes farther than that. It does not allow any special freedom: if you can do something, then you can earn money, but if you cannot, then you cannot earn money. Freedom will exist when responsibility exists—they are identically important.

[Polyanskikh] What do you propose fighting against as a deputy?

[Ulyanov] If anything shows up is, in my opinion, incorrect, that's what I will fight against. For example, I support the ecological struggle very much. Because our ecology is on the brink of disaster. Right now we are fighting against the chemists for Shchelykovo—Ostrovskiy's estate on the Volga. Right next to it they are planning to build a large chemical processing plant, the runoff from which will be fed partially into the Volga, and partially will be pumped deep under the ground. I am afraid that we will be left without water. We have already written a letter to PRAVDA, have written to USSR Council of Ministers, and have made a deputy's inquiry... But for the time being there is nothing that we can do...

Or take the spirituality of art. Let me read an excerpt to you: "It is very sad, Mikhail Aleksandrovich, for me to hear you talking more about actors' salaries than about their spiritual growth..." Yes, my dear comrade sits there and writes that there used to be poor actors, but they brought spiritual light to the people! Well, who says we aren't poor too? Just take a look at how our actors live in the provinces, and at the pittance they receive. Life is hard for them, but they perform every day, bringing that very light. So how are we worse than the prerevolutionary actors? Why can't we fight to improve our living conditions? Why can't I defend my comrades' position, so long as they have put their trust in me and allowed me to take this rostrum?

As a whole, my platform is simple: I am in favor of creating those living conditions throughout the country that prevent any repetition of Stalinism, of Brezhnevism, or anything similar. That is what I shall fight for.

German Comments on Shake-Up at Leningrad Film Union

18000438 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian 10 Jan 89 p 4

[Interview with Aleksey German by V. Potemkin under the rubric "Screen and Stage": "A Drastic Foreshortening—Aleksey German: 'Let's Talk About Resignation'"]

[Text] [Potemkin] First of all I want to ask you about some disquieting news. Is it true that all of the secretaries and the board of the Leningrad Branch of the USSR Film Workers' Union submitted their resignations at the end of last year? Many people did not believe it. How could it be? Remarkable films have been made in Leningrad, films which have received numerous prizes at international and All-Union festivals, and now.... The bureaucracy is no doubt once again to blame, isn't it? The artists have suffered a great deal from it! How many of them moved to Moscow from the banks of the Neva? Your ordeals too are well known.... Has something else gone wrong?

[German] That is all more or less true. It seems to me, though, that the departed artists had it best on the road. They left Moscow too. They traveled far, because life is

just about the same everywhere here. The moves are just weak protests by the artists not borne out by the praxis of illusion. As you know, fate has not pampered me. Only recently has it favored me, and I received two state prizes. Various things have happened. Moscow banned me, however. Apparently people did what they had to. Two of my pictures were not simply banned: banning was an ordinary, everyday thing. "Tested on the Road" and "Lapshina" were written off as losses. Lenfilm paid the state every last kopeck of the films' cost out of its small revenues. Hundreds of people received no bonuses. The objective of the individuals who arranged the persecution was clear and simple: to destroy the very thought of resistance, to set my co-workers against me. Most of the people at the studio are not wealthy. The quarterly bonus is a lot of money to them. I believe that the film-making top brass were scheming to have the Lenfilm collective break me. That did not happen, however. Few people were angry at me. Most of them felt sorry for me.

It was absurd to count on the USSR Film Workers' Union. The union did not even accept me until "20 Days Without War" reached the screen. I must mention Aleksandr Vasilyevich Karaganov as one of those few officials who helped me out of trouble. People from among "those on top" here in Leningrad also came to my rescue.

[Potemkin] As a former worker in the party gorkom I am well aware of who tried to help you, and how. I know, however, that the fact of the spoken and unspoken support was almost insignificant in the situation of enormous pressure from above, both on the directing artists and on the cultural agencies, even on Film Workers' Union.

[German] It is my profound conviction that for many years the Leningrad Branch of the Film Workers' Union was among those responsible for a certain moral climate in Lenfilm. Everything is relative, of course, but the film passions surrounding positions, titles, trips and rations did subside somewhere between Moscow and Leningrad, at Bologoye. Art did evoke respect, though, and dishonesty and upstart attempts to attain stardom elicited disapproval. Despite the corrupt, essentially malevolent situation Iosif Yefimovich Khayfits still donned the jacket with the Hero's Star and traveled to Smolnyy for unpleasant and painful talks, begged, coaxed, degraded himself and attempted a rescue. The union's position was controlled in great part by secretaries I. Averbakh and V. Melnikov. The beginning of the '80s was marked not just by the arrival of Lenfilm's new director, but also by the destruction of the climate in our Film Workers' Union.

[Potemkin] I still want to know how you regard the mass resignation of the board of the Leningrad Branch of the Film Workers' Union. As far as I know, this was a first in the history of Soviet artists' unions.

[German] The fact that the board voted to disband and demanded new elections indicates a change in public awareness. It represents a sense of one's own capabilities and one's own dignity. Therein lies my answer to the question of what the previous secretariat could have done. No one forbade the secretaries of the USSR Film Workers' Union or our own branch from submitting their resignations. From leaving to protest what was done to Muratova or to Tarkovskiy.... The Brockhaus and Efron Dictionary says that the word "hero" is of Greek origin and means an intermediary between the people and the gods. I think that Iosif Yefimovich had a hard enough time in that capacity. And if I have any complaints about the current leadership of the Leningrad Branch it is that—despite my appeals, incidentally—the secretariat failed to resign in the extreme, conflicting situations. If the secretariats had resigned a time or two it would have forced the powers that be to reckon with them. There was a way, resignation, which was dignified and would not have insulted anyone.

[Potemkin] Just who and what specifically are the problem?

[German] I have been talking about it for a long time, and I do not want to repeat myself. The problem lies in great part in ourselves. In years past people in Leningrad traveled at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour, let us say. Today the nation has shot forward. The USSR Film Workers' Union has "shifted gears." In Leningrad, however, we speeded up by 6 kilometers, and we were satisfied. So we submitted our resignations. We did not emerge from the state of degradation and were unable to get a feeling either of our own strength or our own capabilities. I do not like everything in the central union, but at least, at least.... There are ideas there, there is initiative, there is pressure, and it is **interesting** there. Our secretariats are boring, the subjects raised there are boring, and it is boring to attend. The two main things discussed are the fact that the Muscovites do not regard us as people and the snack-bars at the Film Center. In order for the Muscovites to begin respecting us as people, however, we should not be afraid, for one thing, and not send the enormous amounts of money earned by services of the Leningrad union there or argue about them. Our union is as poor as a church mouse, after all. If we need to help sick members of the union or a widow, only Moscow can authorize more than 100 rubles in assistance. Isn't that shameful?! But we keep arguing about snack-bars. We have been arguing for 3 years or so.

So much for that.... The creative individual in the Leningrad studios is defined as the so-called young generation, although it is really the in-between generation, to put it mildly. At Lenfilm it is A. Sokurov, V. Aristov, Yu. Mamin, S. Ovcharov, V. Ororodnikov, V. Sorokin, K. Lopushanskiy, V. Buturlin, D. Svetozarov, V. Bortko, O. Teptsov.... That is not the order of their importance. The attention of the critics, the public and the intelligentsia has shifted to them. And that is only right. The older generation can feel them breathing down

their necks. Two or three years ago, when the association was formed and the board was elected, many of them were not even members of the union. Today—please pay attention to this—the leadership and the social significance are in conflict. Those in charge are no longer sovereign leaders in art, and those they are directing are not followers. Still, something has to be done.... Particularly by the studio leadership, in order to avoid a situation like that on the eve of the 5th Congress of Film Workers.

[Potemkin] But the reorganization of Lenfilm, the establishment of yet another association and the artistic leadership of the three associations—general screen, film and television—headed by well-known directors V. Melnikov, V. Tregubovich, I. Maslennikov and S. Mikaelyan, who advanced their own creative programs and formed a board of like-minded individuals are signs of democratization of studio and union life.

[German] I am not casting doubt upon the artistic leaders. I only want to point out that there have been no real democratic elections. These individuals were still more appointed than elected. The proclaimed programs of the associations have been eroded. It is an unhealthy situation. Only studio director A. Golutva has presently been elected democratically. The artistic directors, however, and the chief editors—still, such a bagatelle—are like the owners of small estates and their managers.

Another thing I dare to say is that one cannot seriously direct a large association and simultaneously produce a film. They cannot be combined. One cannot sew and fire a machine gun [at the same time]. It is either one or the other. At one time they even came up with the idea of a salary for board members. This did not come about. People will not serve without pay, and it ended up with a situation in which the board requires nothing of the artistic leaders and directors. It does not allocate money for films. Most of the members know nothing and decide very few things. The main thing, however, is that they have become first in line to receive work. There are many directors but few films. Should we try to invite talented directors from somewhere or other? There is a lot of talk but little action. Individuals and money are needed. Discussing all of this, one begins clearly to perceive the traces of disease in an outwardly healthy and thriving organism. I have friendly relations with most of the studio and association leaders. I am actually a director of that generation, and precisely for that reason I cannot avoid talking about it. I am equally convinced that the absence of a large artistic council for the studio, with the involvement of diverse creative people, is harming the cause. Public opinion was always the most important part of Lenfilm's creative life. The Lenfilm restaurant has determined more than the evaluation of the director and those in charge. There was a reason why one of the directors considered closing the restaurant. Public opinion is now shifting to the restaurant once and for all due to the absence of a large artistic council. It will be easier for the associations to conceal their failures.

I want to be correctly understood: "I am not snipping" at my own studio. I refused to switch to Mosfilm or the Studio imeni Gorkiy.

[Potemkin] And what would be the ideal union today, in your opinion?

[German] It seems to me and to many others that the union should be to some degree an alternative agency. And it seems to me that those in charge of the associations should not continue to be secretaries of the union, because "where can a man go" in case of a conflict? I. Maslennikov or V. Melnikov is at the studio, let us say, and also in the union. They need to choose one or the other. The absence of a conflict commission in the Leningrad Branch of the Film Workers' Union is one of our definitive features. Relations between the union and the studio and union rights must be conceived with a view not to friendly situations but to conflicts, because the people directing us can change, and situations can change.

Another thing is that the union needs to be active in resolving social problems. It is hard to find housing in Leningrad. I doubt that film workers are in such an impoverished state anywhere else in the nation. At the present time, despite all the promises, remarkable director A. Sokurov lives in a room with a leaking ceiling in a communal flat. His health cannot tolerate the dampness. Some people might say that there are people living in worse conditions and that Sokurov's prominence means nothing in this case. But just show me some other city or rayon official living under such conditions. Incidentally, do not forget the 1.5 million rubles which our union annually submits to Moscow.

[Potemkin] I sense that you have outlined an entire program of action. Is it not because (and this is being discussed not just in the Lenfilm restaurant, of course) it has been suggested that you run for the position of first secretary of the Leningrad Branch of the Film Workers' Union? Most of our film workers support the proposal. If you became the top man, you could indeed help to "pour new wine into the old wine-skins."

[German] Yes, there is nothing secret about that. The secretaries of the Film Workers' Union and my comrades have spoken with me about it. They did not offer me a crown, however, but suggested that I come up with a program. And I must say that the idea appealed to me at first. Something Lopakhin-like stirred within me: I would cut down the cherry orchard, build dachas.... A sobering-up followed. I am a director who has not made a film in a long time. What I need to do now is make films. Other people should direct. A director should have a taste and a desire for that, and most importantly, enthusiasm. He should sense that he is a leader, sense his purpose and the need for it. And he should be a master in his profession, because a master perceives problems as a master, while a craftsman perceives them as a craftsman. It is said that one of the superiors once made this

statement about me: "His films can be released. He is not a leader and will not sabotage us." I cannot say that I was saddened by this qualification.

All of us need to rise above our personal grievances for the sake of the common cause. And may our union unite us.

Kirghiz Goskino Chairman Complains of Stagnation in Film Industry

18300329 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 31 Jan 89 p 4

[Interview with Sh. Usubaliyev, acting general director of the republic Kirgizkino Production Association on Cinematography, by A. Barshay, KirTAG correspondent: "Problem of the Screen: Paradoxes in the Development of Cinema"]

[Text] On the eve of the new year, the film makers of Kirghizia were again awarded the Red Banner of the USSR Goskino [State Committee for Cinematography] and the Central Committee of the trade union of cultural workers for their victory in the competition based on the results for the third quarter of 1988.

The workers of the republic's cinema network and film rental services have already grown accustomed to successes and awards. Yet why, in accepting this high award, did recent chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Goskino, and current acting general director of the republic production association on cinematography ("Kirgizkino") Sh. Usubaliyev speak not so much about achievements and successes as about acute problems, unresolved tasks, and unused reserves in the development of cinema in the republic?

Our KirTAG correspondent asked Sh. Usubaliyev to answer this question.

[Usubaliyev] "We could not have achieved any success in our work, even the most inconsequential," said Sharshen Usubaliyevich, "if we had rested on our laurels and complacently allowed ourselves to relax even a little bit. On the contrary, today, when the reorganization of all spheres of public life is taking place in our country, we see our shortcomings and problems that much more clearly. And also... the paradoxes of our development."

Here is one of them. It would seem that we do not need to convince anyone of the fact that today the role of art, and cinematographic art in particular, is immeasurably increasing in the life of society. However, no matter how bitter this may be to repeat again and again, the construction of movie theatres has been practically halted in the republic. In the last 20 years, instead of the necessary tens, and maybe even hundreds, of new movie halls, only individual units have been built. And, of course, this has a negative effect on the spiritual, moral and aesthetic upbringing of the people and in no way facilitates an increase in the income from film screenings. Under these

conditions, the load placed on our workers and on our movie theatres is excessive. Judge for yourselves. For every thousand city residents in our republic there are 27 seats in movie theatres, while, for example, in Tajikistan this indicator comprises 54.8, in Turkmenia—55.2, and in Uzbekistan—37.2. About the same proportion is retained also in rural areas. At the same time, the gross revenue from film screenings in our republic comprised 9,391,000 rubles, in Tajikistan—9,369,000, and in Turkmenia—8,161,000 rubles. In other words, in spite of significantly lower capacities we receive more income. This means that Kirghizstan residents are strongly drawn to the art of the cinema. And I believe it is simply immoral not to satisfy this spiritual thirst of the people.

This is why we are turning to the government and to the republic's Gosplan [State Planning Committee] with the appeal to actively and energetically resolve this chronically neglected problem of ours. It is paradoxical that instead of strengthening the material base of the cinema network, every year the plan is arbitrarily increased without consideration for the capacities. This places the cinema network into a difficult economic position. On the other hand I believe that today, under conditions of the transition of all sectors of the national economy, including also the cinema network and the film rental service, to economic methods of management, the task of building new film theatres may be resolved at the expense of the profits received by the film makers. Also, I would like to stress that cinema is a very profitable sector of culture. For example: the construction of the largest film theatre "Rossiya" in the republic's capital cost the state 800,000 rubles, while this theatre has already brought in 20 million rubles in profits.

Here is another paradox of the same series. The network of video libraries and video viewing halls is rapidly developing in the entire country. This is a new type of cinema art capable of reaching the most inaccessible and remote regions. Unfortunately, our republic is lagging behind at the tail end of this endeavor. Having at our disposal wonderful video technology, including imported technology, we cannot expand a network of video viewing halls and video libraries due to the shortage of buildings and true interest in the development of this form of art among the local Soviets. At the same time, with their blessing, we have witnessed the mushroom-like growth of primitive video cooperatives, cafes which attract mass audiences, especially the youth, with films obtained on the black market which contain elements of terror, rape and pornography, and are presented on a low artistic and technical level. Nevertheless, prior to the recent resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers on regulating the activity of cooperatives, the organization of performances, including also video screenings, on an individual basis was prohibited by law.

I hope that now the situation will change, and that the production association "Kirgizvideofilm" created under "Kirgizkino" will develop to its full potential.

Here is yet another paradox. In our republic, as in many others, the State Committee on Cinematography has been transformed into the production association "Kirgizkino", which has been handed over to the Kirghiz SSR Ministry of Culture. This was a difficult and controversial decision which evoked many objections. And, in fact, how can we mechanically unite, especially in an epoch of cost accounting, a sector which brings in multi-million ruble profits with a department which receives budget subsidies? It is good that in the reorganization of our department we have retained a certain economic and administrative independence of the film industry. Naturally, we believe that the changeover of the sector to full cost accounting will be possible under the condition that the "Kirgizkino" association and its structural subdivisions will be fully responsible for the production and rental of film and video products, as well as for the provision of film and video services to the public within the limits of those functions which were previously performed by the Goskino and its structural subdivisions.

Another problem which concerns us today is the attitude toward cinema on the part of kolkhoz and sovkhoz managers working under conditions of cost accounting. Many of them, using the excuse of saving money, refuse to present purposeful film screenings at outlying pasture and local sites, dairy farms and villages which do not have standard film screening facilities. This, I believe, imparts not so much material loss upon the film makers, as social detriment, depriving the farm workers of cultural recreation and of the opportunity of expanding their professional knowledge.

[Correspondent] Sharshen Usabaliyevich, everything you have said relates primarily to the film network and film rentals. But how are things with film production? After all, the "Kirgizfilm" studio is also part of the "Kirgizkino" association.

[Usabaliyev] Yes, it is. And here there are specific problems, creative as well as organizational, financial, etc. As before, the question of strengthening the material-technical base of the film studio has not been removed from the agenda. This, naturally, cannot help but be reflected in the working conditions of the cinematographers. Nevertheless, for the first time during the last two years the studio has operated without losses, and has even shown some profit. Last year the studio released a number of interesting feature films. Nevertheless, as yet there has been no real frankness, no great new discovery in the Kirghiz feature film...

The situation is even sadder in our documentary film making. Here the qualitative indicators are notably declining. Thus, out of 18 films released last year, only one received the first category classification. The situation was about the same also in 1987. We are slowly but surely losing the high reputation of our cinema. Although, it would seem, the artists and the studio itself have currently received much more artistic freedom. Yet

at the same time, it seems to me, our film makers, especially the young ones, lack responsibility and exactingness in their approach to their work. They seem to have a lack of enthusiasm, passion, and burning desire. And, frankly speaking, the atmosphere itself which is today prevalent among cinematographers is not very conducive to inspiration, creative search, and friendly comradely work. Here, alas, there is a flourishing of destructive clannishness, personal ambitions, envy, petty bickering, and some artistic workers lack intellectual background and culture in their discussions. Unfortunately, the leading film makers are not showing concern for the youth. They do not seem to care much about their students, about those who will come to replace them, and about the future of Kirghiz cinema. That is how misunderstanding and dissent between the generations arise. I believe that without support, with a search for talented and capable youth, it is difficult to think seriously about the future of national cinematography.

We would like to develop a creative youth association "Debut". Let the young people themselves approve the scripts, select the producers, and do the filming. No declarations, debates, discussions or conversations can replace live, specific action. In short, we must work.

Rybakov Rebuts 'Lies' in MOSKVA Article

1800534a Moscow OGO NEK in Russian No 5, 28 Jan-4 Feb 89

[Letter to the editor from Anatoliy Rybakov]

[Text] Many of my readers, including readers of OGO NEK, ask why I do not answer the charges which have appeared against me in the press recently.

I essentially have nothing to say on criticism of "Deti Arbat" [Children of the Arbat]. I have had hundreds of fine heartfelt responses and several major critical reviews, and, of course, there are a whole number of malicious little articles which for the most part are printed in the journals NASH SOVREMENNİK, MOLODAYA GVARDIYA and MOSKVA. I think this abuse is above all the result of the well-known position of these journals. And secondly, reader surveys have shown that in terms of popularity "Children of the Arbat" has overtaken the books of past leaders who thought they were on top for life: Yu. Bondarev, V. Rasputin, V. Belov, M. Alekseyev, A. Ivanov, P. Proskurin, and the authors, editors, and members of the editorial collegia of these journals. This process is natural in literature: one day certain books are popular, the next—others, and the next—still others. However, some people do not want to accept that and have kicked up a racket over "Children of the Arbat" which, incidentally, did not have the expected results.

Then they conceived an enveloping maneuver. They decided to defame the author. They said that he had begun as a Stalinist and ended as an anti-Stalinist. For proof they chose the story "Kortik" [The Dagger]. And

they imagined that the heroes of "The Dagger" were looking for "enemies of the people" (!) (V. Bondarev, N. Fed, and others). But this time too the authors of the maneuver had become confused.

Alla Latynina softly set her colleagues right: "In 'The Dagger' they're not looking for enemies of the people but a treasure" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 14 December 1988). But not everyone paid attention to the critic who was better read than they.

A. Baygushev proved to be more direct than the others. He decided to go the other way, and lie all the way. For this is A. Baygushev's credo: "Any slander and any absurdity—just make it resound. On the principle—pour dirt on them, and as for cleaning up, that is not our concern..." (MOSKVA, No 12). And so according to Baygushev the heroes of "The Dagger" are no longer looking for "enemies of the people" but are informing against their fathers to the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs].

When I read that, honestly speaking, in the first moment I thought that there was some kind of mistake, that A. Baygushev had confused "The Dagger" with some book about Pavlik Morozov. But then, after I had gotten a grasp on it, I understood. No, the MOSKVA author had not misspoken.

Baygushev began his article with this fabrication and ended it with the same one. He accused OGONEK of a prejudicial attitude toward writers whose works had come out in print runs of millions in the years of stagnation and declared that "more than 5 million copies of 'Children of the Arbat' came out in the last 2 years." A. Baygushev took this figure from the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR of 21 October 1988. But the same newspaper in its 25 November 1988 issue apologized to me under the headline "A Mistake Was Made": 5 million was not the number of copies published but the number planned for several years ahead, including 3 million copies in the ROMAN-GAZETA.

As I already said, the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY LITERATOR apologized to me. They are educated people. But I doubt that the editor in chief of the journal MOSKVA Alekseyev will apologize. Besides, people do not at all like to apologize in our country.

So, Baygushev's article began with a lie about "The Dagger" and ended with a lie about "Children of the Arbat"! And in between were 30 pages of journal text filled with slander and abuse.

The reader finds out, for example, that Yu. Bondarev, A. Ivanov, and M. Alekseyev were the fiercest fighters against "stagnation," and obviously for that reason the leaders of the stagnation awarded them the titles Heroes of Socialist Labor (for bravery and courage, that is).

The reader also finds out from A. Baygushev's article that it was not the 11 "pillars of our literature" who persecuted Tvardovskiy and NOVYY MIR, but just the opposite, it was they along with Sofronov who defended him and it was the NOVYY MIR people themselves who ruined Tvardovskiy.

The reader finds out as well that Zhdanov was merely a diligent pupil of Bukharin and echoed his words.

The reader finds out a great deal that is unexpected and stunning if he reads A. Baygushev's article. However, to do so he has to expend a great deal of effort and must overcome a sense of disgust and feel pain for Russian literature. But then once more we see the malicious grin of those who stand behind him and await their own hour.
Anatoliy Rybakov

Postscript: When my response to readers was written, I read a letter in PRAVDA of 18 January 1989 signed by M. Alekseyev, V. Belov, S. Vikulov, and others.

The attacks on OGONEK which this letter was filled with are directed not only against the journal itself, but against all contemporary progressive literature and journalism and against writers, scientists, and historians who consider it their civic duty to participate in restructuring. As a writer I personally completely subscribe to the statement by M. Kolosov published in OGONEK (No 1, 1989). The facts cited in it are well known to all the literary community.

The goal of the letter from Alekseyev and the others was to preserve their own inviolability from criticism. But there have never been any inviolable figures in the history of world literature. And there never will be.

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Culture Ministry Rapped for Ignoring 'Memorial' Society

*18000534b Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 5, 28 Jan-4 Feb 89 p 5*

[Letter to the editor by Yuriy Samodurov, member of the organizing committee of the Constitutional Conference of the Memorial Society, initiator of the movement, and candidate of geological-mineralogical sciences]

[Text] The USSR Ministry of Culture published the conditions for the competition for the design of the memorial to the victims of repression on 27 December of last year in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA and on 3 January of this year in IZVESTIYA.

The announcement of this competition was a significant and long-awaited event in the country's life. Playing no small role in the fact that it happened was the Memorial popular movement, which developed with strong public support to perpetuate the memory of the victims of repression.

It seems that the meaning and main result of the path taken by the Memorial movement is that its participants have proven that they can and know how to carry on socially significant and publicly important work to perpetuate the memory of the victims of repression and can and know how to create the organization needed for this work.

But how has the USSR Ministry of Culture (whom the CPSU Central Committee instructed to conduct the competition to create a memorial to the victims of the cult of personality) treated this organizational know-how as well as the abilities, energy, and enthusiasm?

The Ministry has treated this social wealth in an amazingly foolish way—neither the results of the work nor the enormous creative potential of thousands of the movement's activists interested the ministry, and it calmly published documents on conducting the competition in which not a single word was mentioned about cooperation with the Memorial Society.

The policy of the Ministry of Culture is a policy of separating the population from all concerns for themselves, and that is the policy of yesterday. And this policy is not simply unacceptable to us, it recreates the atmosphere of a stagnant life, and that is much worse.

The dignity, capabilities, and desire for responsibility, initiative, and energy awakened in people by restructuring can exist only in socially significant and professionally and independently organized activity. If we want the Memorial movement to participate in the cause of building a memorial complex in Moscow, then the only way to achieve these relations is, I believe, as follows: using every means of persuasion, we must immediately make an official request that the building of a Memorial to the Victims of Repression of Stalin be entrusted jointly to the USSR Ministry of Culture and the Public Council of the Memorial Fund.

I am certain that this form of cooperation between members of an informal organization and the political and executive organs of power must become a normal and inalienable occurrence in the new stage of restructuring which we are now entering, and I hope that the public and the participants in the movement will concur with the idea expressed here.

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Infant Death Rates, Related Factors Discussed
18300340 Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
29 Dec 88 p 2

[Interview with candidate of medical sciences Zoreslava Antonovna Shkiryak-Nizhnik, head of the department of medical and social problems of motherhood and childhood, conducted by staff correspondent L. Khazan: "The World of New Arrivals"]

[Text] A little girl is playing with a doll. She imitates everything her mother does. But there is one feeling she has not yet experienced. That biological feeling which is born along with the child: fear for it.

The statistics show that in recent years the reasons for fearing for one's offspring should have increased in our country. During the first 50 years of Soviet power, infant mortality decreased ten-fold. And more importantly... We currently rate 50th in the world in this regard.

Food for thought:—in Turkmenia, the infant mortality rate is 58 cases in 1,000 births;—in the RSFSR it is 19.3;—in the Ukraine 14.4;—and in Lithuania 11.6.—And another thing: in Japan it is 5.

Thus, in our republic fourteen children out of every thousand do not reach their first birthday. Is this a lot or a little? When considering such matters, it is best to imagine the number 1,000 as very small, yet the number 14 as huge. Because it represents the deaths of children, and it is hard to imagine anything more tragic than that.

The Kiev Scientific Research Institute of Pediatrics, Obstetrics and Gynecology has a department concerned with the quality of medical examinations for mothers and children. It recently became the foundation for the first department in the country of medical and social problems of maternity and childhood. Our staff correspondent talks with the head of the department, candidate of medical sciences **Zoreslava Antonovna Shkiryak-Nizhnik**.

[Khazan] Zoreslava Antonovna, you are the first head of the first department in the country which has united the study of the medical and social aspects of the problem of maternity and child protection 'under one roof'. Many caustic, but justified, words have been said about the narrow specialization of medical professionals, which has led to the fact that a physician who treats feet finds it difficult to prescribe a treatment for hands. I am joking, of course, but you must agree that the problem still exists.

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] Of course. That is why our department was created, I believe it is the calling of our times, a striving in all directions to make society more humane. Its creation was initiated by the USSR Minister of Health Yevgeniy Ivanovich Chazov. He is familiar with the many years of study conducted by the scientists of our institute on the social reasons for the breakdown in

health of mothers and children, in addition to the medical ones. It has become clear that physicians' efforts will become 'Sisyphean labor' if we do not begin to actively bring about a change in the unfavorable social factors.

[Khazan] Which of these factors do you consider to be the most undesirable?

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] First, environmental pollution. Second, poor working conditions which cause a disruption in the child-bearing capacity of women workers. Third, the disharmony between the family's life style and its attempt to have healthy children. Fourth, the insufficient and incompetent influence of society on all of these factors. By the way, the latter results from the fact that none of us understand that women need to be valued and seen not only as workers, members of society and housewives (although no one is trying to take this away from them), but as procreators of the species. And therefore of the nation. Everyone agrees with this in theory, but in practice...

Food for thought: more than 10 million women are employed in the UkSSR national economy. This constitutes 52 percent of the total number of workers.

[Khazan] And what about in practice?

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] This is what. All women employed in heavy labor should have been released from their jobs by this year. However, during the past two years only half have been released. In the Donetsk Oblast alone, 10 thousand women are employed in heavy labor.

It is a depressing sight to see women wearing rubber boots, standing in drafts and dragging along sacks and buckets. And while this is going on the women's councils and trade union organizations are dozing off (or perhaps they are used to this sort of thing?). It is the physician's job to wake them up.

Food for thought: studies conducted at the enterprises of the republic's textile industry and in the instrument-making and energy industries showed that 30 to 40 percent of the women employed in jobs with night shifts are of child-bearing age -between 20 and 40 years old. The number of divorces in families of this category of workers is increasing.

[Khazan] Our newspaper is taking a serious look at these problems in an article entitled "It is Not a Woman's Burden". But, you know, in practice, we sometimes encounter this paradox: the trade unions are continuing their efforts to transfer women from heavy labor jobs or those with dangerous conditions to others which are not dangerous to their health, but they meet with stubborn resistance from none other than the women themselves.

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] I understand, they are attracted by the increased wages. But, first of all, dear women, money does not buy health and happiness. And second, we should of course ask the government to review the wages of mothers and give them (as well as future mothers) greater benefits and family subsidies. Women should not have to work to the detriment of their health out of necessity. In many countries of the world, monthly subsidies are determined and paid for each child in the family, regardless of the mother's job. And if we reason according to our conscience, we find that our women workers are making a great contribution to the creation of the national profit, but the other side of the coin, the free children's institutions and partial wages until a child reaches its first birthday, etc., is distorted because it is not based on the individual case, it is based on the notorious principle of wage-leveling.

I believe that the time has also come to ask about reducing the number of working hours for pregnant women from the very beginning of pregnancy. And high-risk women, if they wish, should be given complete leave from work during this time or allowed to work part time.

If we use the dry, pragmatic language of the economists, the calculations show that such measures would be much less expensive for society than the costs involved in caring for premature and sick children and their subsequent years of treatment in hospitals and sanatoriums, as well as the sick leave wages for their mothers.

Food for thought: it costs the government 15-20 rubles a day to keep one premature newborn or a newborn with some illness in a hospital. In many cases, these children have to stay in the hospital for two months or more.

[Khazan] I would call the problems we are talking about traditional compared with the new ones brought up on the agenda by cost accounting. The newspapers are already discussing the similarities to the NEP (New Economic Policy) era, when the great intensification of labor resulted in mass reductions in workers. And during that time, the women themselves started asking for a third shift.

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] Well, such a turn in events is possible if preventive measures are not taken. I think that this is an important subject for sociologists and lawyers to consider. From my point of view as a medical professional, I would only like to remind you that more than 70 percent of women who have had unpleasant pregnancy and birth experiences talked about an increase in both physical and emotional fatigue.

Studies conducted by our institute also revealed this important fact, which particularly applies to our republic: women who moved from rural areas to the city less than three years before giving birth experienced a five-fold increase in the number of still births or infant deaths during the first year compared to the control group.

It is also worrying that under urban conditions almost half of the tragic outcomes occur in accidental pregnancies. At the same time, in the overwhelming majority of cases, a wanted and planned pregnancy ended favorably.

[Khazan] After these words, I think it is time to talk a little about the attitude toward women in the family.

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] A shift in the proper emphasis has occurred within the family in the same way as within society as a whole. Young people do not always understand (not even by the second and third year of their life together) why they got married. And no offense to the male species, but I think they are extremely confused about their role. Their lack of desire to help their wives with housework, for example, has more serious repercussions than husbands themselves realize. Many women consider their burden in everyday life to be heavy and stressful.

At the most recent European congress on perinatal medicine in Rome, convincing data was presented concerning the interrelationship between the health of the fetus and newborn and the husband's demonstration of love and affection toward the future mother of his child. A happy, peaceful, loved woman is able to breastfeed her baby much longer... Men probably do not realize what an important contribution they make to the health of their children, to the world of new arrivals. For up to now it has been accepted that everything or almost everything depends on the mother.

Food for thought: the birthrate was 4.4 per 1,000 people in 1986, and 3.5 in 1987. The year before last 792.6 thousand babies were born in the Ukraine, and last year this number was only 760.9 thousand. The trend toward small families continues. For the foreseeable future, this trend will not even maintain the current population.

[Khazan] Our interview has progressed in such a way that we are only now coming to one of the most important questions which concerns every intelligent person today, the question of environmental conservation. For its health not only concerns us in and of itself, but primarily because we are living in this environment. If we do not do anything about nature, it will slowly take its toll on our health. It seems to me that the thoughtless and negligent attitude toward the unrestrained use of pesticides and other chemical substances in agriculture should be made a punishable crime.

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] I agree. The time has come to ask such questions point blank.

This summer in Tatarbunarskiy Rayon of Odessa Oblast our co-workers heard an utterly scandalous story from specialists of the local antiepidemic hospital: children were gathering the onion harvest at the Vosstaniye kolkhoz while a helicopter sprayed fertilizer directly overhead. I think that no condemnation of such action could be too strong.

Food for thought: congenital developmental defects are the number one cause of infant mortality in Odessa Oblast.

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] This depressing story at Chernovtsy, yet another 'sign of trouble,' demonstrates the result of neglect of environmental-conservation measures. Is it necessary for the thunder to crash before a serious attempt is made at Chernovtsy to expose the offending enterprises?

A system for actively monitoring the use of any toxic substances is necessary. Each step farmers take toward their use should be approved and regulated by the sanitary-hygienic services at the site. And we, the medical professionals, who see the consequences of environmental pollution, should alert the public and the deputies with our observations. We are also preparing the employees of our department of medical and social problems to participate in this effort.

[Khazan] I am listening to you and thinking how important it is for all of us, journalists, trade union workers, medical professionals, to take an honest, direct and calm look at all of this. And how timely the creation of your department is. But there is one thing that surprises me: the first recruitment of employees (heads of the lower chains of the health administration) consisted of only 16 people. In the second group, employees from the RSFSR, there will be a few more -23 people. But this is too few to talk seriously about converting broad strata of the medical profession to a new way of thinking.

[Shkiryak-Nizhnik] It is a drop in the bucket! Even if you take into consideration that similar departments have followed our lead and begun operating in Moscow, Leningrad and Gorky. For our republic even a dozen departments is not very many...

All the same, I believe that the most important thing is not work with the medical professionals, but with the people, the general population. Only their enlightenment and activation can create an atmosphere of caring concern for maternity and childhood. This activating and enlightening work should be initiated on a broad front—at the enterprises, in the VUZes and in the schools. And, if you like, even in the kindergartens, where little girls play with dolls—as yet only future mothers.

Successes, Shortcomings in Children's Health Care

18300332a PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
30 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by T. Mayboroda, Kiev: "Baton of Mercy"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Republic Division of the Soviet Children's Fund imeni V. I. Lenin has now been in existence for exactly one year. Hundreds of persons of good will during that time have become participants in the baton of mercy whose principal goal has been a concern

for the physical and moral health of all children, philanthropic assistance to disabled children, orphans, and to children who have been left without the guardianship of parents.

The results of the past year's activities were summed up and problems that require rapid resolution were identified at the Second Plenum of the republic division of the Soviet Children's Fund which was held on December 27.

At the present time the UkSSR has 25 oblast divisions in addition to the Kiev and Sevastopol city divisions of the Soviet Children's Fund. There are additional city and rayon divisions operating on a voluntary basis that are being organized, and the aktiv of workers, kolkhoz workers, and creative intelligentsia personnel is becoming larger.

Kindness cannot be measured in money. Nevertheless, as of December 1, 1988 over 1,300,000 rubles were deposited into account No. 707 in the republic. The broad publicity given to the utilization of these funds has resulted in a philanthropic response from the people. Thus, resident of the village of Knyzhichi in the Brovarskiy Rayon of Kiev Oblast S. G. Danilyuk deposited 200 rubles into account No. 707, pupils at High School No. 8 of the city of Stakhanov in Voroshilovgrad Oblast contributed 27 rubles, the children's literature publishing house Veselka contributed 908 rubles, and the UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs contributed 100,000 rubles.

One can sight many examples of charitable acts of mercy undertaken by the Soviet Children's Fund which since its inception has earned national recognition. The first to respond to the tragedy of the Armenian people that touched the hearts of the whole world were divisions of the Soviet Children's Fund, including the Ukrainian republic division which turned over to Armenia tens of thousands of rubles. The Fund has and is rendering assistance to Chernobyl and Chernovitsk children and infants whose fathers perished in Afghanistan.

A lot has been done and is being done.

However, the Plenum participants concentrated their attention on painful problems of child care.

Chairman of the Soviet Children's Fund republic division Academician Ye. M. Lukyanova cited in her report figures that could not help but cause public alarm. In the Ukraine there are more than 70,000 orphan children, 273,000 single mothers, and more than 116,000 families with several children one-half of whom are living "below the poverty level", and almost 86,000 children are in boarding schools for physically and mentally retarded children...

And here are some more facts.

The health of pupils during their training between the first and eighth grades gets four times worse.

In spite of tendency to become smaller, the child mortality rate in the republic is still high...

Many of the speakers advanced specific proposals to improve the state of affairs in the practice of public health and spoke about the participation of the Soviet Children's Fund in that effort. In particular, the need to make an ecological-pathological map of the Ukraine was emphasized. The map would identify zones that are unfavorable to the health of children.

The child nutrition situation was a cause of general concern among the plenum participants. A number of addresses cited incidents in which there was a local failure to understand the importance of the tasks confronting the Soviet Children's Fund. The need to create normal working conditions for Soviet Children's Fund staff workers was also pointed out. Appropriate premises have not yet been provided for Soviet Children's Fund divisions in the Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Nikolayev, Odessa, and a number of other oblasts.

Almost all of the speakers ascending to the rostrum spoke about the place of the Soviet Children's Fund in the political system of our society. In that connection, the plenum unanimously adopted a resolution to petition the election commission of the Soviet Children's Fund include the name of Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Republic Division of Soviet Children's Fund V. V. Usenko in the list of possible candidates to be elected as USSR People's Deputies.

Vodka Sales Increase in Southern Republics for 1988

18300332b Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 6, 8 Feb 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Imbined Over the Last Year. Figures for Thought"]

[Text] It is difficult to say how much home brew was consumed over the past year, but judging by the "sugar boom" that amount must be considerable... As regards alcoholic beverages purchased at state and cooperative stores, the USSR State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat] has established with a high degree of accuracy that the number of bottles sold was much higher than in 1987. Vodka and liqueur sales came to 134.9 million decaliters, or a 10 percent increase, wine sales totaled 176.8 decaliters which represents a 15 percent increase, and champagne sales came to 20.9 million decaliters, or a half percent increase.

The increase in vodka and liqueur sales was greatest in Kirghizia where it grew by 33 percent. Percentage increases in Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia and Moldavia, and Uzbekistan were 27 percent, 22 percent, and 19 percent respectively. On the other hand the consumption of strong alcoholic beverages decreased in two republics: In Armenia that percentage was lowered by two percent, and decreased by one-half percent in Georgia. It is true,

however, that the consumption of wine in Georgia increased significantly: Wine consumption increased by 54 percent and champagne consumption increased by 26 percent.

Tuberculosis Increasing in Kirghizia, Care Inadequate

18300332c Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 26 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by B. Derbishev: "Help the Children and Help Them Now!"]

[Text] Little girls were playing "hospital" in one of the wards of the pediatric department of the Kirghiz Republic Anti-Tuberculosis Clinic. The gown that was probably taken from a hospital attendant without her permission sat on the young "doctor" like some white cloud—a rather amusing scene.

But in the adjoining room real doctors were struggling to save the life of a child dying of meningitis and who needed immediate resuscitation. But emergency aid for the youngster was only available in the city which was a good 25 kilometers from the village of Tash-Tyube in Alamedinskiy Rayon. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the pediatric department never had its own ambulance.

How could this happen? Why is it that seriously ill children who are frequently in need of emergency resuscitation procedures find themselves removed from a principal medical center?

Somewhat later I found out that a little more than two years ago, in October 1986 to be exact, a commission of Gosstroy discovered a vertical crack between the blocks and a lack of earthquake proofing in the foundation in the main therapeutic-diagnostic wing of the Kirghiz Republic Anti-Tuberculosis Clinic which housed the pediatric, urological, and two therapeutic departments. Naturally, this was followed by a decision to halt operations in this hazardous installation. The move out of the building began on the day the order was issued.

A very unpleasant situation, but somehow or other adult patients were placed in the adjoining room of the clinic. Now the republic's Ministry of Health literally landed the only pediatric department into the suburbs, to the area of the Ala-Too tuberculosis sanatorium. Moreover, that department was left "to survive" in a cold, crude, dark barracks with a cement floor where the conditions were more conducive to the spread of tubercular bacilli rather than to their destruction. The "wards" of this prewar barracks type structure were terribly crowded. For example, no more than two square meters were allotted per cot. There were only two bathrooms without blender tanks or showers for 80 children. And the only wash basin with cold water was against a wall in room with meningitis patients... But what I saw was just a prelude to an even gloomier picture which was painted

by department supervisor E. Shchebletova: "The conditions in which we find ourselves do not satisfy the elementary requirements of sanitation and hygiene. In addition, the therapeutic-diagnostic process has become extremely difficult. Thus, we are forced to keep specimens for tubercular mycobacteria analysis in the refrigerator for three days because we have no way of shipping them to the city laboratory. Physicians know what a lengthy trip can do to a patient following anesthesia. Nevertheless, we have to risk taking youngsters back to the sanatorium following a bronchoscopy performed in the capital. The great distance from a medical center does not allow us to conduct consultations with other specialists, such as oncologists, allergy specialists, and therapists who are not included into the regular staff of the Kirghiz Republic Anti-Tuberculosis Clinic. At times we are unable to provide emergency surgical services for children needing them. These problems are well known to officials of the republic's Ministry of Health. However, they don't seem to be in a hurry to help us.

My desire to find the reason for such a callous attitude towards the problems of the pediatric department led me to the Ministry and Chief of the Administration for Child and Maternity Therapeutic and Prophylactic Services K. Subanbayev:

"Yes, we know about the disastrous situation in the pediatric department. We therefore decided to transfer the administration and auxiliary services of the Kirghiz Republic Anti-Tuberculosis Clinic to this building which will once again be operation after it is reconstructed. And 50 beds and a resuscitation station will be installed in the area that will be made available as a result of that move. In addition, plans have been worked out for the development of a network of therapeutic institutions of this type. Thus, in the near future we will have in operation a 180 bed hospital in the village of Archaly in Alamedinskiy Rayon, and several wings will be added to the Ala-Too pediatric tubercular sanatorium."

Well then, a rather optimistic response. Only it is difficult to believe. After all, for a period of two and one-half years now construction workers have not once promised to accelerate the building's renovation. In the meantime every remains as before: In that very same barracks that houses the pediatric department children are freezing, muffle themselves up in warm blankets, and are coughing strenuously. And if we want to be completely frank, then K. Sybanbayev should admit that those youngsters should never have been transferred to that sanatorium.

Yes, there is still a shortage of space to house medical institutions in the republic's capital. Indeed, other hospitals are in even worse condition. Nevertheless, whenever the need arises to transfer patients such situations should be resolved with the greatest of attention. The patients' circumstances should be ascertained with the greatest scrupulousness, and the best alternatives should be sought.

Incidentally, with regard to the case in point there was a way to ameliorate the situation. Thus, Deputy Chief Physician of the Kirghiz Republic Anti-Tuberculosis Clinic A. Sukhenko suggested that the administration of the Kirghiz Scientific-Research Institute for Ecology and the Prevention of Infectious Diseases which just one year ago was incorporated into the Tuberculosis Institute, as was the Kirghiz Republic Anti-Tuberculosis Clinic, be transferred to another building. The rooms that would become available should then be converted into wards for seriously ill patients.

The example of the pediatric department at the Kirghiz Republic Anti-Tuberculosis Clinic is merely one excursion into the extremely unfavorable situation with respect to this illness in the republic. Only two or three out of the almost 40 existing anti-tubercular hospitals satisfy today's requirements. And this is one reason the number of tuberculosis patients is increasing in the kray. The tuberculosis incidence is 10 to 15 percent higher than it is for the rest of the country. The incidence among children is 18.7 percent higher, 20.3 percent for teenagers, and 2.5 to 4 times higher among persons of indigenous nationality. There has been no reduction in identified cases of neglected forms of fatal tuberculosis and meningitis.

I don't want to dramatize the situation, but if the party and soviet authorities of the republic do not soon render effective assistance to phthisiologists, there will be many more people who will succumb to this dangerous illness.

Steps Taken to Reduce High Infant Mortality Rates in OSH Oblast

*18300304a Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 7 Jan 89 p 3*

[Article by L. Timoshenko: "Disaster Can Be Averted"]

[Text] It will take more than just a few days for the medical profession in the OSH Oblast to reduce the level of infant mortality which is considerably higher than it is in the other regions of the republic. And still this calamity can be averted. This is the conclusion one can come to after seeing the serious work that has been undertaken in many therapeutic institutions of the republic in the battle for the life and health of newborn infants.

Last year's outbreak of infectious diseases in these krays graphically proved that the high mortality rates were due to adverse social conditions and a poor quality of everyday living habits, particularly in the rural areas.

Deputy Chairman of the OSH oblispolkom N. Abdurakhmenova said "The way to resolve the existing problem is to create appropriate social conditions, regulate the birth rate, and of course raise the qualifications of medical personnel as well as the quality of emergency aid. The problem at hand has required serious goal-oriented efforts on the part of all of us. Not a single

administrative building is under construction today in the oblast. All of the funds have been designated for the construction of new therapeutic institutions and the reconstruction of existing ones. In the last three years we have built 2.5 times more hospitals and out-patient clinics than were built during the entire 11th Five-Year Plan period. Construction is underway on water supply pipes in the countryside as well as dispensaries and rehabilitation centers. However, whereas the material base of the health sector and be strengthened with relative speed, it is not quite so simple to change social traditions, family life-style, and attitudes toward women. I have in mind exhausting domestic labor, frequent pregnancies, and nutrition which is the same as has been in the famine years. That is why daily and hourly work on prophylaxis and explanations to women constitutes one of today's most important tasks.

And how much grief is brought about the cultivation of such health hazardous crops as tobacco. There are no economic benefits that can justify the violation of elementary machinery safety rules and regulations on industrial working conditions. Tobacco was and remains one of the oblast's principal crops. Tobacco was and remains on the principal crops cultivated in the oblast. But that surely does not mean that children and pregnant women should be harvesting tobacco crops. Indeed, in many families women have been decisively refusing to out to the tobacco plantations. But that is certainly not happening everywhere. And that is our calamity because when a future mother is engaged in harvesting tobacco leaves she will give birth to a weakened child.

I became convinced of that truth when I was part of raid team of the OSH oblast health department and visited therapeutic institutions of the oblast.

We witnessed the arrival of a young woman at the Tash-Kumyr maternity home. Her face had an unhealthy color, she had edema, and was generally weak. Tobacco had already struck a death blow to her yet unborn infant.

In Ala-Buke Deputy Chief of the Oblast Health Department T. Chubarova was urgently called to the operating table to help stop the bleeding of a woman in labor who also turned out to be a victim of tobacco plantings.

"The rapidly increasing infant mortality rate has forced us medical professionals as well as soviet and party authorities to think about the need of undertaking preventive and health-improvement efforts among future mothers," said Tamara Georgiyevna. "Considerable attention is now being given to the questions of genetics as well. Today many central rayon hospitals and maternity homes in the oblast are working closely with the OSH Marriage and Family Maternity Consultation Clinic whose physicians have thoughtfully and vigorously undertaken this new effort by taking advantage of the experience gained in Moscow and Riga."

But we are still far from accomplishing our goals successfully. We in the OSH oblast are having a difficult time. There is a catastrophic shortage of medical personnel in the oblast, and many of them do not have a sufficiently high level of skills. Previously, we ignored that problem because of the shortage of personnel. We have now understood that it is better to have fewer people who are better qualified. The oblast health department held certification examinations in June. Fifteen chief physicians at district hospitals were demoted and sent off for additional training. One out of every six dentists [stomatolog] failed the examination as did many specialists. It was therefore with gratitude that accepted help from Belorussian and Ukrainian medics. Leading physicians of our fraternal republics are sharing their experience with their OSH colleagues and are helping in the conduct of supervision of medical practice.

"A considerable role in reducing infant mortality has been played by the organization of a resuscitation service that has been operating around the clock," said Chief Hospital Physician M. Gazibayev. "In addition, we have installed our own dairy kitchen which was converted from a previous billiard hall of the gorispolkom. Now we have practically no problem of child nutrition. We supply several rayons besides our own central hospital."

And here is another example. An old tea house [chaykhana] and dilapidated bath house have been a center of attention for the residents of the Tendik kolkhoz of Suzakskiy Rayon. On the advise of elders they have decided to repair both of the buildings and place a kolkhoz health center in both buildings. Today one can get all kinds of physiotherapy, mineral baths, and mud baths there. Mothers with many children who had previously understandably refused hospitalization are now being treated at a day hospital that been organized there without leaving their families.

Veterans are supervising the construction of a day hospital at the kolkhoz imeni Ulyanov in the Dzhany-Dzholskiy Rayon. Part of the money for this construction was appropriated by the kolkhoz and the kolkhoz residents themselves made up the additionally required 35,000 rubles. Future mothers will not only undergo a course of health improvement treatment, but will also learn proper infant care and feeding.

Medical personnel at the district hospital of the May 1 kolkhoz have acquired two cows from the dairy farm of the kolkhoz. They themselves are tending to the cows, milking them, and turning the milk over the children's division. Fruit harvesting from orchards planted by the medical personnel of the Ala-Bukin Central Rayon Hospital is provided free of charge to the hospital dining room.

Contrary to all staff instructions a department in the Dzhany-Dzhol Central Rayon Hospital has been created for the treatment of future mothers and improving the health of women in the child-bearing years. Today many

therapeutic institutions in the oblast have child health offices and are building their own dairy kitchens, and are adopting improved medical service practices.

Of course, all of this is just the beginning of a major and difficult undertaking. But we are all capable of repeating the accomplishments made in Ala-Buka, Dzhala-Abada, and in some farms of the Suzakskiy, Kara-Suyskiy, Dzhany-Dzholskiy, and other rayons. This would be a real effort to avert calamity and to triumph over it.

Kirghiz Rescue Teams in Armenia Complain of Poor Equipment, Training

1830034 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA
in Russian 11 Jan 89 p 4

[Interview with Kirghiz Armenian earthquake rescue workers Vyacheslav Lyakh and Aleksandr Novikov by A. Galunichev under the rubric: "Leninakan: Days and Nights of Tragedy"]

[Text] Rescue workers from Kirghizia were among the thousands of persons who came to the demolished cities of Armenia. They recently have returned home. Each one of these fellows came across death in the course of their work on a number of occasions, participated in difficult rescue operations which were often under the extreme conditions of the Tyan-Shan heights. But it was there that they saw something which was incomparably incredible, and it seemed that my old acquaintances who had been on more than one expedition, returned themselves with wounds that would not heal. I therefore decided none of my own words or conscientious descriptions could replace their story...

Here then are two of the rescue workers from Kirghizia—chief of the rescue control station of the Kirghiz Ala-Too Vyacheslav Lyakh and high-rise installation worker Aleksandr Novikov. Now I'll turn on the recorder:

[Lyakh] Following the earthquake the program Vremya reported that the USSR State Committee for Sports was sending teams of mountain climbers to Armenia. While I was trying to get through to Moscow by phone a telegram arrived. The telegram asked that nine persons from the rescue detachment be dispatched immediately with full gear, winches, lines, and foodstuffs (all items were enumerated), i.e. ready for self-contained operations. I had already gotten through to somebody, and many telephoned me offering their services and even wanted to know their assignment. I also was contacted by the cooperative of mountain-high altitude services of the city of Przhvevsk which at the time was working on the repair of high-rise buildings in Frunze. The foreman was Boris Sergeyevich Kuzmenko. That group ultimately included five persons. The composition of the group was a reliable one since almost all were master candidates or mountain climbing instructors.

[Galunichev] And did you get to Armenia quickly?

[Lyakh] There were no flights on the computer disk unit [Manas] so we were given alternate routes through Baku and Kuybyshev. We made a stop at Tashkent. Everything required for an emergency departure was done in Frunze. Because of us part of the baggage was taken off the airplane since we were carrying almost 500 kg of equipment and victuals. At Tashkent we rushed through the procedures, on the one hand, with the airport directorate, and on the other hand, with the republic headquarters for assistance to Armenia. We were joined by 18 mountain specialists from Fergana. It was decided that there would be special flight to carry a total of 180 persons.

Within two hours 200 persons had been gathered. We flew out and landed in... Krasnovodsk. There we were transferred by the military to a Il-76. We arrived in Yerevan late at night.

I already knew through the republic headquarters of mountain climbers that 600 climbers had reached Armenia. I was appointed leader of the Leninakan detachment comprised of 270 persons.

[Galunichev] How did you find Leninakan?

[Lyakh] We drove into the city at 4:00 a.m. It was hard to call what we saw a city. Inwardly we had expected to see ruins and were prepared to see terrible scenes. But what we saw shook all of us. A horrible human tragedy. A calamity without measure.

[Novikov] Gigantic destruction, night camp fires, ruined piles of former homes. People were wandering around like shadows, literally deprived of their senses. One cannot imagine the scope of such a catastrophe.

[Lyakh] Most mountain climbers are familiar with disasters. We have become to accustomed to them more than other people. Everyone in the group had rescue medals. We have also seen human death, and have carried comrades in our arms down from the heights. And what we saw here compelled us to act immediately.

We had received instructions to assemble at the stadium in Yerevan. We set up the "pamirki" and were ready to go to work at seven o' clock. At city headquarters we were told that work had to be done at the compressor and microelectric motor plants and on the ninth floor of building No. 11 on Isaakyan Street.

I nevertheless asked where were the mountain climbing skills needed. "Work had to be done on the demolished rock piles," we were told. There was no time to squabble.

We arrived at the compressor plant. Apparently, headquarters was not yet in command of the situation. Mountain specialists were already working at the plant. Before that people had asked us: "if you can, go to house No. 99 near the station. We had found it completely by accident. Dismantling of the building had started. The

rock slides had evolved in a way that somewhere in the pockets and "huts" of cement slabs there might be some people. Saving them was our number one task. If they were alive, it would almost be a miracle.

A man came up to me. He said that this is where the family of his relatives used to live. We quickly went to the apartment he pointed out. It was impossible to look at what we found without shuddering. When the slabs were removed we saw on a divan a husband, wife, and a two-year old little girl whom the parents were apparently trying to protect with their own bodies. We found quite a few more corpses that day. And we also saw merely imprints of people on the cement slabs...

Among those who turned to us was a man of indeterminate age. At first he asked for our help, and then demanded it. His relatives, he said, were there. His apartment too had its turn. We looked and saw a safe there. It was a large safe. He grabbed at it...

But of course most concerned other people. We helped and got help. Thus, we scraped until we bled. And we somehow had already become very close. We learned what calamity was befalling which person. We learned that quite a few valuables were in other apartments. We saw it all—gold, rare jewelry, and money. But the people carried off the bodies of their family as the greatest jewel of all.

[Novikov] We also came across this "last word in fashion"—the clamor of armored doors. In one nine-story building we found 15 to 20 apartments with steel doors. The thickness of the metal was "top grade". Made to look like wood. The corner iron jambs were exceptionally fine. But oh, oh!, they didn't use an autogenous welder for the dowels. That means the steel is an alloy. We had to cut out a hole so the crane could grab hold. They lived here in earnest.

[Lyakh] We dug out seven more people. We reached the basements and after the last interrogation of those remaining alive we turned the building over for industrial clearing.

[Novikov] Then we went to the shoe factory. Workers from the Chernobyl Special Nuclear Construction Administration were already there. They had a 200-ton crane. We started to clear the slabs and they dragged them away with the crane. An elderly man came up to us. His son was somewhere there in the rubble. He suggested approximately where he might be. Three hours later we came across a man caught by a cross beam.

About 300 persons perished on this floor.

The corpses were brought outside the gates. There was an enormous crowd standing there. Immediately people began looking for their relatives. Somehow they were

able to identify them by their clothes since there was no way they could be identified by their faces. And so we continued this work for two days.

[Lyakh] We worked at a steady pace, from morning till darkness. Others worked in two or three shifts. Shop-vans were scurrying about everywhere. And it was characteristic that the residents offered to feed us first, even though no one really had any appetite during all those days.

The water supply situation was set up perfectly. Even in the early twilight of the first day we couldn't at all understand that there were piles of bottles everywhere. This was the efficient work of the sanitation and epidemiological service. It literally flooded the city with mineral water and juices. After all, the sewage system and water supply lines were completely destroyed. We were threatened with a dangerous epidemiological situation. That is why trains with water and juices proceeded with urgent dispatch to the disaster site.

[Galunichev] Vyachislav, you are a honorary member of the Bavarian Rescue Service and supervisor of the rescue service for the entire Kirghiz ridge, and you met many of your foreign colleagues in Armenia. What were your observations and conclusions?

[Lyakh] The foreigners were excellently equipped. They had their own vehicles, including medical ones. They arrived almost instantaneously—on the day after the catastrophe. I should remind you that it took us four days to get here. They all had outstanding radio transmitters. On the other hand our portable Lastochki sets couldn't even reach a caller around the corner. And surely to go into the interior of the ruins with that kind of communication would be quite hazardous. No one would hear you.

We saw that the foreigners had detectors, television equipment, and trained dogs, and even small rat-like animals that squeak when they find a living person.

Here is an example. A detachment of Dombay mountaineers dug their way to a woman who was still alive. But it became clear that it would be impossible to rescue her by using our conventional equipment. We called the Czechs through our commandant's office. They brought concrete cutters with them (8,000 rpm). They quickly cut a manhole into the slab and saved the woman. Then, the Czech physician did all that was necessary with his resuscitation equipment. I think that we are obliged to adopt much of what we have seen to the fullest degree. This has also been a lesson of the tragedy.

[Novikov] If only that were the case at the textile combine. There the chief watch guard had the habit of locking up the passageway during working hours as well. During the first underground tremor everyone ran for

the exit but it was closed. And a second powerful tremor caused everyone to become buried by the two upper stories of the office wing of the building.

[Lyakh] Soon after we switched our operations to a plant where straightening and bending machines were manufactured. There in the evenings operational plans were made, detachment and groups reports were collected, and summaries were transmitted to headquarters. We were asked to examine the saved buildings for their usefulness. That work was hardly in our line of specialization. We climbed over the girders, floors, roofs and over everything that is considered load-carrying structures. The plant remained standing, to the credit of its designers from Voronezh.

[Novikov] There was a special attitude toward the mountaineers in Armenia. One time we going along at twilight. Ahead of us a patrol checking out a passerby. We too were getting ready for inspection. "Go ahead, go ahead," they said. The inspections were connected with cases of pillaging.

[Galunichev] And did you see such cases?

[Lyakh] No, but we had information that there were looters. We were warned not to turn over belongings and valuables to anyone who asked for them. Other residents were asked to identify the owner of valuables, and an owner was asked to enumerate his own valuables.

There was a report that many gold items were found in the gas tank of a Zhiguli. From the leaflets every knew that the operative headquarters schedule was from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. The leaflets and other informational materials stated that looters would be dealt with mercilessly. Business on the mountain was sickening.

When we were accompanied out of Leninakan a rigid customs inspection was underway. Everything was subject to inspection. During the time we spent in Leninakan enormous valuables and huge sums passed through us. Sacks were dragged off. Did someone have a sudden hankering for something? No, there were no such persons among the rescuers.

[Novikov] I would add that all the work undertaken by us was without compensation. And here an acquaintance asked me when I got back: "How much per day did they pay you?" Indeed not a thing. The average wage remained for those who were at state enterprises. And how they worked! They hardly dragged their feet to the camp.

[Galunichev] Sasha, what did you see in Leninakan as a professional construction worker and an experienced high-rise installation worker?

[Novikov] I would not want to live in such buildings. There was more than enough for one to see. The slabs and ceiling covers were placidly skewered with scrap

iron. Parts that should have been welded were simply twisted together into a knot of wire. By an irony of fate there still remained one slogan hanging over the ruins which read: "Economics must be economical"...

[Lyakh] In Leninakan we met with delegates from Kirghizia from the State Construction Committee and the Academy of Sciences of the republic. They showed us some collected specimens where a concrete block could be broken in two manually. They said that all the buildings constructed in the last 15 years and all of the new schools were destroyed. On the other hand, the prewar structures and pre-revolution high school remained standing. Therefore, it was not so long ago that someone not only compromised his conscience, but committed a crime and in fact dug a hole perhaps for even his family as well as for himself. One would think that in our high stress seismic zone construction workers would not economize on cement and other materials.

[Galunichev] Now people have begun to talk about organizing rescue groups in the country and in the regions to be prepared for major or minor disasters. In view of the Armenia experience, what ideas have occurred to you?

[Lyakh] Armenia has brought out much in the open, including our astonishing inability to deploy men and materials.

Here is recent example. Your newspaper wrote about the avalanche at the Sary-Kyr pass which buried five persons. But no one thought of turning to the mountaineers for help. Three hundred amateurs were gathered, heaps of helicopter hours were burned away, and extravagant sums of money were wasted, even though 20 to 30 rescue workers could have handled the job. They didn't even have primitive "antiquated" test rods. They made them out of wire. Again in December 1987, it took five days to pull out a downed helicopter near the Sary-Chelek mountain. Twenty five persons were engaged in that operation. If given just a preliminary overflight I would have taken six persons and finished the job in one and half days. Everything requires a professional approach.

The status of the rescue worker is a serious question. There is as yet no law governing payment for time spent by such workers in rescue operations. Any supervisor has the right to deny the worker's release. Of course such are workers are released and paid as the humane thing to do, but by violating the rules.

There is still another delicate problem. There are cases where the rescuer himself gets into a jam and becomes a victim and becomes a cripple. The pension allowed for such cases is the same as for an everyday accident. If the rescuer then dies his family is left with a miserly pension. I could cite some specific examples.

I think that reforms in our service should include the following: Take the rescue service out of the base directors' jurisdiction. That set up is a primary obstacle. Our zone stations should be given a regional character. We must be able to form into a unified shock troop and inter-republic forces. I would think there is good reason to organize within the republic's Council of Ministers a department for disaster control to which under various disaster situations other departments would automatically transfer their jurisdiction on a temporary basis. Responses to our requests for aircraft must be immediate. Moreover, experienced helicopter pilots (in fact the ones we usually work with) should be given the right of free flight under emergency circumstances. They too, along with us, are not having it easy. And all of that is still due to the many "don'ts" enumerated in the rules. It is essential to set up a reliable seismological information service—that is not at all a military secret.

We need regular information about foreign innovations. Again, for example, who among our profession goes abroad? Engineers and directors. This brings nothing more than personal impressions. But after all, we are considerably behind in many aspects of this work.

We must begin to train people on a large scale so that they become skilled rescue workers under disaster conditions and know how to save themselves. And if even a single person is helped by such training, it is worth trying. Perhaps we should take a closer look at the civil defense system. What are these comrades doing these days? In Armenia they demonstrated their complete incompetence

We also need an avalanche dog service.

Let us not forget that our kray is a region of large-scale tourism and recreation. Everyone should know what kind of hazards might be encountered on the road and how to avoid them.

[Galunichev] What else might be said?

[Lyakh] I would like to express my gratitude to all who didn't let me sleep prior to our departure. The telephone rang incessantly at night. We have always been confident that our fellows would always be ready to respond to any such disaster. I am reminded of people who rushed onto the airport ticket counters in order to get to Yerevan and who were willing to take orphaned children. Some figured out a way to fly out with us. But it is with pain that I say that there was one person among us with considerable mountain equipment who refused to join our group without any clear reasons.

[Galunichev] But still, how did he explain this?

[Lyakh] "I can't, I don't want to go, I'm behind in my schooling." Unfortunately, there was such a case.

[Novikov] Yes, there was... There has been a lot since that day. And already we have become different people...

Local Aral Population Suffers From Unhealthy Environment

18300331 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 21 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by B. Bektepev: "Shore of Hope"]

[Text] The Aral Sea is now in the second year of clinical death which can only be reversed by ecological resuscitation. What does this mean? It means that the measures designed by specialists and which underlie the recently adopted decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers to save the Aral Sea and its environs from ecological disaster, must be implemented in an orderly fashion in the shortest possible time.

As early as the present year a significant portion of the runoff from the Syr-Darya began enter the Aral Sea. For the first time in the last decade local fishermen were able to practice their trade in the river delta and provide delighted Aral residents with life fish, an immemorial delicacy. But it will be a very long time yet before the first casting net will be thrown into the sea. And then there is the problem that demands resolution today and that paradoxically has literally fallen out of public view. That is, the people who live in the Aral area with their present-day needs, misfortunes, anxieties, and desperation. A lot is being said and written about them. But is that really necessary? To be more precise, is that the only thing that should be written about?

One recalls during the operational days of the Aral Encounter which was described in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA that many local residents loudly expressed their vexation to the Encounter participants, saying that there had already been enough discussion about how necessary it was to save the Aral. That was clear to everyone. First one should save our children, our women, and all those who are paying for other people's mistakes by continuing to live here in this zone of ecological and social disaster.

...My last meeting with Aralsk, formerly a port city but now merely an administrative center of a single rayon, took place during the holding of a rayon party conference. No matter which of the delegates spoke from the rostrum, the speaker in one way or another mentioned the problems of the Aral Sea. Not ecological problems, but social problems. They spoke about the fact that until that time none of the region's residents sensed any really help or concern for their plight.

What that the actual situation? Is it possible that our society would render no aid to persons who have suffered misfortune and who had become a collective victim of a catastrophe? After all, a national decree was adopted which outlined the principal directions for the socioeconomic development of both the Aralskiy Rayon

and the Kzyl-Orda Oblast as a whole? A public assistance fund for the Aral has been created. All that is so. But three days spent in Aralsk and neighboring villages left us with a depressing impression.

The health of the people, figuratively speaking, is a barometer of the social climate that keenly responds to all of its determinant factors, such as living conditions, material security, quality of nutrition, and many other factors which have come to be called human existence. Illness is frequent among Aral residents. The incidence of typhoid fever, viral hepatitis, tuberculosis, and anemia and a number of other serious illnesses in the rayon significantly exceed the incidence of those maladies in the oblast and republic. From year to year physicians have been issuing a very high level of death certificates for mothers and children.

It is painful to talk about the condition of the Aralskiy Rayon Hospital and its inhabitants. The large area on the outskirts of the city is closed off by a formidable fence. The hospital comprises long and low barrack type structures with smoking chimneys. One of the barracks houses the pediatric department. Here there are no sewage or water lines. The reception chamber is a small, dark, tiny room. The first thing that one sees is the thoroughly rotted floor in whose gaping holes stagnant water is turning black. In one corner is an iron bathtub. In the other corner is a small table with an electric hot plate on which a pail of water is being warmed. Wandering here and there along a narrow corridor are people and women with carefully wrapped breast-feeding infants in their arms. The odor of medicine is mixed with the odor of smoldering coals. The department is heated by 12 ovens.

"There are no worse conditions anywhere," said acting department chief M. Kylumbetova. "We have to bring water here by tank truck. The wards are overloaded. But worst of all is the fact that children brought here become ill with secondary illnesses. Most of them, particularly during the cold season, contract secondary respiratory diseases. What they need most of all is warmth and fresh air. The smokestacks are not tall enough to make sure that the exhaust smoke and fumes are expelled to a safe distance. Sick children are breathing this smoke. The outdoor toilet is forty meters from the premises."

"This year," deputy chief physician M. Kozhabayev joined in the conversation, "we asked the rayispolkom to connect at least the pediatric department to a central heater. But nothing came of it because of a lack of piping, batteries, and other equipment..."

The same situation applied to the therapeutic department. The only difference is that most of the patients are women. There are twice as many, and sometimes three times as many patients in the wards that were designed to accommodate four to five beds. Persons being treated

here are patients with bronchial asthma and cardiovascular diseases whose main requirement is quiet and a sufficient amount of fresh air.

"We don't have any complaints about the physicians and nurses, they are doing all that they can," said disabled veteran of the Great Fatherland War and participant in the Victory Parade B. Mansurov. But we are offended by the rayon leadership. If one of the leadership or members of their families should get sick, they go to the oblast center which has all the necessary equipment for their care. If they were forced to be treated at the rayon hospital, they would probably try to change the situation."

"We, older men have had to experience all the disorder in the rayon's medical services," war veteran M. Urazaliyev joined in. "I mean not only the rayon hospital. For example, there are quite a few Aral residents with diabetes whose treatment requires a special diet. However, the rayon center does not even have a special nutrition store, and in fact the food offered in the hospital itself is the same for all patients. Dietetic foods are not merely a whim for sick people, but rather a primary necessity."

"One thing I can say," asserted chief physician T. Zhapparov, "is that the hospital is being maintained by the enthusiasm alone of the medical personnel. The lack of isolation wards and the shortage of clinical and diagnostic equipment, resuscitation apparatus, and physicians, especially those in such extremely needed special areas as pediatricians and obstetrician-gynecologists—all of that has been creating great difficulties for the both the treatment and prevention of most diseases."

Our conversation with T. Zhapparov took place in his office from whose window one could get a good view of the brick box-like typical building of the rayon hospital. The PMK-18 Kzylordastroy trust has been building this installation so vital to the rayon for three years now, and it is slated to go into operation next year. But that will hardly happen since only a little more than one and one-half million rubles of the total estimated cost of four million rubles have been used up by the builders as of the present day. The shortage of certain construction materials, mainly silicate brick, is given as the reason for the delay.

One must agree that in a background of global problems concerned with the restoration of the ecological system in the Aral area, the absence of brick, pipes, and panels gives cause for laughter. Equally laughable are the references made to that shortage. The oblast has dozens of small and large enterprises that manufacture construction materials, so that if one wanted to find several tens of thousands of those bricks, it would not be so difficult. But evidently, up to this day the desire to do so is supported to this day on a dependency basis. The problem is much more easily identified than it is to resolve it. Have the rayon health authorities made any efforts to

prove to the construction and planning organizations of the oblast how essential it is to provide priority level construction materials for the most important installation and to draw the public's attention to this most acute problem? Evidently, not. Neither the rayon nor the oblast press had even a single recent article which might have discussed an acceleration in the construction of a new therapeutic center.

It is also generally recognized that a Aral assistance fund has been created in the republic. In the course of my assignment to the Aral region I had occasion to speak with many residents, medical personnel, party, and soviet officials. It was paradoxical but a fact that none of those persons really knew what monies were available from this fund or what they were intended for. Have in fact actual specific amounts been allocated for the development of the health sector in the Kazakhstan Aral area, or for other social needs such as the construction of children's and cultural institutions? This question was asked of many persons, including the present First Secretary of the Party Raykom B. Akpenbetov. The response was a categorical no. Such funds have not been allocated.

"And it will remain so until such time as the Aral problems are examined in their entirety, globally, so to speak," the Secretary continued his thoughts.

But it high time to come down to earth. The program for saving the Aral Basin is divided into the following stages: halt the drop in the water level and restore the ecological balance. And surely the first, i.e., the first-priority stage here is to save the people who are living here and to create social conditions for them that will compensate for the ecological disaster, and primarily moral suffering experienced by those people. Even the rayon center doesn't have a park of culture and recreation, a Pioneer Club, a children's health camp, or a sanatorium. The budget of the local soviets is splitting at the seams because of the necessity to patch up old holes. Today billions are being called for to save the Aral, but it has been some time that we have been trying to find 350,000 rubles to build a standard sports complex. Wherever you turn one encounters disbelief everywhere. Not too long ago the State Committee for Athletics decided to earmark modular designs for a closed sports complex, but later suddenly rescinded its own decision. And one could cite quite a few of such examples of where requests made by Aral residents were not heard outside the boundaries of the region.

But surely today a broad complex of measures is required for an improvement in all aspects of social life. This year the food provision situation for the population has improved somewhat. But as before there is still a shortage of potatoes, vegetables, fruit, meat, and dairy products.

"We would be happy to help the Aral residents," said Chairman of the Kzyl-Orda Oblast Consumers Union Zh. Sarbalakov, "but where are going to get the additional funds? Their rigid centralization does not make it possible to redistribute funds among the rayons of the oblast. If only the Kazakh Consumers Union or even the Central Union would help supply the Aral residents with the needed foods, merchandise, and commercial equipment, i.e., if they could allocate additional funds, then this would a solution to the problem."

A solution to the problem. At the present time there is no doubt that such attempts are being made but, unfortunately, with only partial results. Ample confirmation of that can be find in Aralsk itself. For example, an attempt has been made to solve the employment question. It is a most acute problem. More than 4,000 able-bodied Aral residents are without employment anywhere. A portion of that number, mainly women, will become managers of a city branch of the Atkyubinsk Garment Factory which is now under construction. A portion (a considerable number—1,200) will be employed at the new plant. That would seem to be fine. But that is only half. The fact of the matter is that the plant was initially built for the repair of drilling machines and land reclamation equipment and was placed within the jurisdictional operation of the republic's Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. In the connection with the changeover in the ministry's production program last fall the enterprise was transferred to another department which, after a short period of reflection, decided to accord a new specialization to its adopted offspring. It would manufacture electric motors for vacuum cleaners at an output of 400,000 units as early as next year followed by an additional production goal of up to one million units. In looking ahead, we would note that these items require a high level of manufacturing precision and rigid manufacturing conditions for the operation of the entire plant. And little thought was given to how the climatic features of the Aral area would affect such operations. Factors such as dusty winds, abrupt temperature changes, and many others. Moreover, the reconstruction of former shops requires a considerable period of time.

All of this has already placed the management and staff of the plant into an almost hopeless situation today which might be defined in the following way: The enterprise is obviously unable to manufacture a product of such high complexity. All the more so if one considers that there is absolutely no equipment for this purpose so far and no highly skilled workers for such operations are available.

In order to occupy the present contingent of workers in some way, the plant is manufacturing metallic items at an output volume of a little more than one million rubles per year. In addition, because of a regular shortage of metal, the plant shops are frequently idle which only results in further losses. Consequently, this kind of thoughtless planning in the organization of a new plant can hardly facilitate the resolution of one of the most

acute social problems facing Aral residents—providing employment. After all, the housing and domestic consumer problems at the enterprise have virtually not been resolved and cannot be resolved in the near future because of departmental leapfrogging. And the formation of a solid worker staff is very difficult unless those problems are solved.

Problems, problems. For the Aral residents each one of them takes on a special meaning. The people who have been living along the shores of the dying sea have been patient. That has been observed by anyone who has been there at least once. But hundreds of Aral families have abandoned their home sites because they could no longer endure their deprivations and difficulties. The residents of the Aral area cannot cope with these difficulties if left to themselves. Then why not undertake a solution together? Why cannot each oblast assume a guardianship over the Aral residents, and not merely in words but in deeds? Would it not be advisable to transfer a part of the republic Aral assistance funds to the account of the local soviets so that the funds could be used as needed? Would it not be desirable to organize, finally, a unified coordination center that would be located in Aralsk itself and that would be empowered with broad authority for the effective resolution of all problems associated with the ecological and social disaster? The Aral and the Aral residents are awaiting replies to these questions.

Goskomstat's Guryev Interviewed on Census Implications

18300410 Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE*
OBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 18, Dec 88 pp 36-38

[Interview with V.I. Guryev: "Census-89: A Snapshot of Society"]

[Text] In January 1989 our country will conduct the latest All-Union Population Census. What will that census provide to the national economy and to social sciences? What will be the distinguishing features of a census conducted under conditions of perestroika and glasnost? The editorial office has directed these questions, and other questions that are of interest to our readers, to Vladimir Ilich Guryev, chairman of USSR Goskomstat.

[Question] When and how will the latest census be conducted?

[Guryev] From 12 through 19 January, census-takers will visit every home. But it must be kept in mind that the answers to the questions on the census sheet must be given as of "the moment of the census"—0001 hours, 12 January. The statistician's science knows that the information that is closest to the real situation is provided by a "snapshot" of the country's population that makes it possible to avoid the mistakes linked with the so-called natural movement of the population (births, death, migration).

There is yet another important condition in the census—the anonymity of the information received. The last name in the census sheet is indicated only for purposes of checking to see that no one is left out and that no one is listed twice. The family name will not be put into the computers that will process the census data. All the information will be recorded simply on the basis of statements made by the person being listed. No documents will be required. We hope that the public will take a responsible attitude toward the census that is built on trust.

[Question] The most accurate figures are still only figures. How is it possible to use them to create "a snapshot of society"?

[Guryev] We can find a direct answer to that question in a quotation from Marx: "However dry these figures look as they are arranged in tight columns..., they actually provide a larger amount of valuable materials for the history of the overall development of a nation than volumes that are full of rhetorical rubbish and political chatter" (Marks [Marx], K., Engels, F., "Soch." [Works], Vol 13, p 513).

[Question] But what if we are speaking not about history, but about the future? Because the thing that is currently in the center of attention of the party, the government, and society as a whole is social policy, which is being fundamentally restructured. How can the census data be used to resolve this task and other vitally important tasks of our society?

[Guryev] It is generally known that it is necessary currently to allocate considerably more funds for social needs than previously. But no billions of ruble will help if the social programs do not have the necessary informational support. The 1989 census has been called upon to provide the necessary information. We will receive information about the sociodemographic composition of the population, its distribution among the various regions of the country, population migration, the number of structure of families, the educational level and occupational training of Soviet citizens, and many other aspects of our life. Simply on the basis of an analysis of the population census data it is possible to plan effectively the country's social and economic development, especially on a regional basis, and to resolve problems of supplying the population with commodities, the training of specialists for the national economy, distributing the labor resources among the various regions...

[Question] Incidentally, at the present time the last problem that you mentioned is an unusually acute one: in many regions there is a growing shortage of manpower, but at the same time, in a number of other places, there is an obvious excess of the able-bodied population. What do the statisticians think about this situation?

[Guryev] In this matter also we expect a lot from the census. In particular, it will make it possible to obtain a more complete description of the population that is employed on social farms, in cooperatives, in individual labor activity, in household management and the running of a private plot—with a subdivision by sex and age. By referring to the obtained data, the specialists will be able to forecast the labor reserves for social production and to obtain reliable indicators of the best places in which to create new enterprises and what their area of specialization should be.

I would like to clarify this by an example. If women predominate in the region among the population that is not working, but that is able-bodied, then it is efficient to build, say, garment factories. But if men predominate, one should think about building enterprises in heavy industry. In a word, a careful analysis of the census data will make it possible to avoid the risk of errors. And this is very important, because the problem of the efficient use of labor resources is not only of economic importance, but also of great social importance.

At the present time the part attaches a tremendous amount of importance to the intensification of concern for the family, for the need to strengthen it, and for the rendering of assistance to it in fulfilling social functions, in educating children, and in improving the material, housing, and everyday-living conditions. The successful carrying out of this line requires extensive information, which we plan to obtain with the aid of the census.

Naturally, specialists have forecasts relative to the basic tendencies in family development, but the census will establish the degree to which they are accurate and reliable. It is very important to know how many families there currently are in the country (according to the 1959 census there were 50 million, and by 1979, 66.3 million), and what the average size of the family is—not in general, but on a regional basis. And this is why. According to the data in the past two censuses, that size was, respectively, 3.7 and 3.5 persons. But that average value was obtained by means of arithmetical actions with very different figures: the families in the major cities of the European part of the USSR are smaller than that average, and there are many families in the Central Asian republics with 7-10 or even more persons. Without having acute, concrete data it is impossible to resolve the tasks of strengthening the family and rendering it the proper aid. Because even housing construction has to be planned differently for regions with a preponderance of families with many children and for those where the families, as a rule, are small.

In order to prepare social programs it is extremely important to get an idea of the complete and accurate picture pertaining to such a social category as dependents. For the most part, that group includes children and housewives. In 1959 that group constituted almost

half the total population, or, more precisely, 45.6 percent. During a 20-year period it dropped by approximately one-third—to 30.6 percent. Probably that tendency has been preserved, but an accurate answer can be provided only by the census. And there is something else: this tendency is the result of the action of two factors: the drop in the birth rate and the increase in the employment rate of mothers. How do they interact? Which of them is predominant? The answers to these questions will determine the evaluation of the effectiveness of the demographic policy being carried out in our country.

[Question] You have said that the program for the current census reflects those problems that are troubling society. Wherein does this program differ from the previous ones?

[Guryev] In order to carry out a deeper study of the migratory processes, a new question has been included in the program—a question about the place of birth, with a subquestion for those who, after they were born, changed their place of residence: what inhabited place (urban or rural) did you come from?

The question of graduation from a vocational-technical educational institution will make it possible to evaluate the extent to which graduates of those schools are being used in various branches of the national economy, and to ascertain how effective the vocational-technical educational system is.

The question concerning the number of children who were born is supplemented by a subquestion about the number of children who are alive at the moment of the census. This information is necessary for the purpose of studying the reproduction of the population and for preparing corrected demographic forecasts.

The formulation of the first question, "Attitude toward the head of the family," has been changed. Now it reads: "Attitude toward the family member who is listed first." This posing of the question is more precise from the psychological point of view, was verified during the course of sample censuses in 1986 and 1987, and corresponds to new worldwide practice. When answering the question of the sources of the means of existence, at the present time, unlike the previous censuses, it is possible for the person to indicate not one, but two sources, and this list has been augmented by work in a cooperative and individual labor activity.

And finally the major innovation. For the first time after the 1926 census, the program includes a block of seven questions devoted to the public's housing conditions. Thus it will be possible to obtain an objective picture of the everyday living conditions for various social and demographic groups of the population, subdivided by regions of the country. It is generally known today that there is an average of 15 square meters of total area per resident. In various regions, this figure varies considerably. In addition, the data concerning "meters per

person" is obvious insufficient to obtain a correct evaluation of the quality of housing. Just take a look at the official listing of people who want to exchange their housing space or at the announcements attached to telephone poles and fences. Judging from them, meters are only one of the requirements with regard to housing. People are also interested in knowing the material that the building's walls are made of, the size of the nonliving areas, and the extent to which the housing is provided with everyday amenities (gas, hot water, etc.). We attempted to include a considerable number of these features in the census sheet and thus to learn how great the need for them is in various regions.

The census will show the composition of the families that are living in communal apartments or those without the necessary amenities, those that are renting housing, how many families need to have their housing conditions improved first of all, and what types of apartments are needed most. This information is very important for fulfilling the program of providing every Soviet family with a separate apartment or an individual home by the year 2000.

Of course, waiting lists of people wanting to improve their housing conditions exist in every city, in every rayon. In addition, current statistics also has at its disposal information about the size of the population and a number of its important features. But it is only a general census that will make it possible to summarize and refine all the necessary information, or, more importantly, to obtain data for combining individual attributes. In order to plan our life for the immediate future and for the more remote future, it is completely necessary to have precisely this kind of comprehensive information at our disposal.

[Question] I would like to know how much this All-Union Census is going to cost us.

[Guryev] It is difficult right now to give a precise figure. I can only say that we are talking about several tens of millions.

[Question] That's a sizeable sum. You could build a lot of new apartments with money like that.

[Guryev] Yes, of course. But we have to know, for example, where to buy housing, and how much of what kind. The census information will help us to avoid many mistakes, and that frequently is more expensive than money. Also, in general, the funds, commodities, and opportunities that we have at our disposal will still have to be managed in an efficient manner. Especially in a situation when we do not have any of these things in abundance. But how does one manage efficiently if one does not have reliable information at his disposal? As everyone knows, information costs a lot. But the funds that have been invested in obtaining it will repay themselves a hundredfold.

Incidentally, we also know how to economize. One of the ways is random observation during the census. Only 25 percent of the permanent population will provide answers in accordance with the complete program. The others will answer only 20 questions. The principle of the random selection has been developed by mathematicians and sociologists, and its results can be extended with the highest degree of probability to the entire population. This approach will make it possible to obtain additional information while saving funds and time.

[Question] Saving time is an important question. We had to wait a rather long time for the results of previous censuses.

[Guryev] At the present time the deadlines are being considerably shortened. The preliminary results that reflect the overall size of the population and its distribution among the various regions should be computed by April 1989. By the end of the year we shall obtain the basic results—the makeup of the population according to age, marital status, nationality, language, education, instruction, sources of means of existence, number and size of families, as well as most of the information concerning the housing conditions of families and single persons. It is planned to complete the elaboration of the census materials based on the complete program in 1990. Modern technology will help us to reduce the amount of time needed to sum up the results: Blank-6 optical scanners, new-generation electronic computers. They are not only more productive, but are also more reliable. The final statistical tables of the 1989 census will be more detailed and contain more factors than previously: we must respond to the new economic and political situation in the country, we must take a new look at many familiar, traditional problems, and we must expand the number of research topics.

[Question] One last question, that pertains to the glasnost of the census results. Will those results be published and commented on in the proper volume? Because, from census to census, the amount of open data has been consistently reduced.

[Guryev] Actually, much valuable statistical information has been concealed from public opinion, even from scientific workers who have a vital interest in it. Moreover, the information that has been concealed was not only those figures that could spoil the carefully created picture of universal prosperity, for example, concerning the average life expectancy, the childhood mortality rate, etc., but also completely "inoffensive" information such as the number of women and men in the country as a whole and in individual regions, and many, many other kinds of information. Suffice it to recall that the results of the 1959 census constitute 16 volumes; for the 1970 census, seven were enough; and the information obtained in 1979 fitted into just one volume...

But now the situation has changed. Statistics is becoming the nutritive medium for glasnost. We regularly supply agencies of the press with bulletins, communiques, and press releases containing statistical information dealing with various aspects of our life. The information that we shall receive as a result of the All-Union Census will

definitely appear in the press and will become the property not of a narrow circle of "devotees," but of all the citizens of the country.

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**Bromley's Ethnographic Study Covers Regional,
Language Issues**

18300411 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 9 Feb 89 pp 2, 3

[Article by V. Stati, candidate of philological sciences, under rubric "The USSR—Our Home in Common": "National Processes in the USSR: A Search for New Approaches"]

[Text] The title of this article is also the title of a book that was recently published by Nauka Publishing House. The author of the book, a historian and ethnographer who is well known in our country and outside its confines, is Academician Yu. Bromley, director of the Institute of Ethnography, USSR Academy of Sciences. A year ago he published the monograph "Etnosotsialnyy protsessy: teoriya, istoriya, sovremennost'" [Ethnosocial Processes: Theory, History, Present-Day Status], which is a work that is almost indispensable for any objective researcher of ethnic and national problems. The theoretical statements and methodological principles in this book explain certain aspects of the development of the Moldavian ethnic group, for example, the ethosocial substantiation of the "isolation" of the Moldavian nation, but, incidentally, not only that nation. This fundamental monograph by Yu. Bromley is intended primarily for scientific workers.

So now, a year later, as though wishing to share his views with new readers, and bringing to mind M. V. Lomonosov's behest—"create the sciences and disseminate same"—Academician Yu. Bromley has published a new book, the name of which has been made the title of our reflections. Although the book is modest in size, it encompasses a broad group of questions on absolutely the most burning topic: the development of national processes both in the USSR as a whole, and in the union republics, including Moldavian SSR. The inquisitive reader will find on its pages the answers—in a popular form, inasmuch as the work is intended for a mass readership—to the questions that arise in the relations among the representatives of various nations and nationalities.

Obviously, the social process today determines the fate of mankind, but at the same time the author notes that, in addition to the struggle for peace and the ecological and other problems, national topics are being brought into the forefront at an ever-increasing rate, and taking on a global nature. This work by Yu. Bromley is based on his own research and on works by his associates Yu. Arutyunyan, S. Bruk, M. Guboglo, L. Drobizheva, V. Kozlov, V. Tishkov, and others. And although a number of generalizations are known from his previous monographs, the interest toward them has not been lessened, inasmuch as, first of all, they have been presented in a new light, and, secondly, they have taken on particular immediacy. The book's theoretical directedness and its obvious emphasis on practical life are confirmed by the author's objective statement and explanation of the difficulties and distortions in interethnic relations; by his well-argued defense of the actual positive changes

in this sphere during the years of the Soviet authority; by his convincing polemics with regard to questions of bilingualism and internationalism; and by his frequently fruitful search for new approaches and untraditional resolutions for the age-old and the newly arising problems on the basis of the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress and the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Congress. Incidentally, unlike other recent works, this work names and describes undesirable phenomena and tendencies without using any euphemisms.

The chapter "On the Paths of New Decisions" traces the socioeconomic development of regions, and the reforms and difficulties in that area. It is noted that, by means of redistributing the national income in the interests of individual nations, by the end of the 1940's the actual equality of nations was achieved. That practice has been preserved, and it has given rise, on the one hand, to tendencies of a "dependent mentality," and, on the other, to distorted ideas concerning the contribution made by individual republics to the nationwide fund. The author justly emphasizes that perestroyka, which is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the national economy, the development of the principles of democratization, and the strengthening of equality, has been called upon also to guarantee social justice. A factor of decisive importance here is the economic reform, the harmonizing of the interests of the country as a whole and those of the individual republics. This will require, Yu. Bromley feels, the improvement of legislation, and its adaptation to the realities of the socioeconomic life of each republic; the further development of the dual process of improving the centralized leadership in questions that are of nationwide importance, and the simultaneous expansion of the independence, rights, and duties of the republics. "Practical life shows us," Yu. Bromley writes with conviction, "that the scientifically substantiated expansion of the rights and duties of the republics, and of their independence, leads not to the weakening, but to the strengthening of the Soviet multinational state."

The book also comments on the correlation between the social and the national. Commenting on the interrelationship that the national processes have with the social and class relations, the author writes that, as there is "a further development of the overall features of the way of life and the spiritual outlook of Soviet citizens, one becomes increasingly aware of the differences of a non-class nature, including the national-linguistic ones." In this section he analyzes a number of shortcomings in the social sphere and reveals the reasons for the arising of informal associations, various groupings, and clubs with nationalistically colored programs, which camouflage themselves with seemingly correct slogans" (Krunik, Karabakh, Pamyat).

The chapter "Cultures and Languages: Different and Equal"), in addition to a broad demonstration of achievements, also deals with the "nationalistically colored tendencies" in the works of certain authors, their

striving to antiquify and expand the historic area of ethnogenesis (for example, to assert that there is a direct link between the Russian language and the Etruscan language, that India is the original homeland of the Chuvashes, etc.). The scientist emphasizes that the attempt to enclose oneself in his own ethnonational culture is fraught with serious dangers: it "separates nations, each of which appeals only to its own forefathers, and this ends up with the stagnation and provincialism of the national cultures."

Influenced by the multinational makeup of the population, the linguistic processes in our country are of special importance. They are characterized by a combination of two tendencies: the free development of the national languages and the simultaneous spread of the Russian language as a means of communication among nationalities. Using various facts, the author indicates that the knowledge of Russian is not only of international importance, but also of national. "A knowledge of Russian," Latvian scientist B. Pudelas writes, "is beneficial for the majority in the interests of economic, sociopolitical, and spiritual development." Analyzing the undesirable phenomena in this sphere, Academician Yu. Bromley remarks that "quite recently, in certain republics, the concern relative to the status of the national language there (concern on the part of writers, cultural figures, and teachers) was viewed practically as the manifestation of a nationalistic tendency."

The researcher calls for a careful accounting of the specific linguistic situation. In our opinion, he comes to the well-substantiated, albeit untraditional, conclusion that, inasmuch as, in many union republics, the recognition of the language of the nationality that gave its name to the republic, as the state language, is viewed as an essential indicator of republic sovereignty, it would seem that, under present-day conditions, this recognition will only serve to satisfy national feelings, without violating the actual equality of languages. Obviously, with the inadmissibility of any privileges or limitations in the use of various languages. The author agrees with M. Guboglo's opinion, which was published in PRAVDA, that "if the proclaiming of a particular language as a state language is not linked with elements of its forced introduction and does not mean the artificial creation of priorities for one of the languages at the expense of infringing upon the interests of others, there is nothing bad in this. Moreover, this can become an indicator of the maturity of the socialist rule-of-law state."

Yu. Bromley deservedly devotes a large amount of attention to questions of studying one's native language, since the concern for the fates of one's native culture and one's native speech that has been encompassing broad segments of the population in the republics has a direct influence upon the climate of interethnic communication. Another aspect of this process is the mastery, by Russians and persons of other nationalities who are residing in the republic, of the language that gave that republic its name. He writes, "The circumstance that the

migrants—chiefly eastern Slavs—as a rule are not fluent in the languages of the USSR nations that are the basic populations in the appropriate union republics causes even great complications." Relative to the situation in the Baltic republics, the author notes that the failure of the local Russians to know the indigenous languages is frequently viewed as a disdainful attitude toward the indigenous population. In general, the scientist continues, one cannot consider it to be a normal situation when a representative of the indigenous nationality of a republic cannot be understood if he speaks in his native language when dealing with such institutions as a clinic, post office, the militia, etc.

The book contains polemics that are instructive both in essence and in form—the wealth of arguments, the respectful attitude toward one's opponent, and the intellectual tone—between Yu. Bromley and Estonian author M. Khint, who, without sufficient justification, defends the thesis of the harmful consequences of the early study by children of two or more languages, etc.

These polemics also continue in the next chapter, "In Favor of Genuine Internationalism," which is distinguished by new judgments, the modern level of the interpretation of phenomena, and the development of new approaches. The author emphasizes, "Ideologically it is very important to know where the appropriate knowledge will be directed: to the formation of nationwide, Soviet patriotism and internationalism, or only to the national glorification and isolation of nations." The gaps, silences, and half-truths on the pages of historical works—and not just historical ones—no only create a soil for incorrect ideas concerning the historic path of nations and their cultures and languages, but can also be used for purposes of political demagoguery.

This work is one of the first to analyze on a generally understandable level, frankly, and at times polemically, but in a specific and convincing manner, the acute collisions and undesirable phenomena in the development of national processes in our country. The reader comes to respect and to be convinced of the book's optimistic directedness, which is reinforced by a search for new approaches and recommendations for improving the interethnic relations.

One senses the lack of a chapter dealing with the manner in which the questions being studied are illuminated in foreign social sciences. The author repeatedly notes the tendencies of foreign authors to represent onesidedly the development of the interethnic processes in the USSR. The reality is such that the relations among the Soviet nations are studied intensively in the West, and the information and propaganda activities of the Western research centers exert an influence upon a definite part of the population. In the past three years dozens of books have been published outside the confines of the USSR, in which books the national policy of the CPSU is studied in by no means a conscientious manner.

Obviously, there are no grounds for taking an attitude without the proper attention to the works of foreign social scientists concerning the development of the national processes in the USSR, or to the attempts of our authors to study those works.

The principle of the objectivity of scientific analysis, and the differentiated approach, designate the path for studying the foreign social sciences relative to the interethnic relations in the USSR, and they provide the opportunity to overthrow the ideologized theses of the conservative Western authors, to subject to doubt the moot assertions, and to agree with well-substantiated judgments. The fact that in recent times there has been noted a definite similarity between the assertions made by our authors and individual theses made by foreign social scientists should not shock us, if we are dealing with the objective study of one and the same phenomenon. The appearance in various geographical zones, irrespective of the social structure existing there, of scientific results that are in principle identical, on the basis of the impartial study of one and the same facts, is not such a rare phenomenon in science. But if the conclusions on both sides are onesided or unconvincing, then what prevents us from evaluating them on the basis of their merit, in a well-argued manner, with the glueing on of labels or the application of "strong" terminology?

In our opinion, the book over the pages of which we have been reflecting is beneficial and necessary for the broadest circle of readers. The only thing that one regrets is that it was published in a very small printing run—10,000 copies. This omission can and must be corrected, if the desire to do so exists. Taking into consideration the acute shortage and the ever-increasing need in the republic for literature that throws light, from a contemporary point of view, on the development of the national processes, we feel that it is necessary to have a scientific translation of this book into Moldavian and to have it published in a mass printing run. That would be a truly concrete contribution to the study and explanation of problems that everyone is interested in. But that translation should be done immediately. Here too the Nauka Publishing House can serve as an example: it published the book in three months.

Readers Comment on Status of Moldavian Language, Culture

18000529 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 22 Jan 89 pp 3-4

[Article by E. Shalimov: "Thoughts on Letters: We Do Not Need Emotions"]

[Text] Quite frankly, when I was offered the assignment of preparing an overview of the letters our editorial office has received in reply to V. Kalin's article, "SOS for the Moldavian Language and Moldavian Culture," I imagined the task would be much simpler. But the mail was exceptionally voluminous. Our newspaper has probably never received so many responses to a single article, and

the replies were very unexpected and often expressed completely opposite viewpoints. This convinced us that we had hit a nerve, or rather a highly sensitive nerve center, in the life of our society. But just where is that nerve center located? Doctors know that sometimes the pain is in the heart, for example, yet it is experienced in a completely different part of the body. It is very difficult and yet extremely important to find the source of the pain and not get causes and effects confused.

Before launching into the letters themselves I would like to make a small digression. Recently it has become very fashionable to pin labels on people. Before you have time to turn around you find yourself branded a reactionary or an instigator of enmity. Yet at the same time someone else proudly displays his own label of "lover and speaker of the truth..." Not to mention the fact that the world is not so neatly divided into malefactors and positive heroes as some people might believe; not to mention that a label is as a rule used to cover up a lack of serious arguments; not to mention that the phenomenon of labeling is part of the worst pages in our history: most of all we must see that labeling is a futile endeavor. It does not bring us one step nearer to the truth or to a solution to our problems. I personally am firmly convinced that a label does not describe the person to whom it is applied as much as it does the person who engages in the dishonorable activity of labeling. Let us bear that thought in mind as we proceed.

Nor is there any need to immediately accuse our newspaper of attempting to inflame sentiments, including nationalistic sentiments, merely because we publish various letters or excerpts from them. Our newspaper is simply making public things which exist whether we like it or not. We receive a wide variety of letters in the mail, and it would be wrong to shut our eyes to that fact. As to how we feel about it, that is another matter altogether.

Of course, a human being together with his views and convictions does form some kind of unified whole. But is there any reason in the course of debate and discussion to equate the author's personality with the article he wrote? I think that should not be done because that approach distracts us from the main issue: which of the authors' ideas are correct, and which are not? For this reason I have taken the liberty of not quoting letters which draw unfounded conclusions, saying that people like V. Kalin do not belong in the party, etc. This would add nothing but personal insults, and not just personal ones, to our discussion.

Yet by the same token I have also taken the liberty of not devoting any particular degree of attention to letters whose authors declare right from the start that V. Kalin is a true, honest Moldavian patriot. To me genuine patriotism is something else.

So let us put aside the letters in which verbose extremism and emotions of various degrees prevail over well-argued conclusions and reasoning. It would be better for us to

take a look at the way readers responded to the thoughts expressed by V. Kalin, at who agrees with him and who does not.

Among the hundreds of letters our editorial office received in reply to "SOS" (let us use this shortened title for the article in question) there was more than one that supported V. Kalin wholly and completely, without reservation. "We support V. Kalin's opinion and are prepared to sign his article," says a letter from Kishinev signed by I. Sekare and M. Vyntu. "What he wrote is confirmed by real facts and is philosophically well-founded." "Thanks to Comrade V. Kalin for finding the time, busy as he is, to concern himself with Moldavian language and culture, which heretofore have been in a poor condition," writes the Lupesku family from Yedintsy. One also cannot help noticing that the authors of a number of letters written in support of V. Kalin reproach our editorial staff (some in polite terms, other not so politely) for commenting on his article. "We were deeply touched by V. Kalin's article," says Ye. Ivasyuk, secretary of the party organization at Rezina Sanitary and Epidemiological Station writing, he emphasizes, on behalf of his collective, "yet at the same time I was outraged by the editorial comments attached to it, which practically sound like a threat against the author. There was nothing apolitical or anti-party in the article. We feel that the article in question requires no commentary... Indeed, there can be various opinions, but do not attempt to impose the opinion of your editorial board on us, because we will not accept it anyway." (This letter was accompanied by a note saying: "We request that you publish the article as it was written." It is impossible for us to comply with this request due to size constraints in our newspaper.) "I cannot understand why you immediately commented on the article instead of letting us, the readers, do so for ourselves," write P. Gritsko, G. Zavtoni, F. Bobeyko and V. Ketryan, residents of Kriul'yany. The authors of a letter written on the letterhead of the MSSR Republic Literary Museum imeni D. Kantemir (bearing 32 signatures, which we assume is its entire collective, though we have no way to be sure) were also dissatisfied with our editorial commentary (note). Yet a letter from Soroki signed by I. Chobanu and V. Boltage claims that V. Kalin's article was made up, because "it is obvious that your editorial collective likes provocative articles like this." Incidentally, we have also heard similar ideas expressed in conversation; supposedly Kalin is our man and he even got a promotion for writing **that kind of letter** (read: the kind our editors needed).

I will attempt to expound in brief our editorial board's position on this group of questions. Why did we publish **that kind of letter**? There is no need to immediately start hunting for secrets, malice or the intent of creating a provocation. The matter of whether to publish it or not was decided by our editorial board after serious discussion. We realized that it would not evoke just applause, that it would actually evoke more of other feelings from many people (and our mail has confirmed this). But we could also see something else: the article contained not

only V. Kalin's views, not only his individual interpretation of facts and events—our mail has confirmed that, too. Maybe not a majority, maybe not that many readers at all, expressed support for the author's thoughts and sentiments, but we do have a file full of letters like that, too. That means that there are problems here, and it would be foolish to shut our eyes to them; it is better to discuss them calmly and see what is what, who is right and who is not so right. How could we "dare" to comment on the article? The same way any other editors would dare to comment on an article published by them when they do not share or are not in complete agreement with the author's position and wish to make that clear. Otherwise readers might assume that the author's views are those of the newspaper. And in this particular case we did not want that to happen. We will not conceal the fact that our views differ from those of V. Kalin on many of the issues he discussed. In passing, let me note that those who reproach us for a lack of objectivity in our commentary, saying that after "the native population showed you hospitality, gave you food and drink, warmed you and clothed you" you "pour out abuse on the most honest internationalist among the native residents of Moldavia," did not bother to include any sources or proof in their letters. (The quotes are from a letter written by Shtefan Pedure, an engineer from Kishinev.) The same applies to accusations that V. Kalin is "our" man; let us not lose our sense of moderation in this regard. For the sake of particularly vigilant comrades I will report that as of this time no one has given V. Kalin a promotion on account of his article in SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA.

"You know," I. D. Kobzak writes from Kotovskiy Rayon, "your commentary on this article was aimed at simpletons and blind people. You overlooked the fact that there are not many of those left anymore..."

"...Why did you not mention the paragraph in which the author quotes from Lenin's works? How could you not agree with statements made by the great Lenin???"

As for the "simpletons"... I would not be so bold as to call the many people who wrote to express either their objections to or their support for our editorial commentary simpletons (incidentally, the latter were much more numerous than the former). As for the paragraph containing a quote from one of Lenin's works, it was indeed not mentioned in our commentary. Since this question has come up we could go ahead and answer it right now. But in this case we feel that it would be better to quote a letter from a reader who drew attention to the way in which V. Kalin quoted Lenin. This is what P. V. Lyulenov from Chadyr-Lunga writes: "Why when quoting from a work by Lenin concerning the right of peoples to demand unconditional protection of their language's rights on the basis of the principle of equality did V. Kalin fail to mention that in the same work V. I. Lenin says the following: 'All peoples in a state definitely have equal rights, and any privileges accorded to any one people or language are to be regarded as impermissible and unconstitutional.' Also from the same work: 'Areas

with a heterogeneous population are defined as areas where a minority of another nationality comprises at least five percent of the population.' (Vol 25, p 136)."

We also received reproaches of a different sort. "The article had the effect of an exploding bomb," write comrades M. Dunayev, R. Mazitov, Z. Chekasina, T. Voronova, T. Borisova and V. Moyseyeko in a collective letter from Kantemir. "It is just a pity that such passionate sentiments were focused in the wrong direction. We feel that your editorial staff should not have given newspaper space, especially such a large space, to Comrade Kalin. This article will in no way contribute to the cause of education, especially of young people." This was the opinion held by the authors of a number of other letters as well. Some people suggest that our editors should have "intervened" and edited out everything in the author's article that was false or that could offend members of other nationalities. But then it would have been a different article; it would have contained more of our editors' ideas than the author's. Say what you like about him, but you cannot deny that he was frank. What is more, he expressed fully what "some people are thinking but do not want to say or are afraid to say," as one of the letters calling V. Kalin a patriot emphasized.

These are the reasons why we decided to publish the article "SOS..." in precisely the form the author requested, even though we did not agree with him on a number of fundamental issues. Therefore we can give a short, succinct answer to a rhetorical and not very polite question posed by Comrade P. Zlatov, a worker in the Production-Technical Batching Administration of Kishinev Home Building Combine #2, concerning whether "this (V. Kalin's article) was not an intentional, well-planned operation pursuing a specific objective, i.e. of worsening contradictions in relations between Moldavians and members of other nationalities?": not, it was not. Therefore there is no reason to label anyone on that basis.

A considerable number of responses were devoted to what we will call language problems, and the author of "SOS..." also had more supporters on this point than on other issues. Not all those who responded, by no means all of them, used the same degrees of intensity in their assessment of the situation (degradation, decay, etc.) "V. Kalin's article," writes Comrade V. Pyatak from Beltsy, "raised important, pressing issues pertaining to the Moldavian language and culture which are in urgent need of solutions." "After reading V. Kalin's article I cannot as a mother of four children remain indifferent; I am concerned about the future of the Moldavian language and our national culture," was the opinion of Anna Ivanovna Spynu, a French teacher in the village of Fyrladyany, Kaushanskiy Rayon. That is her right. However, it is hard to agree with her explanation of the reasons for this situation, because she continues: "The transition to the Cyrillic alphabet began in 1940, when Soviet rule was established in Moldavia. But at that time Moldavia had no specialists who could teach in Cyrillic, so they began

sending in Russians and members of other nationalities. The majority of these people did not know Moldavian and therefore contributed greatly to its distortion." I am not fond of catching someone in a misstatement or an error, but judging from our mail these simplified and, quite frankly, curious notions about the history of this matter and about history in general are still quite widespread. Regardless of whether it would be appropriate to make the transition to the Latin alphabet or not (this is discussed by the authors of letters from which I will quote below) we should keep sight of something which cannot be denied: the Latin script was used in this republic in the years 1932-38 and on the right bank, which was under Romanian boyar occupation, from 1918 until 1940. Prior to that time the Cyrillic script had been used for centuries. There is also another contradiction in teacher Spynu's ideas: if the transition from the Latin alphabet to the Slavic had such dramatic consequences for the Moldavian language, then what would be the results of the reverse, since she favors the Latin script? Similar thoughts were expressed by V. Kornovan, a pensioner from the village of Novyye Myndreshty in Lazovskiy Rayon: "Our Romance language is spoken by over a billion people on every continent, and we alone are deprived of the Latin alphabet. But," he stresses, "we do not accuse people of other nationalities, but rather our own 'Moldavians' who have brought our native language to the brink of extinction. Are they now in favor of restructuring? Then where is the evidence of that, when they are still clinging to old bureaucratic methods of leadership?" Like Comrade Kornovan a number of those who wrote to us about the problems of "linguistic pollution" and other language problems see a transition to the Latin alphabet as the solution. For example, this is what M. S. Kostev, chairman of Pravda Kolkhoz in Bolgradskiy Rayon, Odessa Oblast, writes: "I feel that it would be appropriate for our language to be written in the Latin alphabet. This would make it possible to better express the nuances of Moldavian. As for the financial aspect of the matter, that is an issue for the economists." In order to explain why he, a Bulgarian, is concerned with this issue, Comrade Kostev provides the following information about himself: he was born in the southern part of our republic and studied in a Romanian secondary school prior to the liberation of Bessarabia, then later, after the war, graduated from Kishinev University. The author of a letter from Bendery, signed O. Martin, is much more categorical in his views: Moldavian, he feels, "can only be saved by a transition to the Latin language (he probably means the Latin alphabet—E. Sh.) used by our forefathers." A number of other authors agree with V. Kalin in his assessment of the state of the Moldavian language and feel that the situation can only be rectified by granting it official language status or by making the transition to the Latin alphabet. However, a majority of the letters we received partially or completely rejected this remedy. M. S. Kostev himself wrote: "I can clearly remember the Latin-alphabet signs on all public buildings: 'Speak only Romanian!' Will there not be those who would like to repeat that approach, just in a somewhat different variant? In my opinion that danger

does exist." Incidentally, those same signs were cited in a number of other letters. Why are they engraved in the memories of members of the older generation? I think it is because neither in the course of numerous discussions on this subject nor in a majority of articles in the press has the actual concept of an official language been defined. Each person interprets it as he pleases. On the other hand, when talking with both friends and strangers (including some with higher education) who signed a petition to the interdepartmental commission handling this matter, I have on more than one occasion found that they cannot even articulate the concept of an "official language." Hence, I believe, this suspicion on the part of those who do not know or have only a poor mastery of Moldavian: if in the end a referendum (the seriousness of this issue deserves public discussion), for instance, decides to grant Moldavian official language status, what will be the practical effects of that? And are not some people leaving this question to be settled "later," when it is already too late to discuss the matter? Quotations from political dictionaries cannot satisfy anyone; an article in a dictionary is not a legal statute. Comrades A. Kovrik from Leovo, I. Kozak from Kishinev, V. Antonovich from Rybnitsa, V. Topore from Drokiya, A. Gutsol from Beltsy, M. Slepoy from Bendery and many others wrote to express their disagreement with the idea of changes in language status and the alphabet. Considering the delicate nature of these matters as well as the fact that certain very attentive categories of our readers equate every opinion in our newspaper that displeases them with our newspaper's position we are going to pass the aforementioned responses and over 100 similar letters along to A. A. Mokuanu, chairman of the MSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, for replies and commentary.

Putting it in a somewhat simplistic way, one could say that in his article V. Kalin made a person's respect for another people directly proportional to that person's knowledge of the native nationality's culture and language. We also received letters in support of this approach. Once again I quote M. S. Kostev: "I cannot comprehend," he writes, "in what way Russian-speaking peoples have prevented or are preventing the development of Moldavians' ethnic self-awareness and language. At the same time it cannot be called a normal situation when the Russian-speaking population, which has lived in this republic for a long time, makes no effort to learn Moldavian." I think that if respect for a people is not placed in direct proportion or, as mathematicians say, linear proportion, to knowledge of that people's language (the better you know it, the more you respect them), if knowledge (respect) is not to be achieved through coercive, administrative methods, then the idea of an interrelationship on this point does have some foundation. It is indeed very bad that after living in Moldavia for decades many of my fellow Russians (or would it perhaps in this case be better to say "fellow Russian speakers"?) have not managed to learn Moldavian nor made any effort in that direction. There are more than just one or two reasons for this. Many people cite the difficulty of mastering a second language, especially as

an adult. This can be countered with an excerpt from a very emotional letter written by kolkhoz member G. Gore from the village of Sturzovok, Glodyanskiy Rayon (incidentally, he wrote two letters in response to V. Kalin's article): "And is it easy for Moldavians to learn Russian? They are living human beings, too. Obviously that never occurred to the editorial staff..." It does occur to us, esteemed Comrade Gore, it does. I, like an overwhelming majority of my editorial colleagues, am in favor of everyone knowing the other person's language. But I am afraid that in this regard, as in all things, there is a wide gap between good intentions and solutions. I will not go into how important it is to know Russian, the commonly-acknowledged language of interethnic communication in our country. It is my native language, and anything that I say on the matter would be the conclusions of a biased individual; I will not feign to be absolutely impartial in this regard. By the same token, I am not going to quote from letters dealing with the role and significance of Russian in interethnic communication, although there are many on that subject. It would be better for us to continue our discussion of why a majority of us, the so-called Russian speakers, have either a poor knowledge or no knowledge of Moldavian. B. Stanchenko from Dubossary (who describes himself as Russian, age 37 and a drill operator) writes: "The hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians who came to Moldavia to rebuild it and who have lived here for years and decades have not studied Moldavian. Why? I have asked many people that question. Most of their answers are something like this: 'That would be beneath my dignity' or 'It's just one more thing to clutter up my brain.'"

What can you say? If someone would answer that way then his dignity is not worth very much. However, if I were Comrade Stanchenko I would not generalize: every people has its uncultured people and even its fools; should what the whole nation thinks be judged on the basis of them? For that same reason I do not set great store by the universality of the remedy suggested by Comrade Stanchenko: "If Moldavian is granted official language status the people who think that studying it is beneath their dignity will consider it an honor to know it," and so on. He is seconded in a letter signed by S. G. Polyakova, Kishinev: "What change will there be in my life if Moldavian is made the official language? Many things will change. I will begin to respect our republic's leaders, and I will no longer feel ashamed before the Moldavian people because I am Russian." Generally speaking I assume that respect requires a certain amount of culture, and not being ashamed before someone on account of something requires an absence of wrongful actions on one's part. But it is difficult to like or respect someone because of a decree or a regulation. Neither one will create knowledge by themselves. Unfortunately very many authors of letters expressing concern for their native language suggest that we should make legal provisions for the establishment of Moldavian as official language, make the transition to the Latin alphabet and equate the Moldavian and Romanian languages and then

all our problems will be solved. That is hardly the case. We must not appeal once again to the power of an official piece of paper when what we really need is painstaking, persistent work. "I have no pat answers," writes V. Panko from Glodyany. But there are some ideas that I would like to share. I speak Moldavian well enough to translate from it into Russian. I am not going to cite examples from Moldavian: I think that one more example of incorrect usage of the language will not prove anything more than will another example of correct, literary, "pure," skilled or other kinds of usage of it..."

"By whom and when was research conducted which produced precise data on the use of Moldavian demonstrating incontrovertibly the catastrophic state of Moldavian in our republic or, for instance, in my rayon? If such research was done, then it would be appropriate to publish the results. It would be good to know how many people have a good mastery of Moldavian and how many do not know it and, consequently (according to V. Kalin) 'ignore or manifest hatred toward this land... are inferior and harmful to society.' That, at least, is a shameful thing to hear from a candidate of medical sciences. But this is not so much the problem as is something else: what will happen to people who do not speak Moldavian well or do not know it at all? They will learn. But in the debates over language which have erupted in the press lately I have not found any clear-cut delineation of the two concepts of 'literary language' and 'oral culture.' These concepts are mixed to such a degree that it is difficult to follow the thrust of the discussions. If one analyzes the situation carefully I believe it will become clear that the Moldavian literary language is not any in trouble, for it is the language of Moldavian literature. It is the language of Drutse, Lupana, Viyeru, Vangeli, Yesinenku and other writers. Outstanding works are still being created in it today. What sort of 'SOS' is it when there are two writers for every rayon in our republic, with each one making his or her contribution to the language? Oral culture is another matter. Of course there are a million problems in this area, and they need to be resolved. Let the thousands of teachers and educators, the hundreds of thousands of conscientious individuals and the dozens of writers cultivate correct, 'pure,' literary Moldavian."

This idea of Comrade Panko's is developed in a very interesting way in a letter sent from Bendery by G. F. Pologov. He regretfully comments that "many scientists, historians, writers and other potential bearers of national culture have reduced all the diversity of the concept of culture to one of its manifestations, language, and even in the decline of language culture some comrades see the 'insidious hand of Moscow' and an aggressive Russian-speaking invasion. Kalin himself notes that few people attend Moldavian-language performances yet fails to mention the more serious problem of the people's aesthetic upbringing. Not having received cultural leavening in schools and VUZs first students and then specialists become indifferent to both national and world culture. Here is a real-life example. Once V. N. Voronin, first secretary of the Bendery Party Gorkom, arranged a

trip for teachers and their families from Bendery to the Tiraspol Theater. Everyone paid for their tickets, yet only a few went to the performance."

It is hard not to agree with these thoughts. Though, I believe, a large part of cultural mastery does begin with language. Actually, the degree to which one has a mastery of a language and is able to express all the diversity of human thoughts and emotions using it will determine that person's level of culture to a significant degree. But there is also a reverse connection here. If a person learns a language poorly from childhood, then there are some things that that person's mind and soul do not pick up. If I, for instance, live in Moldavia and do not know Moldavian, the language of a majority of its population, then naturally there are some things in the life of the people with whom my consciousness is connected that I will not fully understand. And the cultured individual can only draw one conclusion from this: the language must be learned. But that is where the problems begin, problems which V. Kalin's most ardent supporters unfortunately fail to mention. I must reiterate that everyone is demanding an administrative decision and pinning their hopes on it. Well, let us suppose that it is made tomorrow; what would change in real life the day after tomorrow? "Who is to blame if people who have been educated as teachers of Moldavian do not know the correct word in Moldavian?" writes Ye. F. Orlovskiy, chairman of the Biruintsa Settlement Ispolkom, Lazovskiy Rayon, in his letter. "Moldavians comprise half the population of our settlement. Last year we prepared an appropriate number of ballots in Moldavian in preparation for local soviet elections. Uncertain of how to translate correctly a certain word (the word in question pertained to the title of a specialized field) I asked the secretary of our ispolkom to go to the school and ask the Moldavian language teacher. Imagine my surprise to find out that he did not know the correct translation of that specialization in Moldavian, either. Thank you: we got help from your colleagues at your Lazovskiy office."

"It does not matter to me which alphabet we use, Latin or Cyrillic," writes Nina Yegorovna Polyakova, a crane operator from Kishinev. "That is the easiest thing to master. The Moldavian people should decide this issue. Let ordinary working people decide what they need. On one point you are right, Comrade Kalin, everyone should know Moldavian. I was one of the first at our plant to sign up for a Moldavian course. But if the teacher uses the same methods there as they used in my secondary school he will not have any luck with me." In school, Nina Yegorovna recalls, "we studied anything we liked in Moldavian class except the language. That suited the teachers, who gave us good grades."

Judging by my son's experiences I myself can vouch for this: students receive good grades in Moldavian for learning, for instance, to recite a poem by Eminesku in Russian or for translating a text written by nobody-knows-who, and the teacher has no interest in testing real knowledge. It is hard to demand that children take a

serious interest in the language when adults do not. So that people will not accuse me of inciting something here (because as a rule teachers of Moldavian are of native ethnicity) I will say that my youngest daughter was lucky—she is learning Moldavian from an enthusiastic teacher, and the results are different. But what is the situation by and large? Judging from these letters, in disarray. Both in Russian-language schools and in Moldavian-language schools. Yet even the most ardent proponents of using Moldavian in all areas of public and economic life are not making many suggestions of ways to change this situation, in which Moldavian-language schools are graduating students who have not mastered all the wealth of their native language and Russian-language schools in this national republic are graduating pupils who have not even mastered the basics of their fraternal people's language. Now the question arises, what is the purpose of all today's discussion about the state of Moldavian? If we are just talking about a legal solution to the problem, then simple legislative acts will suffice. But if the goal is to ensure that the language develops and expands its functions (and not at the expense of other languages, of which at least four are used in our republic) and to bring about greater harmony in interethnic relations, then we have some work to do. It is not so easy for adults to learn another language. Perhaps we should focus our attention on the teaching of Moldavian in Russian-language schools and Russian in Moldavian-language schools. In a national republic these courses are not just language. They are much more. Adults as well need to make language study easier. In order to do this we need modern methodologies, textbooks, teaching aids, language courses on records and tapes for various levels of student and much more. Scientists and language teachers know better than I do what is needed. Yet for some reason they have not been very eager to speak their minds on the practical aspect of the matter, judging from our mail.

Nevertheless—once again, judging from our mail—the spectrum of readers' opinions was broadest with regard to the state of Moldavian and ways of asserting it in various realms of social activity. As for the other issues raised by V. Kalin, here the demarcation line is very clear: some people praise him and express their support, for example the aforementioned comrade Gore from Sturzovka, Glodyanskiy Rayon, who seconds Kalin in expressing his dissatisfaction with the fact that “by no means every Russian, Ukrainian or member of any other nationality came to Moldavia as an important or essential specialist,” while others (the majority) were sincerely offended and outraged by certain statements made by this candidate of medical sciences.

Statements like, for instance, about those who came “with specializations that were not in short supply.” Only machine tools and equipment can be imported strictly on the basis of the need for them. Dealing with people is much more complicated. A family that includes one person with a hard-to-find specialization often

brings with it two people who have different specializations. Anyway, what kind of consumption-oriented approach is this? I personally submit that a Soviet of any ethnic background is a Soviet citizen in any Soviet republic, with all the rights of any other citizen, not some “guest worker” whose entire “value” is relative to the fact that he does some job that the native population cannot or does not want to do. Plus a shortage of a given specialization is often of short duration; sometimes it is eliminated with the aid of the “new arrivals” themselves. What should happen to them then? Should they go back to their former place of residence because they are no longer needed, some of our readers ask? “I, like hundreds of others, did not end up in Moldavia of my own accord,” writes V. Gorbacheva, a retired bacteriologist. “A branch of the 1st Leningrad Institute was moved to Kishinev in order to combat an epidemic of typhus and malaria there and to build a base for the training of physician cadres. At that time the city lay in ruins. The first thing we did was clear away the rubble on the site set aside for our institute, then we built the institute building and our dormitory. No, our life was no paradise...” Incidentally, the reference here is to the very medical institute from which V. Kalin later graduated. “In connection with my work I wound up in Kishinev when I was just a girl. Its was a dirty little provincial city. Everyone helped rebuild it, and everyone took pride in its growth: Moldavians, Russians, Jews...” This is an excerpt from a letter written by R. Ivanova, a resident of Kishinev and a veteran of labor. I. A. Vasilenko, a Hero of the Soviet Union, CPSU member since 1941 and an honored citizen of the city of Beltsy, relates in his letter how he first came to Moldavia under even harsher circumstances: in 1944, when the 5th Offensive Army liberated the region. “My family,” says L. S. Borshchak in a letter from Tarakliya, “moved to Moldavia in 1955. At that time the MSSR deputy minister of health selected 13 or 14 graduates with some independent work experience from the Odessa Medical Institute. My husband was one of them. At the Odessa Medical Institute they studied trachoma from pictures on posters, but in Tarakliyskiy Rayon, where we have lived ever since that time, hundreds of children had it and other infectious diseases in 1955. There were many patients and only two physicians at the sanitary and epidemiological station. Now everything is different; the sanitary and epidemiological station has a large staff, a laboratory and a four-story building.” Dr. Borshchak, of course, did not make any contribution to the development of the Moldavian language. He did something else—he fought widespread infectious diseases. By doing so I daresay he made his own significant contribution to the development of the people's culture, because culture is more than just language or works of art. In the above letters and in dozens of others, whose authors are rightly outraged by the passages in V. Kalin's article where he claims that “whole groups of Russians and other nationalities who often did not have specializations that were in demand came to Moldavia... (for our land is abundant) and began to settle down and introduce their own ways and oppress us in every way,” one can trace not

only the lives of individuals families. These are human documents revealing very interesting pages in the history of our republic. Yes, there was the Stalinist era and much more, but there were also people— hundreds and thousands of people who gave their fraternal republic their knowledge, skill and labor. These are very interesting letters. It is truly a pity that we cannot print at least an excerpt from each one of them.

Allow me to quote from one more letter on this subject: "One gets the impression that questions of language and culture per se are not really as important to V. Kalin as an opportunity, a pretext, to accuse someone of all the mortal sins. The article's tone is offensive not only to the 'foreign-speaking' population, but also to Moldavians, whom the author depicts as eternally persecuted victims who do not have their own ethnic self-awareness or their own history, who have lost their language. Signed: P. F. Gorchakov, veteran of war and labor, Kishinev." It is hard not to agree with Comrade Gorchakov. I merely want to direct readers' attention to two points: all our country's development in one way or another stimulates the "importation" of highly skilled specialists and in general the "importation" of knowledge and skills; everywhere the creation of new jobs through investment from the center is regarded as positive factor. Some people here think differently. Yes, the union ministries have not made much effort to spend money on the social infrastructure when investing money in the development of our republic industry. Yes, many things in our economy seem to be backwards: sometimes kilograms, tons and meters seem to be more important than human beings. We must work together to correct this. But above all we must place our economic thinking on the firm basis of knowledge, not emotion.

Our readers also responded to the "oppression" mentioned by V. Kalin. "I am a native Moldavian," writes A. Pupeze from Ryshkany. "I was born here and I have lived here. I know very well what the yoke of Romanian occupation was like. The Soviet system saved us from all that; we began to lead better lives, and I was trained in a specialized field." "The reunification of Bessarabia with its fellow Moldavians on the left bank was greeted by all of us living there with tremendous enthusiasm, as surviving newsreel films will testify. We were celebrating because we knew that poverty, hunger, backwardness and illiteracy were going to become things of the past." (From a letter written by Ye. Orlovskiy, Lazovskiy Rayon). "I do not know how old V. Kalin is," writes P. I. Mospan, Tiraspol, "but I can tell him that even in the Stalin years the appropriate services had instructions to offer members of the native nationality positions in all fields." "I would like to recall a fact which probably not everyone is aware of: the VUZs of Moscow and Leningrad granted young people from the union republics favorable admission status. And very many of our young people were admitted." (From a letter by A. P. Fefilova, veteran of war and labor)

I could quote from many, many more letters on this subject but, I repeat, space in our newspaper is too

limited to accommodate such an abundance of mail. As I read through it I often caught myself thinking how much the general level of the people has risen even within, say, the past 20 years. Many of the letters attest to so much erudition; they express so many astute thoughts. But I felt irritated, too; it is painful to realize that something that was not constructive prompted all this. People rose up in protest against the blatant unfairness of V. Kalin's ideas and it is clear that very many of our readers are capable of thinking reasonably, soberly, profoundly and convincingly. I can applaud the authors of a majority of these letters for that, but I still do not take any delight from this mail. Why were we so eager to settle scores for insults and services? Even if in some cases those scores were very justified ones. Does a harmonious family keep track of who has done what for whom? Perhaps O. B. Galushchak from Ataki is right when she writes: "I read V. Kalin's article with pain in my heart and thought with great concern that we need to cry 'SOS' in regard to our interethnic relations!" Indeed, that is what we are going to have to do if we do not take charge of our emotions, if we do not face up to a simple fact: everything we have achieved we have achieved together. Our country is a single edifice. It is monolithic, unless we start shaking it and pulling bricks out of it. We are a single organism. If one part tries to shut itself off from the rest, if someone intentionally tries to create clots, it will hurt the whole organism, and its individual parts will be harmed even more.

Therefore all in all I like best of all the letters whose authors are seeking that which unites people of different nationalities. "Our family," writes one of those who once came to help build the Moldavian State Regional Electric Power Station, A. N. Velts of Dnestrovsk, "is friends with many Moldavian families; our friends include the head teacher of a school and workers and peasants. None of us has ever chosen the others on the basis of ethnicity, but instead on account of human qualities." "Our institution is a base for advanced experience, and we do not keep track of who has made the greatest contribution to that experience, whether Moldavian, Russian, Ukrainian or Jew." (From a letter sent by the collective of the Dubossary Sanitary and Epidemiological Station) Here is an excerpt from an amazingly tactful letter (tact is a characteristic which many letter writers unfortunately lack) from Yelena Ivanovna Komarnitskaya, also from Dubossary: "I feel that people of different nationalities who live together mutually enrich each other rather than harming each other..."

"I would like to ask you," writes Yelena Ivanovna to V. Kalin in the conclusion of her letter, "and others like you, educated people of Moldavian nationality who have received your education from instructors of other nationalities, to make every possible effort to ensure that there is not even a hint here in Moldavia of events like those in Nagorno-Karabakh. How much happiness have those events brought to the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis?"

And a few more lines, from a letter signed by "Moskalenko from Dondyushan": "Restructuring can be brought about and results achieved only by people who can look far ahead along the path of our development, not by people who judge others on the basis of their ethnicity."

Sometimes even a family has to thrash things out. Sometimes this is even beneficial. The question is how long to go on thrashing things out, for what purpose and by what means. Perhaps it is already time for us to reject unnecessary and harmful emotions and extremes in this matter and calmly try to find out what is what, where it really hurts and where we are merely feeling the pain. So that we will have enough energy and nerves left to work for restructuring, because all of us—many speeches have been made about this—are in favor of restructuring. Discussion of certain problems has pushed others into the background; how far has restructuring actually progressed? This is obviously to someone's advantage.

I have not even been able to mention every letter in this overview. Our editorial staff thanks everyone who wrote to us. We will try to use a portion of the remaining letters in some way or another, and we will reply to the people who wrote them.

One last thing. We also received letters whose authors did not insist that they be published; they simply requested that V. Kalin be invited to the editorial office and allowed to read them. I think that he would find it interesting to read dozens of other letters as well. So come by for a visit, Vasilii Dionisovich!

Faculty Members Fired for Corruption, Appeals Denied

18110050a Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 11 Jan 89 p 4

[Article by S. Kerasymenko under the rubric "From the Courtroom": "By the Back Door"]

[Text] Professor A. I. Horova and Associate I. K. Bulyk have been dismissed by order of the rector of Dnepropetrovsk State University for an attempt to obtain admission to the university of secondary-school graduates by influence, at the behest of influential persons.

These faculty members filched copies of written examinations in mathematics and passed them on to prospective freshmen—the daughters of S. Burlaka, secretary of the Pokrovskiy Rayon party committee, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, of L. Makarovych, chief engineer of this rayon's agroindustrial association, and of A. Sakhnenko, manager of the Nikopol Fishery.

Commenting on the trial of this case by the Zhovtnevyi Rayon Court in Dnepropetrovsk, a local newspaper, DNEPR VECHERNIY, states that the above-named university employees simply sold their conscience for "three kilograms of sea roach and a couple of watermelons."

The People's Court ruled that the dismissal of Horova and Bulyk had been justified, and the oblast court has denied their appeal.

UkSSR Official on Honing Party, Economic Apparatus

18110050b Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
11 Jan 89 p 2

[Interview with Doctor of Economic Sciences M. M. Yermoshenko, chief, UkSSR Council of Ministers Administrative Department, by MOLOD UKRAYINY correspondent Serhiy Kharchenko: "There Is a Plan. Will There Be Changes?"]

[Text] An administrative management master plan has been drawn up in this republic, the purpose of which is to restructure the operations of republic ministries and agencies. Demarcation of area of activity and elimination of duplication have already led to a substantial reduction in numbers of administrative and management personnel—by almost 92,000 persons. Nine ministries and agencies, 55 republic industrial associations, 450 independent structural subdivisions attached to ministries, and 353 oblast-level organizations have ceased to exist.

But such a mechanical "reduction" can hardly be called a fundamental restructuring. Wherein lies the content of these reforms?

Doctor of Economic Sciences M. M. Yermoshenko, chief of the UkSSR Council of Ministers Department of Administrative Affairs, answers these and other questions put to him by correspondent Serhiy Kharchenko.

[Yermoshenko] New structures have appeared within the system of management of the republic economy—interbranch economic complexes, headed by deputy chairmen of the UkSSR Council of Ministers: industrial, agroindustrial, construction, transportation, and social. Their purpose is to break down the notorious ministerial barriers and more effectively and efficiently to coordinate the operations of interlinked branches. A basic element of the economy is being strengthened in a parallel move: new production associations, agroindustrial combines, agrofirms, design-industrial-construction, production-trade, and scientific-production associations are being formed in the localities. Transition primarily to a two-shift system of management is continuing in the production branches. Management and administrative costs will be paid for from the profits of enterprises and organizations.

[Kharchenko] The master plan formally articulates the ratified system of management, but at the same time it acknowledges that this system will be evolving in the future. What does this mean?

[Yermoshenko] We have made provisions in advance for a stage-by-stage reworking of organizational structures. We are not satisfied with the results of the first phase: the narrow branch principle of ministry and agency operations has not been eliminated; they are continuing to intervene in the affairs of the enterprises, and are applying methods of rule by administrative fiat to boot, and economic levers are being utilized only with great effort and with conflict. At the same time the ministries are inadequately performing their basic tasks (progressive scientific-technological, structural, capital investment, socioeconomic policy, cooperative and external economic relations).

For this reason the second phase of development of the management and administrative plan prescribes further reduction in the number of ministries, chiefly by means of their consolidation and integration. It would be expedient, for example, to establish state committees for construction, transportation, forest industry, health care, and social security. It is proposed totally to eliminate administrative management at the ministry level in the domain of local industry, housing and utilities, consumer services, culture, and sports. Their enterprises will be transferred over to local jurisdiction.

[Kharchenko] But will this not require radical reforms in local administrative management?

[Yermoshenko] They are already being implemented. Planning-economic administrations have been established under the executive committees of 25 oblast soviets in this republic. Their function is to coordinate the economic and social development of the regions. But practical experience has indicated that a more effective body is needed. The main production-economic administration, which is no longer subordinate to the executive committee but directly to the Soviet of People's Deputies as the highest agency of authority in the region, can become such a body.

[Kharchenko] Restructuring of the economy and the adoption of economic accountability at enterprises prescribes intensive development of the scientific, technological, production, and social base. An enormous amount of money is required, especially at first. In the past there existed the "minister's pocket." Who is supporting them now?

[Yermoshenko] It is planned to establish production-economic associations of enterprises (PGA) on the basis of production. This is not a new administrative management entity: the enterprises themselves will have a small association administrative staff with coordination functions, financed by voluntary contributions from profit. The PGA will be headed by a council of directors, which

will entrust the interests of its workforces to an able director. The association will handle matters pertaining to scientific and technological advance and renovation of production facilities, will perform construction for the development of co-production, will handle market development, and will extend credit.

[Kharchenko] Are such cooperative associations already operating in the Ukraine?

[Yermoshenko] There are few at the present time. One example is the territorial-interbranch production association (TMVO) in Pervomaysk, Nikolayev Oblast.

Growth of Co-Op Movement in Alma-Ata Viewed *18280063 Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 Feb 89 p 2*

[Interview with Mikhail Sergeyevich Khurin, chairman of the board of the Alma-Ata Oblast Cooperative Alliance, by TRUD correspondent for KaSSR O. Kayatkovskiy: "'Their Own Interest' at the Service of Society"; date and place not given]

[Text] TRUD correspondent for KaSSR O. Kayatkovskiy spoke with M. Khurin, chairman of the board of the Alma-Ata Oblast Cooperative Alliance, about problems in development of the cooperative movement. The subject of the interview was not chosen at random; the cooperative movement is now developing rapidly and vigorously in the oblast of Kazakhstan that contains the capital.

[Kayatkovskiy] Mikhail Sergeyevich, your alliance was established considerably earlier than others, including the one in Moscow. And, as far as I know, the Cooperative Alliance of Alma-Ata Oblast was created without complications or obstacles and doubts which quite often arise in such cases in other regions of the country. Unless the easy birth was deceptive, what is the basis of its being maintained, and how do you explain it?

[Khurin] I would not say the birth was all that easy, but that is not the point. Today, in my view, it is precisely by the level of development of cooperative labor and self-employment that one can judge the level of interest of ispolkoms of local soviets in solving social problems.

I will give an example of this approach. In the most remote rayon of the oblast—Narynkolskiy—a deposit of brown coal has been well-known for a long time. Its reserves amount to 70 million tons, and its ash content is only 12 percent. According to state calculations, more than 100 million rubles would have to be invested to begin to work the deposit. They have been reluctant to make those outlays. Coal has been brought into Narynkol and also neighboring rayons from truly the other end of the world—from Ekibastuz. This coal cost 36 rubles per ton. The cooperative "Medeo" proposed developing the deposit by spending only 15 million rubles on development. The soviet authorities in the oblast reacted instantaneously. The cooperative, whose

members include 150 highly skilled miners, received 1.7 million rubles in credit through the bank. The oblagroprom has purchased from "Altayzoloto" equipment which it has turned over to the cooperators. The association "Almaataagropromtrans" stood as guarantor for "Medeo." I have just been in Narynkol. The cooperative is doing a remarkable job—the stripping operations have already been completed, and the approach road has been laid. I think that the preliminary calculations are being borne out: by producing 300,000 tons of fuel next summer at a cost of 20 rubles per ton, the cooperative "Medeo" will not only earn a profit amounting to more than 7 million rubles, but will also help to finally solve the coal problem in the remote areas of the oblast and bring a social benefit....

[Kayatkovskiy] Presumably, there are also other examples of how the initiative of savvy cooperators has met with a response in the soviet?

[Khurin] Of course. We are now on the threshold of creating an enterprise which will receive credit financing from a foreign firm. Documents have been prepared to build a plant near Alma-Ata to process onions, potatoes, and vegetables. "Firmachi" from the Netherlands has agreed to become the trading partner of our cooperative "Iveriya." Judge for yourself how important this contact is to the oblast. About 40 percent of the 200,000 tons of vegetables we produce every year actually goes to waste—mainly because of the absence of processing plants. Now there is a practical opportunity with the help of cooperatives and the attraction of foreign capital to raise the level of vegetable processing in the oblast to a qualitatively new level. But how did it all begin? Aleksandr Golovenko, a forester by occupation, an enterprising and talented man, who at that time was chairman of the cooperative "Sinegorye," came to the oblispolkom. The cooperative of which he was a member at that time had been putting by the "gifts of nature." Golovenko asked: Help us organize marketing abroad so that we can get foreign exchange. He was told: We will help, but the Western businessmen should be turned toward the more acute needs of the oblast.... That is the origin of the idea which is now being pursued by the cooperative "Iveriya." And Golovenko himself now heads the foreign-economic industrial-trade cooperative, which in our alliance is concerned entirely with marketing.

[Kayatkovskiy] What is the structure of the Cooperative Alliance?

[Khurin] It includes about 40 cooperatives and a few large enterprises, such as, say, the Alma-Ata Furniture Production Association. The founding assembly has decided to set up its own cooperative bank. There are 12 cost-accounting (khozraschetnyye) sectors operating in the alliance—to organize wholesale and retail supply and sales, for timbering, woodworking, and furniture production, the agroindustrial sector, the transportation sector, and others. The first joint enterprises have also emerged.

Our alliance is oriented toward production cooperatives. This is our motto: Above all to make what the state is not producing today, and if possible make it better than it is being produced in the state sector. But we go further than that....

[Kayatkovskiy] You are thinking of the cooperative "Ata-Meken"—"Land of Our Fathers," which is concerned with environmental protection?

[Khurin] That would be one. A rayispolkom set aside 2,500 hectares of land for the cooperative "Ata-Meken." The cooperators are engaged in restoring the area of Baba-Togan, which was damaged during the voluntaristic construction of the Kapchagay Reservoir. It is in the Baba-Togan area that the last Kazakhstan tiger was killed 40 years ago. "Ata-Meken" intends to restore not only the flora, but also the fauna of this remarkable little area. It has already achieved encouraging results in the reproduction of pheasants and bustards, wild boar and the gazelle dzheran, and valuable fish species.

[Kayatkovskiy] "Ata-Meken," as far as I know, has also "set its sights" on the Great Silk Route.

[Khurin] And the Cooperative Alliance agrees with it. Incidentally, we have created a sector for tourism and athletics for that purpose. From Dzhambul to the border with China, there is this ancient road over Kazakh soil. Year after year it has been attracting more and more tourists from the Western countries passing through. The section of the route that passes through Semirech has not even the smallest conveniences for tourists. And so the cooperators will build motels and campgrounds—so that some of the foreign exchange will stay with us....

[Kayatkovskiy] So, we have become convinced: the common effort of the cooperators with the support of soviet authorities guarantees the stability and boldness of the movement. But when will ordinary workers feel the results of the work of the cooperators in their everyday life?

[Khurin] The "pressure" of our cooperators on the market will be clearly noticeable when next year's harvest is being processed. Soviet authorities in the oblast firmly intend to make the transition next year of all rayons of the oblast to self-sufficiency in fruit and vegetables with the help of cooperatives. A base cooperative for production, procurement, storage, processing, and distribution of these products is now being set up in every rayon. For example, in Kaskelenskiy Rayon the cooperative "Iveriya" has already built a salt pickling shop, has received land and a livestock-raising operation, and is working out contract relations with truck gardening and fruit-growing partnerships.

[Kayatkovskiy] Does the alliance tend to fight the unfair income of certain cooperators who are said to have been trying to grab something for themselves?

[Khurin] This is one of our main concerns. Kaskelenskiy Rayon, with its 77 cooperatives, has become the "capital" of cooperators in the oblast. By agreement with our alliance, a likvidkom was recently created under its rayispolkom. This is its warning: Violate the law and the charter—we eliminate you on the spot, without mercy. This is a necessary measure. People who are hangers-on of the cooperative movement discredit the idea and hurt the cause.

[Kayatkovskiy] What is your biggest headache now?

[Khurin] If we are to speak in general terms, it is getting the most complete information at every moment about all the areas of the life of the cooperatives both in one's own oblast and throughout the country. To speak in specific terms, we expect a great deal of the Cooperative Bank, whose charter has been registered with USSR Gosbank, and of the credit of \$100 million which an American firm is opening. That means new opportunities and new business....

**ArSSR Party Organizational Work Chief
Akopyan on Karabakh Committee**
18300367 Yerevan *KOMMUNIST in Russian*
4 Jan 89 p 1

[Response by Ruben Yakovlevich Akopyan, candidate member of the Armenian CP Central Committee Buro and chief of the Armenian CP Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department, to questions from *KOMMUNIST* correspondent: "To Live for a Single Goal"]

[Text] "With what thoughts and plans did you approach this job, and what would you wish our people and our republic's communists?" These were the questions posed yesterday by our correspondent to Ruben Yakovlevich Akopyan, Armenian CP Central Committee Buro member and Organizational Party Work Department chief.

The year 1988 will go down in the history of the Armenian people as a year of great catastrophe, difficult experiences and suffering. Yes, we have experienced boundless grief, the results of which will continue to be felt for a long time to come. However, as the saying goes, life does not stand still, and for the sake of those who perished and for the sake of the cities that are rising from ruins—Leninakan, Kirovakan, Spitak, Akhuryan and Stepanavan—we must draw even closer together, show even greater courage and warmth and act with a greater sense of purpose. We must live.

With this sad preface but also with words of faith and hope, with optimism founded on the will and courage of our people, I would like to wish everyone a happy New Year, health, a healing of wounds, hope, faith and, of course, courage.

We have a right to think thus and to live thus. During these difficult days of natural disaster each one of us has once again felt the great power of the internationalist solidarity of peoples, a heartfelt, unselfish attitude on the part of all nations and peoples, and the boundless concern of the party and the Soviet State and of our leaders. The past few days in Armenia have confirmed what M. S. Gorbachev said at the UN General Assembly session on the day of the disaster, i.e. his thought that the Earth is our common home and we must cherish as we would our greatest treasure.

From the very first day of the disaster Russians, Georgians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Uzbeks, Lithuanians and the sons and daughters of all the other peoples of our limitless country rose up together with our own people and struggled together with them day and night to save the lives of thousands of people and help clear away the ruins, rendering both direct and indirect assistance.

Today we cannot but also express our gratitude to the peoples of various continents, races and beliefs who felt our pain as their own.

In those days many of our countrymen abroad not only shared their loved ones' grief, they also took practical steps evincing their devotion to their homeland, Soviet Armenia.

This caring attitude on the part of people from around the world comforts us; we feel that through this solidarity and aid our new cities and villages will arise like the phoenix from the ashes.

Our readers are well aware of the tremendous amount of work done by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo commission charged with efforts to erase the effects of this disaster. Today that commission is still hard at work, is working painstakingly and to the limit of its ability. The commission members who are here in our republic are in contact with N. I. Ryzhkov several times daily, as are our republic leaders. All the work being done is the subject of Comrade M. S. Gorbachev's daily attention and supervision.

Each day we get hundreds of phone calls, and each day delegations arrive from our fraternal republics. The appropriate commissions have been established at the local level, and administrators are working untiringly to dispatch building materials, food, clothing and temporary housing, plan for the rebuilding of the areas under their jurisdiction and clear construction sites.

All these things bespeak the great workload and the extremely hectic pace of work by our republic's leadership organizations. By way of self-criticism it should be noted that the current unstable situation and the events and phenomena which change within the span of a single day or even a few hours, combined with situations which have never been encountered before, often result in

failure to resolve matters swiftly and efficiently; there have been cases of red tape and lack of organization which have evoked the justified resentment of our working people.

Naturally everything possible is being done to prevent this from happening and I must say that the number of such incidents is decreasing with each passing day; the work is becoming more organized and better coordinated.

In addition to the above I would also like to share some of my own thoughts with your readers. I am referring to the moral and political atmosphere that has been created in our republic in recent months and to the behavior of certain irresponsible people who have gone to extremes in their way of thinking and their actions.

First of all a word about the Karabakh problem and the position of our republic's leaders with regard to it.

It is no secret that from its very first day in office our new republic leadership saw and attempted to understand the Karabakh problem in the form in which it exists. Let us remember the resolution adopted by the June session of the republic Supreme Soviet, let us remember the speeches given by Comrade S. G. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, on Armenian Television and at the 19th All-Union Party Conference, and let us remember the position of our republic's delegation and Comrade Arutyunyan's speech at a USSR Supreme Soviet session held in July of last year. These individual events which attest to our republic leadership's overall position on this issue.

It should be noted that the problem as a whole is also clear to leaders at the all-union level.

In an interview broadcast over Central Television and Armenian Television M. S. Gorbachev clearly stated: "There is a Karabakh problem, it does have roots and it has been exacerbated by the fact that the former leaders of Azerbaijan at a certain stage treated the people of that region wrongly, not in the spirit of Leninist traditions and sometimes quite simply inhumanely. And that offended people. We condemn that. That means that there is a problem."

After all this the question arises: what objective has been pursued by actions undertaken by members of the Karabakh Committee, especially of late? To set the people against their leaders? For what purpose? For the people's position and the leadership's position coincide.

Frankness demands that I state that the committee's "leaders" have been pursuing completely different objectives. To be more specific, they took advantage of the confidence they gained among crowds at demonstrations merely to further their own careerist ambitions.

I do not want to repeat the malicious rumors which were spread in the first days following this terrible tragedy for our people, rumors that someone wanted to take our children away to other republics. Are our people like that? Could we reject the fraternal hand extended to us? Did not certain irrational individuals' distortion of the sincere feelings of the thousands of people who were willing to help us, ascribing other motivations to them, have as its goal the destabilization of the situation? Did this not cause alarm to the hearts of people already in despair and grieving?

At a time when we are hearing appeals for vigilance, patience and discipline committee member A. Galstyan is calling on people not to submit to public order. Or what is A. Manucharyan's goal in shouting: "We will force you to shoot us"? Does Manucharyan want more victims? There have been plenty already.

Finally, what are the people who are opening up old wounds in the people's long-suffering spirit, who have started spreading malicious rumors saying that the army supposedly detonated a nuclear bomb over Leninakan in order to distract the Armenian people from the Karabakh movement—forgetting that military families accounted for a large number of the earthquake victims—what are these people hoping to accomplish?

Profaning the truth, the leaders of the Karabakh Committee also shamelessly perceive "the hand of Moscow" behind the tragedy in Sumgait.

What has prompted them, especially in recent days, to make these extreme statements?

There is only one answer. The earthquake did not distract people's attention from the Karabakh problem, but rather from them, the leaders of the Karabakh Committee. People found hope and faith in the actions of the leadership organizations of their country and their republic, which rose up as one to assist the disaster area. All necessary equipment and supplies were offered. Against this backdrop the committee members have attempted to portray the situation in such a way as to make people believe that they are the ones who are organizing and leading recovery efforts. Yet when they realized that it was not working, that the people were well aware who was doing what, they resorted to extreme measures aimed at destabilizing the situation.

I would like to share with your readers my thoughts on another matter as well.

Our people have solid traditions of a respectful attitude and charity toward the soldiers of the Soviet Army. Soviet soldiers or, as we often say, Russian soldiers have always been a symbol of salvation to our people, and people used to give them their due when they met them on the street and on public transportation or had them as guests in their homes.

Unfortunately it must be noted that at some time during the events of recent months this positive tradition has been broken; people have for some reason taken offense.

Our people have always been generous and now, as we gather around our holiday tables without either particular eagerness or holiday spirit, we should remember that a Soviet soldier carrying out his orders is standing on the street outside. Just as our own sons and brothers and we ourselves once performed and are still performing our duty to the Motherland. Let us change our attitude toward soldiers. Let us bring back our people's positive tradition. Let us be thoughtful and attentive toward them.

In these days we must live for a single goal: to raise our ancient Armenian land from ruins and once again transform it into a flourishing land of song and dancing, laughter and joy.

We will achieve our goal if we draw even closer together and act as a united front. Party organizations and all communists should say their decisive word on this subject. Much still remains to be done if we are to improve the fighting spirit of party organizations and give each communist a greater sense of responsibility. We have faith in our communists' wisdom and strength.

We will reach our goal, for the entire Soviet people is with us.

Further Reactions to OGONEK's Uzbek 'Cotton Slave' Article

OGONEK Defends Position

18300253 Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No 50, 10-17 Dec 88 pp 32-33

[OGONEK editorial response to Uzbek papers' criticism of "Cotton Slave" article under the rubric "Retracing the Path of Statements": "Before and After the Applause"; For previous reporting on this topic, see pages 53-56 of the JPRS series SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, UPA-89-013, dated 15 February 1989]

[Text] "...There are reassuring changes in our cotton industry. A good crop has been harvested, and without the application of butifos [a pesticide]... Basically with machines. Our cotton growers are proud of this. However, they were insulted when the journal OGONEK called a cotton grower a 'cotton slave.' The cotton growers have never been and will never be slaves. And OGONEK ought to burn with a blazing flame and comfort the people with its warmth by inducing them to achieve labor exploits in the name of restructuring, not to emit smoke and poison the people with its toxic smoke. (Applause)..." (From a verbatim record of the speech by Deputy R. N. Nishanov at the Special Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 29 November 1988, Kremlin, Moscow)

On 3 and 16 November, OGONEK was attacked twice by PRAVDA VOSTOKA. Two similar paragraphs appeared in the organ of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee. The first is entitled "Glasnost in Malice?" with the subhead "Rumors About the Use of Butifos Exposed." The second paragraph, entitled "What Are You Scoffing At?" has the subhead "On the 'Cotton Slave' Paragraph in the Journal OGONEK." Both were signed "Yu. Kruzhilin, UzTAG correspondent."

The author of the paragraphs is inveighing against the articles by Aleksandr Minkin, published in OGONEK ("A Deadly Infection" in No 13, "The Consequences of the Infection" in No 33, and "The Cotton Slave" in No 43) and in the Uzbek LITERATURNAYA GAZETA ("Cotton in the Children's Aprons").

The meaning of Kruzhilin's paragraphs is clear from the headlines: everything in the articles concerning defoliation, butifos, and child labor in harvesting cotton is a lie, slander, and mockery. Another report from Kruzhilin is called "Spiritual Pesticides." It states that the OGONEK correspondent is a specialist in "the fabrication of spiritual pesticides which do not poison the body, but the soul," and that "A. Minkin and the editorial staff started a rumor poisoned by pesticide."

It is impossible to argue with Yu. Kruzhilin. His tone is disgraceful and his expressions are insulting. But we must prove to our readers that we have not been misleading them.

Let us turn our attention to the content of Kruzhilin's paragraphs that we referred to. He writes:

"...the butifos was withdrawn before the start of defoliation-87, and the many millions of OGONEK readers have been misinformed... We got in touch with Moscow resident A. Minkin by telephone. The idea of verifying his article with the help of chemical analyses did not elicit enthusiasm... So the gossip has been exhausted... The demagogues who tried to use glasnost maliciously have exposed themselves." (Yu. Kruzhilin, PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 3 November 1988). "...It is time to name the citizen. It is Aleksandr Minkin. We have already exposed his lie about the use of butifos in Uzbekistan. We wrote how he evaded verification of his articles with the help of chemical analysis..."

(Yu. Kruzhilin, PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 16 November 1988).

And this is what the Uzbek and central newspapers write.

"The preparation is dangerous to health!"—this is the verdict given by the chief state sanitary inspector of the USSR in his order No 1/87 (of 4 March 1987) banning the production and use of butifos for the defoliation of cotton plants... But let us read the telegram which went

to the cotton-growing republics on 10 August of this (1988!) year. "In connection with the extreme shortage of cotton plant defoliants, we consider it possible to use the remaining butifos...by way of exception..." This astonishing telegram was sent by A. Gulenko, chairman of the "Soyuzselkhozkhimiya" [presumably: All-Union Association for the Sale of Agricultural Chemical Preparations]. "Yes, that is my signature," Gulenko confirmed. "But we feel that we gave a recommendation, not an authorization. In the first place, a shortage of magnesium chlorate, which took the place of butifos, developed this year. Secondly, what do we do with the unused remainders of butifos? Some 7,000 tons of it are being stored today..."

("The Cotton Field Beggars for Protection," IZVESTIYA, 13 October 1988.)

It should be pointed out that all defoliants are toxic. And replacement does not remove the danger of the toxic effect.

"...Magnesium chlorate is one of the chemical compounds with low toxicity; the average lethal dose of the preparation for warm-blooded animals is 620 milligrams per kilogram. Intake of magnesium chlorate over an extended period of time may accumulate in an organism...and this should be checked temporarily by supplying water for irrigation ditches and canals... During the period of chemical treatment, it is forbidden to use water from the irrigation ditches... Magnesium chlorate is also a toxic chemical, and although it is low in toxicity, it is capable of resulting in a serious toxic effect...and the substitution of magnesium chlorate for butifos has led to unjustified complacency on the farms."

(SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA, 23 September 1988.)
And here is what "recommendations" can turn into:

"Order No 230 for the "Pakhtaarl" Sovkhoz-Tekhnikum of 3 September 1988. ...In connection with production necessity, I direct that: safety zones be strictly observed in defoliating cotton plants with butifos...and that safety zones be treated only with magnesium chlorate... The October Revolution section is to use butifos... the 1 May section is to use butifos... the 22d Party Congress section is to use butifos... the Ilich section is to use butifos... the Comintern section is to use butifos... the Dzerzhinskiy section is to use butifos... the 40th Anniversary (of what?—Editor) is to use butifos...and the Pravda section is to use butifos..."

Where is the rule? Where is the exception? What has remained of the ban?

PRAVDA VOSTOKA wrote in September:

"...attempts to use this preparation (butifos—Editor), prohibited by the chief state sanitary inspector of the USSR...were made by the managers of individual farms in Samarkand, Syr-Darya and Tashkent Oblasts, as well

as by employees of the republic's Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee]... It is even more serious in Kashka-Darya Oblast, where they exceeded the prescribed dosage of magnesium chlorate. The cotton sent from here to the Alma-Ata Cotton Combine caused eye and skin diseases among its workers (and the cotton pickers?—Editor)... They are washing the sprayers in the irrigation ditches...and the people are drinking the water from these ditches. Cattle are grazing along the banks...and the poison is getting into the animals' meat... Studies by the NII [Scientific Research Institute] of Sanitation, Hygiene and Occupational Diseases of the Uzminzdrav [UzSSR Ministry of Health] have shown: there are functional anomalies among one-fourth of the children in rayons where there has been intensive use of pesticides..." All this was reported in the interview "Defoliation Through the Eyes of a Physician" with a senior official of the Uzbek Ministry of Health.

(PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 9 September 1988).

And who was the author of the interview? Yu. Kruzhilin. Yes, the very same.

One who has ears, hears. One who has eyes...

Kruzhilin sees how they are looking after the young cotton pickers: "They boil cabbage soup, borshch and potatoes—but not often, once or twice a week. It is not the best, but it is no worse than in any home for children. They provide clothing for them here—they are fully provided for by the state. They sleep here as well..." Kruzhilin lists the forms of child care. And here he writes: "...a regulation of the Council of Ministers and an order from the republic's minister of public education [sic] has now been published: child labor with cotton has been officially prohibited for the first time. (Taken out of italics by us—Editor) The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, in seeking penalties for those who are guilty, has charged journalists with making the facts public."

So child labor has been banned. Did the UzTAG correspondent seek a penalty for those who are guilty? No, he demands that OGONEK be punished for materials on the child cotton-pickers. But why shouldn't Kruzhilin demand punishment for the author of this material? "In Uzbekistanskiy Rayon, Fergana Oblast, pupils from school No 22 and in school No 16... students in grades 5 to 10...from school Nos 1, 23 and 29... (a long list of oblasts, rayons and schools follows—Editor)... Three children had to be treated by a physician... When do they prepare their lessons? When do they rest?... Who tried to deceive the correspondent who established the fact that the children were working in the fields? Who demanded that the children lie to the journalist? They have picked a great deal, but they have lost even more: in the culture and health of entire generations...and there should be no allowances made for those who value a report today

more than the future of the people of Uzbekistan and the entire Soviet country. It is our common duty to return the children to their desks."

("Children in the Cotton," ZNAMYA DRUZHBY, 22 October 1988.)
The author was Yu. Kruzhilin. Yes, the very same.

Incidentally, this same Yu. Kruzhilin spoke about his inclinations in the journal ZHURNALIST a year ago, speaking for himself in the plural from force of habit:

"We who teach others should learn to live under the conditions of democracy ourselves. At present we don't particularly know how. We plunge from unrestrained enthusiasm to innumerable 'critical signals,' and we furiously expose this and that. When we must act, we wait for a command, but if there is none, we respectfully beg for one. Either we are insufferably offhand or we are taken in..." And an enemy would not make up such a devastating and accurate description for Kruzhilin.

OGONEK has never called the cotton-growers slaves. We were writing about the children, about the hard work by the children which even PRAVDA was concerned about in its article on Turkmenia, "The Cotton Moloch" (24 November 1988) and which can only be described as the cotton slavery that children get caught in every fall. Here is what the newspapers write about this:

"Pieces of dough and carrots were floating in the pot. This is the kind of 'concoction' ['shurpa'] that awaited the cotton-pickers. It is hard to say who there were more of on the field—children or adults... There were bunches of children of varying ages—from those in the lower grades to those in the 10th grade... They counted on picking by hand, not by machine, at the kolkhoz. And the basic work force was women and children... The entire crop is harvested by hand. There are six children, ages 10, 9, 6, 4 and 3, with a family of adults in the field. The smallest ones are picking the cotton in their bare feet... From the cradle to work, as they say."

(SOVETSKAYA BUKHARA, 23 September 1988 and 14 October 1988.)

"...They showed me a pile of telegrams from Surkhan-Darya, Kashka-Darya, and other oblasts. It turns out that there and on other farms schoolchildren are still (mid-November-Editor) picking cotton...and the children are spending weeks and even months in certain cotton fields even today..."

(Erkin Vakhidov, national poet of Uzbekistan,

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 13 November 1988.)

After exposing our correspondent as a liar and proving him guilty of cowardice and callous mockery of "the open wounds," Kruzhilin inflicts the final blow—he makes a political accusation:

"...Here Minkin and his local sponsors are at work for the sake of this—suggesting that we have no restructuring. Those for whom changes in the republic are a sharp knife stand behind us... Let them not speak to us about pluralism and glasnost in this case. These ideas must not be sullied. Glasnost is for persons who engage in an honest argument in the interests of work. The country and we (except the poisoned cotton-pickers, obviously—Editor) are pleased about the honest cotton of Uzbekistan...and the lines in OGONEK will not cross out what has been accomplished or knock us off our path. Let us work... Let us teach our children the sciences... Neither we nor our children will ever be slaves. The article 'Cotton in the Children's Aprons' and the 'Cotton Slave' piece of it—this is spit in our face..." And so on and so forth.

("What Are You Scoffing At?" PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 16 November 1988.)

Note how the image of an enemy is developed: here the mysterious "sponsors" have made their appearance. This is obvious progress. Kruzhilin resorted to more customary terminology in his previous articles. Thus, he labels Uzbek writers in various ways: "hysterical persons," "bawlers," "sanitary engineers of human souls," "itinerant snobs," "traveling demagogues," and "a small group of windbags that are looking for cheap popularity..."

The mystery is not how the libel is composed. The invective against OGONEK and the Uzbek intelligentsia does not disturb us. And the mystery is not how this writing gets into the press. It happens in the heat of an argument, and in a hurry, they print materials that are not well-thought-out.

The mystery relates to something else. The fact that such invective and slander is reprinted by practically all the Uzbek newspapers. In the Russian and Uzbek languages. Simultaneously. Thereby canceling out their previous articles at times and losing their readers' confidence.

And this mystery also prompted A. Minkin in due course to write in the article "Cotton in the Children's Aprons" about the astonishing aspect of Kruzhilin's reports—appearing appear right away in all the newspapers as if they were government decrees.

There is a mystery now in OGONEK's files.

UZTAG TELETYPE MESSAGE:

"FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE EDITORIAL STAFFS OF REPUBLIC AND OBLAST NEWSPAPERS: IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS OF DIRECTIVE ORGANS, YOU ARE TO REPRINT THE ARTICLE "GLASNOST IN MALICE?" IN CURRENT ISSUES. (PRAVDA VOSTOKA OF 3 NOVEMBER).

Just what are the nameless "directive organs"? we ask.

Who inspires you? Kruzhilin asks us. What can we say. We have received many hundreds of letters from persons who are concerned about how to rectify the situation, to provide cotton for the country without sacrificing anyone's health.

We may be engaged in a common endeavor. It is, after all, not to earn gratitude in a personal affair for zeal regardless of the truth. Uzbekistan and the health and welfare of its people are very dear to us. We think no less so than to someone who reviles OGONEK for statements in defense of Uzbek children without choosing his words.

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Uzbek Readers Demand OGONEK Apology
18300253 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
8 Dec 88 p 4

[Letter by Uzbek readers to CPSU Central Committee and the editorial staff of OGONEK: "An Insulting Position"]

[Text] The authors sent this letter to the CPSU Central Committee and the editorial staff of the journal OGONEK, and this is why.

OGONEK No 43 for October 1988 published a paragraph by Aleksandr Treplev on schoolchildren enlisted to pick cotton, with a photograph of a sullen youngster with a cotton-picker's apron.

We consider it necessary to express our opinion in this regard.

We are not opposed to criticism and censure for the negative occurrences during the period of "sharafrashidovshchina" [reference to former Uzbek leader Sharaf Rashidov] and which inflicted tremendous harm on social and economic development and the moral atmosphere in the republic.

Even if the criticism is sharp, but objective and constructive and based on the hard truth, and regardless of who it comes from, it is perceived by us as proper for those crimes committed by Rashidov, Usmankhodzhaev, and their accomplices, and it is considered to be of great assistance to communists and all the Uzbek people in the work to resolutely eliminate the serious consequences of the crimes by a small group of corrupt renegades and in consolidating the authority of the Uzbek Communist Party and its main directive body, the Central Committee, and in restoring the good name of the honest and hard-working Uzbek people in the family of fraternal people of the Soviet Union.

Thank you for such criticism, and let it appear in the central press more frequently. Honest, truthful criticism has helped and continues to help us to reinforce and multiply those positive steps in socioeconomic development and normalization of the moral situation which are being demonstrated in the republic in the struggle against the negative manifestations of the period of stagnation and the "sharafrashidovshchina" owing to the help of the CPSU Central Committee and the purposeful activity of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee with the active support of communists and all the Uzbek people.

However, the article in the journal OGONEK has nothing in common with such criticism.

The author, together with the journal's editorial staff, set the objective of insulting the Uzbek people to begin with, it seems to us. It was precisely with this objective that the paragraph was given the headline "Cotton Slave"; it painstakingly depicts, with a demand for compassion, the portrait of a boy cotton-picker who is so exhausted, we must understand, from "slave" labor that according to the author he is not in a condition to smile.

In this way, without giving specific names, by carrying a photograph of the young "slave" Damir and supplying the "Cotton Slave" headline for A. Treplev's concoction, the OGONEK editorial staff created a generalized image, voluntarily or not, of a people evilly torturing their children and depriving them of their childhood, schooling, rest, and even normal nutrition.

And this was done just when the entire country knows how difficult it is now for communists and all our people in the struggle against everything suspicious, terrible and criminal that was spread for over a quarter century by the contemptible group of criminals from the highest level of the party and state in the republic and when positive changes have finally been begun in the republic in all areas of political, economic, and public life and restructuring resulting from revolutionary processes has been begun in cotton production, which is particularly gratifying.

The Uzbek people have always considered the growing of cotton and the supply of this most valuable raw material to be their national pride and primary international responsibility to the Motherland.

And while the cotton harvest has not been fully mechanized so far and there is a need for part of the crop to be picked by hand, no one in the republic—young or old—has considered or does consider the "khashar"—everyone's participation in gathering the crop—to be disgraceful.

So more than 60,000 honored "aksakaly"—war and labor veterans—and tens of thousands of the republic's working people went out into the fields and took part in

picking the cotton voluntarily, on their own initiative, which contributed a great deal to fulfillment of the procurement plan in a short, favorable period of time—22 work days.

As far as the farms in Srednechirchikskiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast, where A. Treplev, the article's author, said that the "slave" labor of children was utilized each day from 0900 to 1800 hours, is concerned, the author, and the OGONEK editorial staff after him, misled their readers, to put it mildly; this rayon was the first in the republic to fulfill the cotton procurement plan, not only without enlisting the schoolchildren (the rayon has 69 schools), but without the help of townspeople as well. In this rayon, only 700 students of the SPTU [agricultural vocational and technical school] who are specializing in agriculture, for whom cotton picking is part of their on-the-job training, took part in picking the cotton.

Moreover, the author could not have been unaware that the republic party organization, with the support of public organizations, is now engaged in a struggle against the involvement of schoolchildren in agricultural work, not in words, but in deeds. A decree has been approved by the republic government prohibiting the use of student labor in the fields. The republic's mass media are commenting actively and in a principled manner on each violation of this decree, seeking an expeditious response from party, soviet and administrative organs and punishment for those found to be guilty.

Just what is the objective pursued by an article of this kind?

An unequivocal answer may be given to this question—the objective is to cast a slur, "not to take notice" of what has been done in the republic in the struggle against negative occurrences and to normalize the entire situation, and to suggest the idea to readers that nothing is changing in Uzbekistan.

Precisely this idea was expressed by the author when he writes that children "were in the fields under Rashidov and under Usmanhodzhayev, and they were there in April this year—has anything really changed?" The general reference to the status of agriculture in Central Asia is cosmetic in nature and essentially changes nothing.

This article is playing into the hands of those elements—both within and outside the republic—which have put into circulation such insulting definitions as "the Uzbek matter" and "the cotton matter" and continue their attempts to compromise the purifying and normalizing processes under way in the republic.

We consider such a position by the journal OGONEK to be erroneous and demand that the journal's editorial staff apologize for the article, which is an insult to the dignity of the Uzbek people.

[Signed] A. A. Alimov, recipient of a merit union pension; A. P. Alimov, chairman of the Tashkent Oblast Council of War and Labor Veterans and recipient of a merit union pension; S. S. Akhundzhanov, lieutenant general; R. G. Gulamov, chairman of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet, chairman of the republic Council of War and Labor Veterans, and recipient of a merit union pension; Khamid Gulyam, national writer of Uzbekistan; M. Ismatov, Hero of Socialist Labor and chairman of the "Kommunizm" Kolkhoz in Yangiyulskiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast; A. M. Ilyukhin, recipient of a merit union pension; B. A. Kaipov, executive secretary of the Uzbek Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans and recipient of a merit republic pension; A. A. Abzalov, Hero of Socialist Labor and recipient of a merit union pension; B. Kamalov, first secretary of the Srednechirchikskiy Rayon party committee; B. B. Mukhamedzhanov, academician of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences; A. G. Mukhtarov, chairman of the board of the UzSSR Union of Journalists and editor of the newspaper KISHLOK KHAKIKATY—SELSKAYA PRAVDA; M. Ruzmatov, Hero of Socialist Labor and chairman of the Kolkhoz imeni Akhunbabayev in Srednechirchikskiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast; P. F. Saulkin, Hero of Socialist Labor and chairman of the "40th Anniversary of October" Kolkhoz in Chinazskiy Rayon, Tashkent Oblast; G. I. Skorobogatov, first deputy chairman of the republic Council of War and Labor Veterans and recipient of a merit union pension; P. F. Shevelev, colonel general, retired; and K. N. Yashen, Hero of Socialist Labor and national writer of the Uzbek SSR.

Debate Continues Over OGONEK's Uzbek 'Cotton Slave' Article

Reader Offended by OGONEK

18300370 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
10 Jan 89 p 1

[Letter from Moscow reader T. Troitskiy, identified as a CPSU member since February 1945: "The Journal's 'Black Page'"]

[Text] I am writing to OGONEK and PRAVDA VOSTOKA at the same time. I read the black page in OGONEK's issue No 50 for 1988, where it states that this is the "Retracing the Path of Statements" section and a photograph of A. Treplev's article with the picture of an Uzbek boy—the "cotton slave"—is included again. The overall title published on the black page is "Before and After the Applause." In an upper corner is an excerpt from a speech by Deputy R. N. Nishanov at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, where he mentions the journal's insult of cotton growers.

I fully share this indignation, and I think the majority of people in Uzbekistan should be indignant if they have been called "slaves."

I have read the black pages, which are designed for effect and resemble dossiers in content, on several occasions but I have found nothing specific on the "Cotton Slave" article, and there is no response to the quite definite criticism—OGONEK has insulted people.

According to V. Dal [dictionary author], a slave is a person in bondage, a serf. V. Dal writes further: "Fur cannot be inflated, and a slave cannot be taught."

Yes, the "Cotton Slave" article is precisely about this. Look, it says, at the ignorance! The people don't know what "daily" means. The article's author determined that the children are half-starved. The school is in a barracks. The children drink water from a faucet in the yard. Then A. Treplev "gave an examination" in the fourth grade, writing "7 X 8 = ?" on the blackboard, but not even a 10th-grader could give the correct answer! "A slave cannot be taught!"

And more sarcastic "sneers." "The likable principal was sitting in the office under a portrait of Ilich, under Ilich's light bulb. On the wall was a poster with the Politburo members and candidate members. Three faces were covered with scraps of paper. I turned the scraps of paper back—Kunayev, Yeltsin, Sokolov..."

How do we understand this? First casting aspersions on Lenin's electrification program, then a reproach against the intelligentsia of Uzbekistan for their low culture?

And what is this? "They (the children) were in the fields under Rashidov and under Usmanhodzhayev, and they were there in April this year—has anything really changed?" This is clumsy slyness which lays claim to being glasnost, in my opinion.

If the editorial staff of OGONEK and author A. Treplev think that they have made a contribution to the work of improving cotton production, they are grossly mistaken.

I do not wish to "make political accusations," but the "Cotton Slave" and "Before and After the Applause" articles were written with aplomb, they lecture the Uzbeks without restraint, and very subtly stress the height of their own thinking and erudition over the local thinking. Even in the sentence "On 3 and 16 November, OGONEK was attacked twice by PRAVDA VOSTOKA," there is a hint of the question: "Who, they say, are you undertaking to fight?"

I lived and worked in a national republic for 35 years and I know how thoughtless epithets, comparisons and aphorisms hurt the national feelings of the indigenous population. The OGONEK editorial staff should remember this. After all, the "attacks" against OGONEK may also be justified, in spite of the fact that they write about them on the "black" page—in the literal and figurative sense...

I subscribe to the journal and I expect a response on its pages to the specific criticism against OGONEK at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Reader Counters With OGONEK Defense

18300370 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 Jan 89 p 4

[Letter from reader K. Dustmukhamedov, candidate of economic sciences: "Correctly Stated!"]

[Text] The words "cotton slave" appeared for the first time on the pages of the journal OGONEK in 1988. I do not think they have ever been encountered before in the Russian language. In this sense, Aleksandr Treplev made a kind of discovery.

No matter what you say, the expression is sharp, accurate, and figuratively reflects the situation in Uzbekistan, and it strikes like a sharpshooter at the single-crop system of cotton cultivation. It is a bad word, but it was stated correctly.

I am a native resident of Uzbekistan, a town dweller; I have taken part in the cotton harvest all my life, and I do not become indignant because of the expression "cotton slave." On the contrary, it has a sobering effect, it forces me to look at vital problems in a different way, and to think about improving the life of the peoples in the region. My numerous colleagues and friends have the same feelings and opinion. I am confident that millions of residents of Uzbekistan think the same way.

One need not fear the expression "cotton slave." It will not kill anyone. But the cotton kills. Most often the children and women of the rural rayons. This is common knowledge to the entire world.

Who are the ones that are afraid of the words "cotton slave" and speak at the same time on behalf of the allegedly insulted Uzbek people? The ones who stubbornly cling to the single-crop system of cotton cultivation and seek to increase cotton procurements from year to year.

One T. Troitskiy, a resident of Moscow, in the role of a "solicitous kind uncle," writes in the newspaper PRAVDA VOSTOKA on 10 January: "The majority of people in Uzbekistan should be indignant if they have been called 'slaves'."

He himself does not know how the people are reacting, and he probably writes "should" for this reason. But after all, he states that he "lived and worked for 35 years in a national republic." I want to ask T. Troitskiy which "national republic" did you work in? If in Uzbekistan, you would have stated this publicly. That's correct! If you worked in another "national republic," does that give you the right to judge the moods and expectations of the peoples of Uzbekistan? Of course not.

And generally speaking, what kind of expression is "national republic?" Doesn't this really sound insulting? Is there really a republic that is "not national?" You, T. Troitskiy, are living outside some nation, perhaps in the heavens with God? After all this do you have the right to speak as a "protector" of Uzbekistan? No! You are wrongfully playing into the hands of those who advocate the single-crop system of cotton cultivation!

I demand that the newspaper PRAVDA VOSTOKA publish my letter in full and without changes. Otherwise I will cease to believe in restructuring and to trust the newspaper's articles.

Journalist Attacks OGONEK Defender

18300370 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 Jan 89 p 4

[Response to reader's letter from Abduvakhid Khata-mov, correspondent in the PRAVDA VOSTOKA letters department: "Is It Correct?"]

[Text] I confess right away that the tone of K. Dustmukhamedov's letter grated on me. He obviously lacks respect for an opponent and another's opinion. It is common knowledge that the best tool in a dispute is the cogency of arguments, not ultimatums and attempts to humiliate a person with whom you disagree about something.

You, Comrade Dustmukhamedov, carelessly call the author of the article "The Journal's 'Black Page'" "one T. Troitskiy" and you express doubt about the authenticity of his existence—other than by explaining the assumption that he lives "in the heavens with God." I inform you that he lives in Moscow and he has a home address which is known both to us and to OGONEK, where he also sent a letter.

One may agree or not agree with T. Troitskiy's arguments. But I would like to point out that his letter was published under the "Personal Opinion" rubric. I do not think that anyone has authorized you to express an opinion on behalf of "millions of residents of Uzbekistan." I, just as many of our fellow countrymen, even judging by letters to the editorial staff, believe that the expression "cotton slave" insults the dignity of the Uzbek people. The same applies to epithets such as "the Uzbek affair," and so forth. It is another matter that cotton cultivation has become a one-crop system (everyone in Uzbekistan is aware of this) and this has led to many problems, including difficulties in providing vegetables, fruits, meat and milk. There are no grounds for speaking about attempts to conceal the critical nature of the situation that has taken shape in agriculture. Discussions about the current situation and ways to resolve problems have appeared and continue to appear in our newspaper. There is only one opinion: we must put an end to extremes in the economy. And it is impossible to understand whom you want to prove this to; it is a truth that is clear to everyone as it is.

Go to the republic's Gosplan or Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] (you are an economist, after all) and they will explain to you in a general way what the state of affairs is in agriculture and what is being done to correct it. But it is not sound to advance slogans and support questionable articles. Especially for an economist.

In reproaching T. Troitskiy, you forbid him to speak about our republic. But if we follow your logic, who gave A. Treplev the right to call people "slaves?" Troitskiy lived in the East, but Treplev just made a trip and stayed in the republic for a day or two.

You reproach T. Troitskiy for using the expression "national republic," which you consider insulting. But after all, this definition has been accepted and valid for a long time. It stems from the fact that a national feature was taken as the basis for a given state's formation, and in accordance with Lenin, the right of nations to self-determination. This term has been a permanent part of our life for a long time and is commonly used, and no one has seen anything insulting in it before you.

And your words "I demand," as well as "publish in full and without changes..." By what right? Doesn't this smack of a command method?

The editorial staff receives tens of thousands of letters, believe me. We cannot print them all. But we decided to publish your letter. After all, we were given no other choice—otherwise you would "cease to believe in restructuring." And the poor thing would vanish without you. However, you do not regard it seriously if you are prepared to sacrifice what the people have achieved though much suffering because of a letter, which was absolutely not well-reasoned, incidentally. And what are all your arguments about the people and your "concern" for them worth after this? One does not tally with the other.

And the last thing I would like to mention. Discussions and pluralism of opinions are becoming more and more firmly established in our society. But only when they can be of benefit, when they are well-reasoned, with respect for an opponent. Strangely, you somehow forgot about this in your letter, but you did not forget to point out that you are a candidate of economic sciences.

Uzbek Writers' Union Secretary Refutes Misconduct Charges

18300365a Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
7 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Mukhammad Solikh: "Resonance: Where Is the Truth and Where Is the Lie?"]

[Text] From the very first sentences of the article "The Double Standard of Honest Mukhammad" [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 15 December 1988; Mukhammad Solikh's surname spelled "Salikh"] the authors give their readers

a "grain of truth." I really did grant an interview to THE NEW YORK TIMES. What I said to its correspondent was this: "The Stalinist concept of 'cotton independence' is keeping our people completely dependent on cotton." I do not renounce that statement, and I will make it wherever I can, not just "for export." Eighty percent of all Uzbeks live in small villages and harvest "white gold." These are the people dependent on cotton to whom I was referring.

The authors depict me as being in opposition to the Turkmen, the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Jews and the Belorussians. Is that not too much for one man to bear?

I am one of those who signed the "Proposals to the 19th Party Conference," which contained a section referring to the Aral Sea, water conservation and the Karakum Canal in particular. Do Yu. Kruzhilin and I. Khisamov really think that I believe the Turkmen do not need the Aral Sea, the Turkmen who are suffering from the same predominance of cotton?

Are they really certain that the problem of Bostanlyk concerns Uzbeks but not members of all the nationalities who were born here and consider Uzbekistan their homeland and are concerned about it and about what shape the republic will be in when we leave it to our descendants?

The internationalism of Uzbeks and of all other peoples is not proven with slogans but rather by the way people live. We need not cite examples of that. There have been quite a few of them in the long time that we have lived together. But the Uzbek people have never boasted of their internationalism. For this is a trait that is to a greater or lesser extent inherent in every people. But is not so-called "national pride" ridiculous, when an Uzbek is proud merely because he is an Uzbek, and Russian merely because he is a Russian? However, there is such a thing as ethnic dignity, and it should be inviolable. And we should remember that nationalism does not arise in a void: it is virtually always manifested as an echo of chauvinism. That was what the leader of our revolution once said, the leader whom we often quote when the quote serves our purposes and whom we ignore if he speaks against us.

Yu. Kruzhilin and I. Khisamov write: "There are few people in America who are aware of the existence of Salay Madaminov." But in America they are not only not aware of my existence, but also of Uzbekistan itself. And if they do not know us "over there" then that is not our fault, but rather the fault of the Stalinist nationalities policy which dressed all peoples in a uniform, like a straitjacket without any signs of cultural differences or different ideas.

The authors of the article "The Double Standard..." write that cotton independence was and still is a requirement for our country's survival and has nothing to do

with monoculture. Yet at the same time they acknowledge the existence of a monoculture. They not only acknowledge it, they issue this appeal from their offices: increase the harvest any way you can, reduce the area sown and then there will be no more monoculture!

What is monoculture? The year 1929 was for the United States—the USSR's main supplier of cotton—a year of economic crisis. These and other, political reasons forced America to change its trade policy toward us: it stopped supplying us with cotton.

Stalin ordered Uzbekistan to increase the quantity of this expensive commodity that it produced. The area sown in cotton was expanded to 800,000 hectares. In 1930 members of the intelligentsia were taken out to pick cotton for the first time. Yet our plan was not fulfilled up through 1934. What was the matter? A committee from the All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Central Committee arrived. It determined that the peasants were hungry. Their product was being bought for a terribly low price; they were trading four tons of cotton for one ton of bread. Stalin had compassion and ordered that that no longer be done. Go ahead, give bread to the peasants and there will be enough cotton. This idea by the "father of peoples" proved effective: in 1936 Uzbekistan produced one million tons of "white gold." Since then the cult of personality has to us been the personification of the cult of cotton. Even after we stopped worshipping the man we continued to worship cotton. Not just the peasants but also our republic's workers and intelligentsia were brought up in a spirit of adoration toward this plant. For the sake of cotton gardens, pastures and tugai [river valley vegetation in arid and semi-arid areas] were uprooted, villages destroyed and people made to suffer. That is what monoculture means.

The authors accuse me of "comparing Soviet nationalities policy with Himmler's policy in the occupied territory." That is a very serious accusation. Facts are called for here.

I did actually speak "at a certain academic institution," but my speech was on demography, not "Soviet nationalities policy." Those are two different things. At the end of my speech I quoted from an article written by the Hungarian writer Dyul Feket: "In those territories (occupied Russian territory—M. S.) we should deliberately pursue a policy aimed at reducing population. With the aid of propaganda, over radio, in movies, handbills and pamphlets, etc. we must work persistently to instill in the people's minds the idea that it is bad to have large families. We should stress how much it costs to raise children, how many things could be acquired for the same amount, how much risk women are subject to in childbearing, etc." (from INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, No 5, 1988).

Feket took this from statements made by Himmler.

When I quoted him I did not add one word of commentary.

Internationalism is a dialogue between two equal sides, their mutual understanding. I have never sown hostility between people. For me friendship, respect and solidarity are all sacred to me regardless of a person's ethnic background, as they are for any decent individual.

In the article a great deal of attention is devoted to the "help" I gave my brother. Let us examine this. My brother is M. Bekzhan; he graduated from the Literary Institute imeni Gorky in Moscow, to which he was admitted upon recommendation from the Writers' Union in 1979. Despite all his power Solikh could not accept him as a member of the Writers' Union because there exists a whole membership system: the genre council, commissions... It would be simply humiliating to "push" a relative through all these barriers. As for the "dacha given to M. Bekzhan" that, too, is a lie. He received a garden plot, just as anyone who wishes to may. Furthermore, he got it long before my arrival at the Writers' Union.

The article also states that I got my brother moved to the head of the housing list. He was on the list of people in need of housing before, and he is still on it. I have not been able to do anything to help him get an apartment, and I have grown accustomed to the fact that a person must waste 10 years without a roof over his head, as was true in my case as well. I as secretary have also not been able to do this for any of my fellow writers who are also living in other people's homes.

The authors of the article write that a republic Komsomol Central Committee staff member who dared argue with me received malicious anonymous letters and equally malicious telephone calls. Yet on the day that article appeared the very Komsomol staff member in question called me to tell me that she did not tell Kruzhilin and Khisamov anything of the kind. Now you tell me: where is the truth here and where is the lie?

The analysis of the poem "Do Not Beat the Man on the Ground" is just as weak as previous "analyses." Here is an interlinear translation of that poem:

Do not beat the man on the ground. At least
he is calm...
True, he fell, yet still
he fell differently
Than you or I.
He did not die of a fish bone stuck in his throat.
It was not a fish bone that somehow got stuck,
It was the point of a lance that stuck in his throat.
He fell tangled in the banners
thrown at his feet.
(The feet of the victor.)

The poem is about a medieval tyrant. The meaning of the poem is that the tyrant was "crushed" by his victories. He fell tangled in the banners of the conquered peoples that had been thrown at his feet.

No matter how distorted the translation may be the knowledgeable Russian reader will understand the meaning of the poem, for the principal metaphors are preserved in the translation. Yet the authors, either out of ignorance of poetry or intentionally, concluded that this verse was an apology for Rashidov. The translators of SOVET UZBEKISTONI distorted the text so badly that I could scarcely believe my eyes. For their information: this is not an article, it is a poem. It was published in the book "Olis tabassum soyasi," printed in 1986 by G. Gulyam Publishers. At least show respect for your own language.

It has been claimed that this secretary of the Writers' Union wrangled an invitation to go to France by abusing his authority. Yet that invitation was issued in April 1988, at a time when I had nothing to abuse but my freedom: at the time I was not employed anywhere. I was invited to France as a poet because plans were being made to translate my poetry into French.

When Yu. Kruzhilin and I. Khisamov explain "the ecological damage caused by cotton processing" they ignore the fundamental question posed in "Proposals to the 19th Party Conference," i.e., concerning the absence of an Uzbek working class. They cannot help but know that we export 92 percent of our raw cotton and that until finished products are manufactured in our republic our standard of living will remain as low as ever.

This is not a new issue. In a resolution adopted by the 10th Party Congress it was noted that inequality was expressed primarily through the fact that these outlying areas of Russia (Turkistan in particular), which were in the position of colonies or semi-colonies, were forcibly kept in the role of suppliers of all kinds of raw materials which were then processed centrally. This was the reason for their continual weakness and prevented the emergence and especially the development of an industrial proletariat...

Kruzhilin and Khisamov suggest that Uzbekistan be compared to Afghanistan. But they know just as well as anyone else that the gas pipeline from Bukhara passes many shacks along its path. How long will we continue to take pride in the fact that we have electric light in our homes instead of candlelight? And are you, Yu. Kruzhilin and I. Khisamov, the ones to decide what we need and what we do not?

Yes, people do need clean water instead of factory smoke. They need the Aral Sea and rivers full of water instead of parched deserts; they need green meadows, pastures and gardens instead of monoculture. They need

healthy women and children, not deformed ones. The land and the Motherland which have nourished us have a right to expect our protection.

Joint Uzbek-Afghan Review of Afghan Cadet Riot in Tashkent

18300365b Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
21 Jan 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs"]

[Text] Today all rational people on earth are living according to the ideas of new political thinking and mutual understanding. Yet the "radio voices" of certain Western countries continue to interfere in the affairs of others. Recently they have also been offending Soviet Uzbekistan with their "attention."

As glasnost is a normal part of everyday socialist life, the people of our republic were fully informed about the undesirable events which occurred on 1 January of this year in the city of Tashkent as a result of the actions of hooliganistic elements among Afghan citizens studying in the republic capital. The uproar and excesses, exacerbated by alcoholic and narcotic intoxication, resulted in casualties and physical damages.

Ministry of Internal Affairs forces and the people of the city succeeded in quickly putting a stop to the disturbances and the situation was completely normalized. Effective assistance in this regard was also rendered by an Afghan government delegation headed by Mokhammad Aslam Vatanzhar, minister of internal affairs; this delegation came to Tashkent immediately on personal orders from Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan.

Through swift, efficient joint efforts the causes of the incident were uncovered, the ringleaders pinpointed and the extent of the physical damages calculated. Government and law enforcement organs launched an investigation into cases of violations of Soviet laws and the moral standards of socialist communal living; certain ones of the Afghan citizens—the ringleaders—were deported and other measures were taken to restore discipline and order.

The Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers passed a special decision regarding assistance to the families who suffered losses.

Mokhammad Khasan Shark, prime minister of the Republic of Afghanistan, sent a special message in connection with the incident. Khalil Akhmad Abavi, head of a delegation from the National Council (parliament) of the Republic of Afghanistan, who was in Tashkent on an official visit, also expressed to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium his sincere regret over the improper actions of certain Afghan students and stressed that such

things should not be repeated in the future. That is the general opinion in Kabul, he noted, because the sky of our friendship must remain unclouded.

Thus one can and should say that the case is closed on this incident. We must look ahead and think about the future, for now we are entering the most serious period in the development of the Afghan situation, with the most important question being answered: will long-awaited peace finally come to suffering Afghanistan? Under these circumstances it would be wrong to allow the actions of irresponsible elements and the passions inflamed around those actions by the "voices" to succeed in undermining the revolutionary foundations of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan, between the peoples of the socialist countries and the people of Afghanistan.

In the current situation it is at the very least dishonest for those who wish us ill to pour oil on the fire as they have been doing while at the same time presuming to lecture us about interethnic relations in Uzbekistan. In Uzbekistan live and work people of great civic conscience, internationalists in the best sense of the word. In the present circumstances they regard interpretation of their lives, restructuring, history and the future as their principal task. It was here that the noble concept of "the spirit of Tashkent" was born—a spirit of friendship and peace, tolerance and charity. We know very well who is who. We are going to solve our problems calmly, in a businesslike, Leninist fashion; we are going to stand up for restructuring, truth and peace.

Editors' Open Letter Demands Minvodkhoz Action on Ecological Questions

18300295a Moscow NEDEL'YA in Russian
No 2, 9-15 Jan 89 p 3

[Open letter by editorial staff of NEDEL'YA: "An Open Letter to USSR Minister of Land Reclamation and Water Resources Comrade N.F. Vasilyev"]

[Text] Dear Nikolay Fedorovich!

NEDEL'YA takes into account that an open letter to a minister of the USSR is an extreme journalistic measure that must be used very rarely. We are convinced that now is just such an instance.

Four times in the last year we have printed most detailed articles on the activities of Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources] complete with computations, statistics and blatant facts.

The first was the article "Ministerial Power" by UN expert on ecological problems and professor Doctor of Economic Sciences M.Ya. Lemeshev (No 38), which declared that "USSR Minvudkhoz asserts that its resolution (the Food Program—Ed.) is impossible without an expansion of irrigated and drained land. And they are spending tens of millions of rubles on this, making the soil saline and swampy and destroying its fertility." And more: "What necessity other than the Minvudkhoz 'I' and the thirst for glory of some executives has led to the tragedy of the Aral? And everything is not finished with the 'transfer of rivers' either. Minvudkhoz has simply transferred its armada of equipment and people to the south, where it is digging the Volga—Chogray and Volga—Don-2 canals and preparing new nature-de-destroying actions."

Your ministry, Nikolay Fedorovich, has nothing to say, but on the other hand, we were answered by one of the executives of USSR Gosplan, P.A. Paskar, a deputy chairman and a man evidently not as busy as you are. He found the time to answer us, and he supported the NEDELYA feature, writing that "The difficult ecological situation in a number of regions of the country has with entirely good grounds become the subject of apprehension of the general public and the mass media." And he reported the concrete steps being taken by Gosplan, including bringing areas of damaged land back to technological conformity by the year 2005.

The second feature was the accusatory photo report "Groan of the Earth" (No 41) by TASS photo-correspondents L. Chuyko and Yu. Nabatova. It was in preparation for about four months, and detailed discussions were held with the residents of the villages and towns located in the construction zone of the Volga—Don-2 Canal as well as with construction workers and USSR Gosplan experts. "The Volga will wither without fail with the start-up of the second Volga—Don canal," the journalists wrote. "And now the question of the turnaround of some of the sewage of northern and Siberian rivers is worming its way up from under the prohibitory papers as an urgent matter of the utmost necessity. Naturally, with all of its consequences."

The third was the article of special TASS photo-correspondents called "Plundering in the Steppes" (No 45). The report was being prepared for almost six months. A multitude of meetings and discussions were held with the workers of seven rural rayons of Saratov Oblast, managers of farms, local soviet and party organs, land-reclamation workers, planners, economists and scientists. The authors were attempting to trace the causes for which the essential business of land reclamation in the Transvolga region has led to the write-off of 70,000-plus hectares of land, unrestrained growth in the cost of agricultural output in irrigated cultivation and many millions worth of "work in progress."

Our fourth article called upon you directly to answer: "Minvudkhoz is Still Silent" (No 46). It moreover cited rough computations and calculations, made not by journalists—of whom other ministries like to say scornfully

that "These are not specialists, they are dilettantes, they do not understand all the subtleties..."—but by workers of the USSR State Statistical Committee. And the rough computations were very alarming: water losses due to filtration and evaporation in transport, violations of the irrigation regimen and the poor quality of planning and construction totaled 21 percent of the water drawn in 1987. "This is enough to inundate 4 million hectares of land, which would permit additional cultivational output of 3.4 billion rubles!" "One out of five irrigated hectares is salinated, and such areas have increased by 65 percent compared to 1980."

And again you did not find an opportunity to reply, Nikolay Fedorovich!

And again the deputy chairman of USSR Gosplan, Petr Anreyevich Paskar, supported NEDELYA. In his reply, published in our issue No 1 of 1989, he says in particular that "USSR Gosplan shares the opinion of the authors of these features on the urgent necessity of changing approaches to land reclamation and conducting it with a regard for the real needs of the farms." And next there follows a listing of the concrete steps being taken by USSR Gosplan once again.

But Minvudkhoz is silent again! What is happening, Nikolay Fedorovich? There is a long-accepted practice in the country and in party practice: ministries and departments answer critical features no later than in a month. About four months have passed since the first of our features on the activity of the land-reclamation workers, and almost two months since the fourth. But not a word from your ministry. And that is today, during a period of restructuring, when the voice of the public is acquiring greater weight and effective force.

How can this be in agreement with the repeated directives of the CPSU Central Committee to raise the effectiveness of press features? Or the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference "On Glasnost"?

Millions of readers are waiting for you: either acknowledge the errors that have been committed and report what the ministry you head is undertaking to restructure its work, or refute the first, the second, the third and the fourth of our features with facts in hand.

Remember that we are not enemies of land reclamation—as our opponents sometimes attempt to present the matter—but we are in favor of seeing that it is conducted more sensibly, scientifically and economically, not ruining the country and nature but enriching them, helping to solve the most acute food problem more quickly.

The position of the NEDELYA and TASS journalists coincides with the positions of many well-known Soviet scientists that have been expressed in the pages of the press.

Academician B. Laskorin, in issue No 4 of 1988 of the theoretical and political journal *KOMMUNIST* of the CPSU Central Committee, wrote: "One cannot seriously discuss the utilization of water resources if we are thinking about how to realize a cherished number instead of thinking about national-economic efficiency and the welfare of the country. The task consists not of satisfying insatiable departmental and provincial appetites, but rather in finally solving the food problem and creating a healthy living environment for people under the conditions of cost accounting."

In the same issue, VASKhNIL [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V.I. Lenin] Academician V. Tikhonov, presenting convincing data (for example, that a kilogram of commodity meat obtained using feed cultivated on reclaimed land costs 16 rubles, and that the time period for recouping the cost of irrigation systems using concrete rather than departmental calculations exceeds 100 years), said of the land-reclamation workers: "They plan for themselves where it would be most convenient to introduce new land (ignoring therein the concerns of geologists and soil scientists and doing practically no soil research)... The economic system is constructed in such a way that the users have no practical opportunity of monitoring the work of Minvodkhoz."

And in issue No 13 of *KOMMUNIST*, one may become acquainted with the following opinion: "The level of return from irrigated lands is too low, while proportionate expenditures on the introduction of one hectare in irrigation are growing systematically. Whereas they totaled 5,000-6,000 rubles per hectare 10-15 years ago, today they have reached 10,000-12,000 and are trending toward further growth" (Doctor of Economic Sciences Professor F. Kulintsov).

Today all of us and every labor collective are deeply alarmed by our enormous budget deficit, about which the government has told the people directly. And everyone is searching for how to reduce that deficit, be it by a thousand rubles, ten thousand, a hundred thousand or a million.

The workers of TASS who prepared all four sets of materials and the hundreds of theoreticians and practitioners with whom they spoke are firmly convinced that billions, not millions, of the people's rubles could be saved every year in land-reclamation operations without any detriment to agriculture or indigenous nature, on the contrary bringing them more benefit.

And so, Nikolay Fedorovich, we are awaiting an answer as before along with the main thing—deeds. If everything goes on the same way as before, please forgive us—we will fight even more irreconcilably! The way our times demand.

UkSSR: Disagreement Over Ecological Safety of Proposed USSR-Swiss Chemical Plant

18300295b Moscow TRUD in Russian 31 Jan 89 p 2

[Unattributed article under the rubric "Follow-Up": "The Crimea Asks for Help"]

[Text] The newspaper *TRUD* twice last year (June 24 and September 27) wrote about the fact that chemical enterprises in the Crimea pose a serious ecological threat to this all-union health spa. The discussion concerned in particular the fact that USSR Minkhimprom [Ministry of the Chemical Industry] intends to create the Tavriya joint Soviet-Swiss enterprise for the production of colored sulfurous dyes in Perekop.

In reply, managerial workers of the ministry have sent assurances that the enterprise poses no threat of ecological danger to the Crimea whatsoever.

Deputy Chief of the Main Administration for Dyes of the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry T. Trdatyan:

"...The progressive technology possessed by the Sandoz firm, as well as the equipment and the means of process automation and mechanization that they will supply, will make it possible to create ecologically clean production (there will be practically no discharges into the atmosphere and waste water will be fully treated using local and general plant treatment facilities). This production thus poses no danger to the ecology of the northern Crimea."

Deputy Minister of the USSR Chemical Industry V. Romanov:

"The further directions of the work of chemical enterprises in the realm of protecting the environment were defined by the USSR Council of Ministers decree "Halting the Construction of New Industrial Enterprises and the Expansion of Existing Ones on the Territory of Crimea Oblast," which envisages, in particular... the creation of capacity for the production of colored sulfurous dyes at the joint Soviet-Swiss Tavriya enterprise in place of capacity at the Sivashskoye Aniline Dye Plant..."

TRUD features on this topic have stated that a serious accident occurred at an enterprise of Sandoz in 1986, as a result of which an enormous scandal broke out in West Germany. For some reason Deputy Minister V. Romanov did not feel it necessary even to "take note" of that in his official reply to the editors. But here is how the West German press and the public in the FRG commented on it.

TRUD correspondent A. Soloshenko in Bonn reports:

When the gigantic poisonous cloud over the environs of Basel dissipated on 1 Nov 86, the illusion of the safety and ecological cleanliness of the production of a Swiss

chemical concern (Sandoz) located here dissipated once and for all along with it. About 30 tons of highly toxic substances got into the Rhine as the result of a fire at warehouses of that firm. Everything living in the upper reaches of the river perished. It will take at least 10 years in the best case to rehabilitate the damage inflicted on the flora and fauna here, according to the opinions of experts.

The Sandoz firm, renowned before the catastrophe as an "internationally recognized bearer of technological innovations," lost 20 percent of its stock value and was forced to reduce the output of certain types of products by 60 percent. Basel proved to have a reputation equaling that of Bhopal and Seveso.

It could be said that there are no guarantees against chance, but here is what was said after this tragic event by an official representative of the Green Party in the West German Bundestag, H. Henes, referring to "confidential documents" obtained from a Zurich insurance company: Sandoz had long adhered to "scandalous practices" on an ecological plane. As early as 1981, agents of the insurance company warned the firm about serious shortcomings in ensuring production safety, and they refused to write insurance policies until their elimination. The concern, however, refused to fulfill their requirements and instead concluded an agreement with the West German insurance company of Gerling.

The Green Party statement also says that one cannot handle poisonous substances anywhere in the world the way they are handled by the Basel concern. It is time to speak openly and honestly about the constant risk that such types of chemical production are associated: Sandoz could be repeated anywhere and at any time...

These conclusions may seem little convincing to the executives of the ministry. We thus cite another authoritative opinion that was expressed at the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] Plenum by V. Romanenko, director of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Hydrobiology:

A sharp struggle by public opinion has been underway in the republic for several months against the placement of a joint chemical venture with a Swiss firm in the Crimea. Many do not know that this firm—Sandoz—has compromised itself in poisoning everything living in the Rhine.

This incident was being specially considered at an international conference I attended. A resolution was submitted there not to give this firm a place anywhere in Europe. And now Minkhimprom has extended an embrace to it and opened up the possibility of building a chemical enterprise in our nation's health spa—the Crimea.

Today—when ministries and enterprises have obtained the right to direct access to contacts with foreign firms—public organizations and trade unions, which are called upon to defend the interests of the people and their health, are obliged to investigate strictly what partners are being selected by departments and where production is being located...

It is criminal to make a sacrifice of the pearls of nature in our country and to risk the health of present and future generations of Soviet people for the sake of illusory economic gains!

Observers Fear Volga-Chogray Canal Will Harm Environment

Damage to Environment

18240048 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
5 Feb 89 p 2

[Article by V. Vinogradov, professor, director of the aerospace research methods group of the Soviet "Man and the Biosphere" Committee: "For the Good? No, to the Detriment! That is the Opinion of a Scientist Concerning the Volga-Chogray Canal. Another Variant is Proposed"]

[Text] If the Volga-Chogray Canal with its large 350-kilometer river crosses the northern and central parts of the Kalmyk ASSR, what will it bring with it?

The canal's construction zone itself, its reservoirs, collectors, normative right of way zones and spillway lakes will swallow up tens of thousands of hectares of pastures. But this is just a one-time loss during building. What will happen in 7-10 years? The answer is provided by the example of the Sarpinskaya, Chernozemelskaya and Kaspiyskaya irrigation systems previously developed in the Kalmyk ASSR by RSFSR Minvodkhoz [Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources]. They are expecting the rise of ground waters, their mineralization, soil salination and in the future—the development of deserts on large land masses...

I fully support the conclusion of those scientists who on the basis of a thorough analysis determined that the building of the canal is economically ineffective, technically unfounded, ecologically harmful and socially damaging.

As an alternative to this plan the workers of the Institute of Evolutionary Morphology and Ecology of Animals of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Feed Institute of USSR Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee], VASKhNIL's [All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni V. I. Lenin] Institute of Agricultural and Forest Reclamation and the Yuzhgiprozem Institute of RSRSSR Gosagroprom have proposed the concept of the agricultural ameliorative assimilation of the Kalmyk ASSR. At its basis is a general scheme for the struggle

against the development of deserts on the Chernyye lands and the Kizlyarskiye pastures developed in 1986 and still not financed by RSFSR Gosagroprom.

As long-term research has shown, the optimal number of sheep in the Kalmyk ASSR should not exceed 2 million right now. Moreover, with the proper approach, a decrease in the size of the herd does not decrease production output. In 1913, 0.9 million sheep yielded over 25 kilograms of meat each, but in 1985, 3.7 million sheep yielded only 8-10 kilograms each. It is time to understand that not always by far does the increase in the size of the herd result in an increase in total production!

It is time to more decisively reexamine the herd that is unaccounted for and to halt the pasturing of livestock from other republics and krais in the Kalmyk ASSR. Selective aerial photographs and investigations by the republic's committee of people's control convince us of this.

Finally, life demands the introduction of sectional pasture rotation and the fencing in of pastures. Right now pasturing takes place wherever something is growing, arbitrarily. In a desert you will not find the boundaries of pasture lands. Scientifically-based pasture rotation is capable of bringing, at least in the low-lying part of the Kalmyk ASSR, the restoration of pastures within 3-5 years. And these are not just words. In the photos from space of the Sudan and Mali—places where pastures were fenced and where pasture rotation was introduced—lands were reestablished within 2-6 years and yielded more feed than the previous area that had been twice as large. It is true that an attempt has already been made to fence pastures in the Kalmyk ASSR, but these fences have been torn down by offenders and by owners of herds that have not been accounted for.

Of course we need measures for the radical and surface reclamation of pastures and for agricultural amelioration. Such measures are all relatively inexpensive and do not require irrigation; their methodology is well-developed and their ecological and economic effectiveness is high. Of course this is only true if the work is done in a qualified manner.

In the past in the Kalmyk ASSR sufficient amounts of hay were produced from drowned river valleys; some hay was even sold to neighboring regions. Today haylands have been ruined everywhere as a result of hydromelioration, but they can be reestablished with the help of a complex of well-known agrotechnical measures. In addition to natural haylands, for emergency forage reserves feed produced within existing irrigation-flooding systems is adequate, if however so-called "initiative" irrigation, which only results in the wasting of water and secondary soil salination, is not tolerated. Moreover, reserves of existing irrigation systems in the Kalmyk ASSR have not been utilized because their construction has not been completed. Instead of laying a new canal, it

is time that RSFSR Minvodkhov complete its old long-term construction projects and qualitatively improve many others. This is where the attention of the reclamation worker should be focused!

A word about the water supply for pastures. Isn't it time to reestablish the use of the perched water table lens available in almost all of the Kalmyk ASSR? For hundreds of years these lenses provided local livestock with water. In addition, reserves of fresh ground water have now been explored in Yergenia and not far from the border of the Kalmyk ASSR; diversion of this water is technically uncomplicated. Finally, it is essential to lay a group pipeline which will take Volga water in tenfold smaller quantities, and construction will be incomparably less expensive than that for a canal. Let us not forget that water from an open canal is still unsuitable for drinking—it is dirty, salinated and not harmless.

The implementation of the project involving the land improvement struggle against the development of deserts will cost about 700 million rubles—several times less than hydraulic construction. Incidentally, the cost of constructing the Volga-Chogray Canal is snowballing with every new consultation. At the end of the year before last it tentatively cost 1.9 billion, after consultation with the USSR Academy of Sciences and VASKhNIL—2.6 billion rubles, and after the initial consultation with USSR Gosplan the cost has already reached 3.8 billion rubles. The time for repayment of itself is shorter—3-5 years—for the land improvement measures whereas the repayment of the hydraulic construction project, according to the predictions of the planners themselves, is 11 years, and according to the calculations of the feed institute's workers—over 25 years. In 7-10 years extensive secondary salination of the soil will begin and the reconstruction of the hydraulic reclamation system will be required. Again enormous expenditures will be necessary...

The reestablishment of natural plants of the soil will doubtless achieve an improvement in the ecological conditions in the Kalmyk ASSR, will result in anchoring moving sands, in a decrease in salinated soils, in a decrease in sandstorms, in a decrease in the level of salinated ground waters, in a drop in extreme atmospheric temperatures and as a result in an improvement in man's living conditions. This cannot be forgotten! Kalmyk people are natural livestock farmers; for centuries they have lived in harmony with nature in the Caspian area. The land improvement concept of reestablishing pastures in the Kalmyk ASSR is more effective in all ways than the concept of hydraulic engineering construction. This is why it would be expedient to stop the work to build the Volga-Chogray Canal and to transfer the allocations to the RSFSR Minvodkhov earmarked for this work to RSFSR Agroprom for the implementation of the alternative project of restoring Kalmyk pastures. Not only is the Volga-Chogray Canal not needed, it is also harmful because it will bring about great losses

of natural feed lands, a sharp deterioration in the ecological situation, and the deflection of efforts and means from truly needed and effective plans of Kalmyk agricultural and social development. The canal will bring harm to Stavropol by gradually facilitating the degradation of irrigated chernozems, the loss of their structure and fertility and their salination and solonchaks-formation.

Canal-Related Disruptions

18240048b Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
11 Feb 89 p 1

[Article by V. Nikolayev, Kalmyk ASSR: "The Canal—Affecting Whose Future?"]

[Text] Society is still heatedly discussing whether the Volga-Chogray Canal should exist but it already stretches a good 50 kilometers through the Kalmyk ASSR. Those who have already seen this waterway not far away from the rayon center of Yashkul, let us say, can probably judge it from the point of view of a return already today without waiting for the distant future.

This is a Martian-like canal judging by the lifelessness around it! Its width including embankments is over 200 meters. Last fall it was already full of water, but I have not heard the song of birds yet, or even the croaking of frogs. I descended along the slope covered by white frost, cupped some water in my hands and brought it to my mouth...It was bitterly salty! I understood that it was not frost that had made the embankment silvery but the salt that had come to the surface. I remembered the words of a well-known song, "The birds don't sing here; the trees don't grow."

I must confess that we conducted the following frivolous "experiment" here. We found a healthy frog somewhere else and set it free in the canal. Live and multiply. Alas, a few minutes later it washed ashore belly up.

Forgive us, frog. I would like to believe that you will be the only sacrifice brought to His Majesty the grandiose project.

And this water is going to be used to water future crops? Isn't it symbolic that the place where the canal begins its trip from the shores of the Volga into the depths of the Kalmyk steppe is called the Solenoye [salty] Water-Meadow?

Creating irrigated plots on solonchak soil means receiving an immediate advantage, but then being left with a broken carriage. The basements of Yashkul houses are already flooded with salty water; a new palace of culture and party raykom are standing in the water. No, no, these are not the side effects of the Volga-Chogray Canal, this has "been achieved" by the relatively small Chernozemelskiy Canal.

...Here it is, the new channel. The moving excavator is humming deeply. The shovel holds six cubes, the crane arm is 45 meters long. Above the din of the work you can hear Vysotskiy: "We are tearing to pieces the belly of mother earth..."

We become acquainted with the crew. There are six members, all from Moscow. They have been in the Kalmyk ASSR for 2 years and in this area—4 months. The head of the crew is D. D. Ilin; two of his sons—Viktor and Nikolay—are with him.

"The volume of work is enormous," says Dmitriy Danilovich. "As for people's worries about this construction, that is not our concern; we are earning our money honestly. Yes, ground waters have already appeared. Perhaps the bottom should be shallower and the embankment higher. Who knows..."

"Will Mother Volga have enough water to feed the canal?"

"I do not think so. After all, the plan to divert the northern rivers has not been cancelled, just suspended..."

On whose land this waterway will pass, we know. Whose future will it involve?

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